There is a symmetry between the mistakes the Bush Administration made in Iraq and the mistakes of Israeli military strategy in Lebanon. I would emphasize right up front, that the concerns that I and others have raised from the start of this operation are now widely and increasingly held in Israeli intelligence and military circles.
Because it is sensitive, to restate my personal opinion: I supported military action to remove the imminent threat of Hezbollah attacks; I supported the Israeli right to do it, and the decision to do it. However, I opposed the overreliance on aerial power and heavy bombardment which are not the effective manner of conducting counter-insurgency and asymmetrical warfare, because they result in a heavy toll in world opinion, they cause too many preventable civilian casualties without a correspondingly appropriate gain in military advantage.
What I would have done, and advocated very early in this conflict, was that instead of the tactics I predicted would be ineffective, the Israelis should have given 72 hours notice to civilians in Southern Lebanon, then moved in with special forces supplemented with a far larger ground force, to clean out a 10-20 mile zone of safety followed by a multinational force. So, while I opposed the invasion of Iraq per se, from the point of view of someone generally aligned with a centrist Sam Nunn view of defense, I supported the Israeli move against Hezbollah but strongly dissented from the way it was executed.
The mistakes of the Bush Administration in Iraq, and the mistake of the Olmert strategy in Lebanon, result from the fundamentally flawed neoconservative vision of when and how to wage war.
They both proceeded, without regard to the opinion of the democratic world and without regard to the opinion of the people affected by the conflict. They both proceeded without a clear strategy to win; they both proceeded with the combination of "shock and awe" bombing without adequate numbers of troops for the mission. They both indulged an "occupation mentality" that contradicts the movement of history, the logic of counter-insurgency, and the need for policy to be supported and sustained.
There is now an arc of chaos and civil war from Afghanistan, which has deteriorated; through Iraq, which has deteriorated to dangerous levels; to the West Bank and the broader Palestinian-Israeli issues, which have been neglected by obsession with Iraq and intransigence without serious diplomacy for the first time in generations; to Lebanon, who's cedar revolution for democracy is now threatened by devastation to the Lebanese infrastructure, the alienation of the Lebanese people, and the possible return to factional chaos; through Somalia, which is now almost completely neglected today and is a breeding ground and training camp for terrorists.
We have seen the result of the neoconservative narrative executed with political brilliance and catastrophic misjudgment; and the result is the neoconservative nightmare that is now imposed on all of us, on people through the region, only hurting the hopes for freedom and democracy and helping those recruiting new terrorists who thrive on mistakes such as these.
What I have tried to contribute, as have others, is an alternative narrative that combines these elements:
1. The support of the use of force when necessary; greater use of special forces and more mobile and politically savvy branches of the service, and the reliance on the Powell Doctrine. In the Powell Doctrine, when force is necessary, we do not fight wars on the cheap with promises of easy victory and insufficient force. We do what is necessary, with the force size that is necessary, preferably with strong allied troop and financial contributions following the model of Bush I in Iraq 1.
2. A panoramic diplomacy from day one, putting the full force and power of American diplomacy behind the broad search for solution to the issues that most deeply define the conflict. We have not had any substantive commitment to fundamental diplomacy from the Bush Administration since the President assumed office; nor have we had any serious and meaningful contribution from Democratic leaders or the Democratic national security establishment. There are leading lights with credibility and experience from both parties, who should have been engaged in this mission and must now be engaged.
3. A fundamental commitment to freedom and democracy using economic, political, social and military components. In Lebanon it is unconscionable that following the cedar revolution there was not dramatic, overarching American, European and Gulf State assistance to the Lebanese democratic infrastructure and the people who build it.
It is equally disastrous that there was not major military assistance and training to the Lebanese military. In Afghanistan there should have been far more support for indigenous democratic structures and there should never have been blood deals with war lords and drug dealers. In Iran, while I oppose a military attack for the same military reasons I opposed the invasion of Iraq, there should be strong and decisive support for advocates of democracy in Iran, especially through neutral nations and NGO's to women, workers, young people and others.
4. We have to recognize the human dimension to war, and be extremely careful to avoid tactics that create pain and rage among the people we seek to enlist against terrorism and for freedom. Special Forces understand this; many leaders of the Marine Corps and Army understand this.
Yet the neoconservatives disastrously hold this in contempt, with results now obvious. We have to recognize as well, that there are human dimensions of peace. Foreign aid is not a dirty word; one of the most effective tactics of Hezbollah is their contribution to health care and schools, which does not justify their crimes, but does explain much of their popularity.
I recommend the essay by Daniel Levy in Haaretz, and on this, he is right: we must end the nightmare of the neoconservative narrative, and recognize that to do so, we must offer a stronger, tougher, wiser and more generous narrative of our own.
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