Bill Scher is the author of the new book, Wait! Don't Move To Canada! -- A Stay-and-Fight Strategy To Win Back America
The National Intelligence Estimate on trends in global terrorism is so damning to the Right's entire foreign policy vision, they have no choice but to pushback on it now that is has surfaced.
But they are so caught off-guard, they are flailing about with contradictory messages.
Should they dismiss the report as a political hit job from that anti-American intelligence community? Or should they spin the report as supporting a stay-the-course strategy in Iraq?
The Weekly Standard attacked the intelligence analysts who wrote the report.
While PowerLine and RedState insisted that the report argues against any sort of troop withdrawal from Iraq.
And as Sidney Blumenthal, author of the critically important How Bush Rules, notes in Salon, Dubya has managed to contradict himself, supporting and dismissing the report.
The stay-the-course argument hinges upon the first and last sentences of this section of the NIE:
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the
struggle elsewhere.The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.
The Right's simplistic argument follows: we must continue to occupy Iraq or else the jihadists will succeed and we will fail.
Now, the NIE doesn't give an explicit opinion whether or not a stay-the-course Iraq strategy will bring about a jihadist failure.
But the following paragraphs in the NIE give weight to an alternative approach: that a fundamental shift in our foreign policy, away from permanent occupation of the Arab/Muslim word, is needed:
We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.
Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims -- all of which jihadists exploit. ...
The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution -- an ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world -- is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade. ...
Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders. If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.
Conservatives will still argue that the above just means we must push forth with democracy in Iraq.
But if there was real progress for democracy in Iraq, why would the NIE be so sour on the situation?
As I lay out in my book, Wait! Don't Move To Canada!, the problem with conservative foreign policy is not its pro-democracy rhetoric.
It's that the rhetoric is wholly insincere. It's that you don't get democracies that people find credible when they are imposed on them at gunpoint and shaped by the occupying force.
The book then makes the case for a liberal foreign policy vision, based on promoting credible democracy and eradicating poverty.
The four ways we Americans can help bring about legitimate, homegrown democracy -- in brief -- are:
None of that negates the need to use our military to capture or kill Al Qaeda members, but if we want to stop recruitment of future terrorists, you need more than just brute force (as even George W. Bush has said).
Further, when we use our military for permanent occupation in Arab/Muslim countries, that feeds all the resentments and anxieties that the NIE says jihadists exploit.
Finally, if our democracy efforts are combined with a real, long-term effort to fight poverty abroad, we will mitigate the "destabilizing transitions" that create opportunities for terrorists that the NIE warns about.
Conservatives will continue to distort the choice in front of us as between stay-the-course and cut-and-run.
When in fact, we can replace the strategy of permanent occupation in Iraq and beyond, with a global strategy of strict military focus on Al Qaeda, promotion of credible democracy and eradicating poverty.
From what I (and others) see in the NIE, such a shift is imperative.
Cross-posted at LiberalOasis