It's become an axiom to highlight the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident as the breaking point in Turkish-Israeli relations. But a closer examination reveals that beginning in the early 2000s, broader changes in the Middle East combined with political, social, and economic changes within both countries made a break in the relationship all but inevitable.
On the Israeli side, the early 2000s marked the end of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as we know it. The rushed Camp David process in summer 2000 revealed the inability of both Israel and the Palestinians to compromise and give up on their most cherished goals. The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000 embedded anger and mistrust among Israelis.
The Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and from Gaza in summer 2005 was -- from the Israeli perspective -- a costly and mismanaged effort to keep trying. Continuing rocket attacks, provocations, and cross-border skirmishes indicated to Israelis that no matter what they did in the name of peace, the other side was simply not interested: their only goal was to destroy Israel, piece by piece if necessary.
Later, the 2006 electoral victory of Hamas and then its military takeover of Gaza in 2007 suggested that the moderates among the Palestinians (namely, Fatah) were weakening. The onset of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (official launched in 2005) combined with these developments to heighten the "siege mentality" in Israel, which included a broader suspicion of the rest of the region.
At the same time, Israel experienced very positive economic growth during the 2000s (with some slowdowns during the Second Intifada). Its diamond-cutting, defense production, bio-medical research, and computer telecommunications industries expanded considerably. As the country became wealthier, consumer goods became more readily available. Public interest was shifting away from foreign affairs and the conflict with the Arabs to domestic social and economic issues, culminating in the 2006 elections with a brief resurgence of the Labor party and the sudden appearance of the Pensioners Party, devoted exclusively to socio-economic concerns.
Although foreign policy intruded when conflicts with Hezbollah and Hamas erupted in 2006 and 2008-2009, the growing support for center-right (Kadima) and right-wing parties (Likud, and smaller far-right ones) indicated a growing Israeli preference for complete separation from and disregard with the Palestinians and the peace process.
In short, there was by 2010 far less interest in involvement in regional affairs apart from what was necessary.
On the Turkish side, in domestic politics the weakening of the Kemalists in the military and in the security forces changed the broader assumptions and expectations of Turkey's foreign policy. Growing Islamism (that is, a desire for more acceptance and presentation of Islam in the public sphere) created conditions of sympathy for Islamist parties in Turkey, who were bound to hold a different interpretation of Turkey's place in the world.
This was augmented by a split among the Islamists themselves, between the old hardliners and the new moderates -- the latter of whom formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of today. Their successes at governing at the municipal level enhanced their appeal. Finally, the sheer inability of the secular parties to end factional infighting and cooperate on a common political agenda left the Turkish public eager for a fresh party.
At the same time, economic growth and a growing need for more energy to feed the expansion of the domestic economy refocused policymakers' interest toward Turkey's neighbors, including former antagonists like Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Turkey moved to resolve outstanding issues with all of them, and to sign trade and other agreements.
In foreign affairs, snubs from the European Union made many Turks question their long-standing Western orientation. The late 1990s also witnessed a more aggressive Turkish foreign policy, culminating in 1998 when Turkey mobilized troops on the border with Syria to successfully demand the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This led to renewed confidence in its power, and a perception that it could more easily throw its weight around the region.
So although the 1990s was a period of warming Turkish-Israeli ties, by the 2000s both countries began to diverge in their needs and expectations. This was especially evident on the Turkish side. Ankara's need for non-Israeli trade items (like gas from Iran or markets in Syria) combined with growing interest in realigning itself toward Arab and Islamic countries.
The AKP, which came to power in 2002, saw these regions as Turkey's natural reference point. Israel's continuing occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza War of 2008-2009, and the growing strength of the right in Israeli politics only reinforced the AKP's perception that Israel was an unnatural ally. AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself is a passionate believer in Palestinian rights, and genuinely horrified at Israel's actions against them. His reaction to the Gaza War has shaped much of the AKP's subsequent rhetoric and policy.
As the AKP has grown stronger in the domestic balance of power within Turkey, its ability to shape foreign policy has expanded. With Israel no longer seen as a valuable or even necessary ally, it was only a matter of time before a Mavi Marmara-type incident ruptured the relationship completely. Even without such an occurrence, the relationship would have dragged itself to death eventually.
There is very little to suggest that the two countries have enough in common at this point to move beyond the damage. Indeed, things are quickly moving in the opposite direction; the Turkish insistence on providing military escorts to ships sailing to Gaza all but guarantees a direct clash with the Israeli navy.
This type of hostility and antagonism appears to be the future framework for their relations.
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How many seconds did it take you to come up with this brilliance?
Israel did not withdraw from those areas as a good-will gesture in the name of peace. They were forced out of occupied Lebanon by Hezbollah, which inflicted on going casualties, and costs that Israel found unsustainable. Similarly, Sharon withdrew Israels from Gaza because of the costs involved in protecting 14,000 settlers, among a hostile population of 1.4 million, and because he wanted to remove Gaza from the demographic equation of Palestinians versus Israelis, living under Israeli control. He was trying to claim that the now 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza are free of Israel, however, since Israel controls Gaza's borders, coast, air space, imports and exports, it is not free of Israel.
Israel kept Gaza for years and could of continue to do it. Especially if Israel would know that it would lead to creation of a rocket launchpad against its citizens.
Second, while I can give you lots of examples, it hardly makes sense for me to justify Israel's thought process.
Do you really think Israel withdrew in the interest of peace? Then why didn't it do it decades earlier, in each case? Why, didn't it reach an agreement with the party that would be in power?
Any nation or state that shows compassion towards the Palestinians is considered hostile and the US dollars come pouring in to keep the peace.
Time to stop all this nonsense. The Jews don't seem to want to share the sandbox because they are so afraid they won't have a Jewish state. All points indicate that even though they would be the minority in a one state solution, their determination and keen organizational skills would most likely dominate in any newly formed government......if only they could see the broad range picture.
Israel has good relations with most EU countries, most east asian countries, and the vast majority of the coutnries in the americas. In fact, it is only with muslim countries, with their knee-jerk anti-israeli attitutdes that relations are particularly poor, a relationship that is strained in large part because of their history of violence, aggression and animocity towards israel and israelis.
Well, that's an interesting revision of history.
What "insistence"??? At present, the only thing Erdogan is shooting is his mouth. Whether he will move to shooting with his warships is very far from clear.
Like Iran, Turkey has no territorial disputes with Israel or Europe.
Yet the religious-messianic rhetoric of Erdogan is highly reminiscent of the worst excesses of Iranian Islamist theocracy.
It is no accident that Erdogan received honorary Iranian citizenship in February 2009
Factual examples:
Intolerance towards Europe. Erdogan:"Assimilation is a crime against humanity. "We need to inoculate European culture with Turkish culture."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,684125,00.html
Belligerence towards neighboring states:
Turkey illegally blockades its ports from ships of E.U. state, Cyprus.
Turkish invaders repeatedly violate Iraqi sovereignty with vicious bombing of Kurdish refugee camps In Iraq.
Oppression of freedom of speech: Turkish Nobel Prize recipient Orhan Pamuk has been convicted of a crime agaisnt "Turkishness" for saying in 2005, “30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians have been killed in this land.”
On Jews- According to BBC- "Mein Kampf" has been a best seller in Turkey. " Nough said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4361733.stm
"Gaza is a prison camp, says David Cameron
David Cameron has described Gaza as a ''prison camp'' and appealed to the Israeli Government to allow the free flow of humanitarian goods and people in and out of the Palestinian territory."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/7912095/Gaza-is-a-prison-camp-says-David-Cameron.html
By REUTERS
09/13/2011 20:38
Statement to Human Rights Council disputes Palmer Report, says blockade summarily punishes Gazans, infringing upon human rights.
http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=237827
Or else it guarantees an end to Turkish ships sailing to Gaza. The Turks must know that they would fair poorly if they push that sort of clash.
The U.S. would inevitably defend Israel's actions (and, if need be, its territory) and as a result we would suffer a further dimunition of respect and influence in the UN and the rest of the world.
(2) Turkey has a much larger navy than Israel and their air force is comparable. If there was a conflict, it would fair poorly for both sides. There won't be any shots fired.
(2) Perhaps so and so I hope your conclusion is correct.
Israel would do well to end the naval blockade of Gaza.
As for the blockade, I think they have agreed to do that if Hamas agrees to end the violence.
I don't think Israel should end the naval blockade in Gaza just yet. Ships keep getting caught with weapons for Hamas. What they should do is completely end the land blockade (although it's close, it isn't completely done). They and the Egyptians can inspect everything going into Gaza for illegal weapons but let in cement, etc.
So any proposal, insisting on ROR, is a dead end. Everything else is up for negotiations.