Including the Good and the Bad in Afghan Peace Talks

It is critical that we use this opportunity wisely and hold the members of the High Peace Council accountable to their commitment to peace.
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On October 8, 2010, the ninth anniversary of the US intervention in Afghanistan, the High Peace Council convened its inaugural meeting. No one was surprised that the vast majority of the familiar faces appointed by President Karzai are affiliated with armed groups, with many accused of egregious human rights abuses. The irony of a peace council dominated by warlords wasn't lost on observers who see this figurehead body as representative of the impunity that has become endemic in Afghanistan. Despite the obvious challenges that these selections present, the High Peace Council could serve as a conduit to co-opt potential spoilers into a peace process.

The mandate of the High Peace Council is to set national and regional policy for the peace process, as well as building confidence with the leaders of insurgency groups. What is President Karzai's motivation in appointing council members who clearly lack legitimacy among the international community, civil society, and the general Afghan population? Further, how can the High Peace Council engage the Taliban in high-level talks when the Taliban fought against and came to power as a result of the incredible corruption and crime committed by members of this council? The answer is that, in Afghanistan, no one expects much from the High Peace Council. This is purely a symbolic body, a mere formality in the reconciliation process, but a political necessity nonetheless. Excluding these very powerful actors would leave too many loose cannons that could disrupt Afghanistan's prospects for peace.

What is important symbolically is the buy-in of the members. Like it or not, these are the people who control Afghanistan. They have survived the volatile environment of the region and have remained active in the upper echelons of society by exerting control over their own factions, who are involved in the drug and arms trades and maintain ties to ethnic militias. This is the power structure that has been endorsed by the Karzai administration and empowered by our own US policies.

Quite the opposite of what one might initially think, to pursue a reconciliation strategy without the blessing of this group would doom the process before it ever began. If these actors are excluded and denied a constructive role to play in the peace process, they will become spoilers, actively working against the last hopes for a durable peace. More importantly, their participation sends a signal to their constituencies that the time is ripe for political negotiations about their country's future. At this critical time in the war, the Afghan government needs all of the support it can get. Karzai's increasingly unpopular administration is battling a multitude of insurgencies, many of which receive material support to carry on proxy wars between India-Pakistan and US-Iran.

It is critical that we use this opportunity wisely and hold the members of the High Peace Council accountable to their commitment to peace. Holding them to their word will ensure that their constituencies also back the potential peace agreement and will open up space to focus on the more difficult aspect of this peace process, the actual negotiations that will have to resolve grievances against the current government and the presence of international troops.

While realizing the necessity of including characters that we may view as unsavory, it is equally important to ensure that more credible representatives are not excluded or marginalized where it really matters. The real power lies with those sitting at the negotiating table, as they will ultimately determine the terms and outcomes of any political agreement. The international community should therefore exert pressure on the Afghan government to include local civil society and human rights groups, who fear that progress made in the past several years will be negotiated away, as well as opposition figures such as Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, in the negotiations. This parallel process will serve the purpose of including all of the relevant parties, while ensuring that the more substantive track of the two will be a more inclusive process.

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