Many conservatives have developed a dangerous case of the Iraq Syndrome. Whereas the Vietnam Syndrome affected mostly people on the left and gave them an overly pessimistic view of American power, the Iraq Syndrome is equally dangerous in reducing most of America's foreign policy problems to Iraq.
The latest example of the "Iraq syndrome" at work is a bizarre response to me by RedState.com's Soren Dayton. Dayton is, by the way, a very thoughtful and reasonable commentator. But in response to some skepticism I voiced about recent claims that we are making progress in the "war on terror" he sought to take me to task for failing to recognize progress in Iraq.
Simply. Iraq is not the same as the "war on terror." Al Qaeda attacked our embassies in East Africa. Al Qaeda attacked the Cole. Al Qaeda attacked us on 9/11. Al Qaeda was behind the devastating attacks in Bali, Madrid, and London. And al Qaeda is alive and well in the northwest border areas of Pakistan. They have a powerful and effective media apparatus. And they have access to plenty of funds due thanks to drug money.
Nothing that happens in Iraq -- not eliminating al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), not marginalizing Moqtada al-Sadr, not establishing permanent bases -- will eliminate the al Qaeda threat worldwide. The whole concept of Iraq as the central front in the war on terror would be laughable if it were not so incredibly dangerous.
I'd like to make three points in response to Dayton.
First, I don't know anyone who denies that there has been a lot of progress in Iraq. I personally believe that we are finally getting to the point of undoing some of the harm the Iraq war has done to American foreign policy. But then again, I never thought we had lost in Iraq. I have argued for years that the issue with Iraq is that we won all we were ever going to win a long time ago. Saddam is dead, Iraq is disarmed, the sanctions regime was lifted, and Iraqis held elections. Those are important accomplishments. For the life of me, I can't see the American interest in ensuring that Nouri al-Maliki manages to eliminate all rivals for power domestically. How the U.S. benefits from helping Maliki defeat Sadr is simply beyond me. The issue with Iraq is not victory vs. defeat. It is costs vs. benefits. Though we accomplished a lot in Iraq, I now feel that the war as a whole was not worth the costs, although I can see the alternative argument as well. Looking forward though, I simply cannot fathom how anyone can argue that getting involved in a domestic power struggle in Iraq is possibly a worthwhile endeavor. The costs in terms of lives and treasure are simply too high.
Second, until conservatives come to grips with the reality that our problems with terrorism are paradoxically a function of both perceived vulnerability AND perceived strength, they will never be able to conceive of a workable strategy. The jihadists had the guts to attack us because they thought they could get away with it. But they were motived to attack us in the first place because they think we are aggressive meddlers. Demonstrating resolve and a willing to use force makes us a less appealling target, but it also makes us a more legitimate one by reinforcing the jihadist narrative which claims the U.S. is an aggressive imperial power. That's the paradox in Iraq. The war sends two messages to our enemies, one helpful, one decidedly not. Balancing the two is hard. It is made even harder when news comes out that we want a larger and more active presence than our Iraqi allies themselves. We can't win this struggle if it looks like we are imposing ourselves into the region rather than simply responding to requests from friends. And frankly, even responding to requests from friends when those friends are authoritarian or narrowly sectarian elites is also problematic.
Third, there is no mechanism by which the Iraq war will have a measurable impact in the "war on terror." Even if Iraq becomes a fully functional pro-American democracy, as long as people like bin Laden have safe havens, access to money, and their own fanaticism to motivate them, they will remain a major threat. The Iraq Syndrome here is most misleading. The answer to the challenge of Islamist terror is not going to be found in Iraq.
For too long, the Bush administration has treated the "war on terror" as a political cudgel rather than a policy challenge. And for too long, we have allowed the administration to play a shell game with this serious threat. The men who attacked us on 9/11 remain at large and continue to lead a dangerous movement that daily plots our demise. Unfortunately, rather than focus directly on this threat, the Bush administration has used it to scare Americans into supporting its policies on Iraq, Iran, and domestically on civil liberties. Worse, they have used the threat in a nakedly political manner, ratcheting up fears when convenient and soft-pedaling them when useful. This permanent campaign mentality -- of doing whatever it takes to win politically at all times -- has distracted the country and made us less safe. Unfortunately, we are now at the point where pointing out this obvious fact comes across as a political attack by "a man of the left" as Soren refers to me.