One Last Option for Securing Iranian Enriched Uranium

The Iranian Government is about to refuse the proposal to ship 75% of its stock of low-enriched uranium to Russia before the end of the year. Instead, it will offer shipment in small batches. This is unacceptable. The Geneva and Vienna talks focused on the expectation that most of the uranium would be shipped beyond Iranian borders soon. Indeed, the West needs a solid confidence-building gesture from Iran to reduce the risk of a breakout scenario (the domestic re-enrichment of the accumulated stock to weapon levels) and also a genuine token of seriousness for the forthcoming negotiations.

The Iranian counterproposal is clearly not acceptable. Yet, before closing the door again, before re-launching stronger and more efficient sanctions, the IAEA should ask Iran to opt for a similar confidence-building option, namely the storage of the evolving stock of Iranian low-enriched uranium in a small European country -- with occasional, partial shipments to fuel manufacturing plants in Russia and France to feed the Tehran research reactor and the Busher power plant. Let's see why and how it could work.

One needs to understand the Iranian reluctance to hand over to Russia and France the bulk of its low-enriched uranium. Over the years, the Russians have generously provided Iran with a protective political umbrella in the Security Council while leading the Iranians by the nose -- commercially speaking -- in connection with the Busher nuclear power plant. During the last decade, the Russians have been industrially unable to complete Busher within any schedule, or else they were clearly unwilling to do so (a Russian official told me once that Busher will be completed "when the Kremlin so decides"). Or both.

At the same time, they try to extract horrendous prices for the future take-back of Busher's spent fuel. As to France, in the seventies, Iran loaned some 1.2 billion dollars to the French enrichment project Eurodif (together with France, Belgium, Italy and Spain). Following the Iranian Revolution and a wave of Iran-inspired political assassinations in France, the Eurodif deal with Iran fell apart. After lengthy negotiations, Iran got some 1.6 billion dollars back in the early nineties. All in all, France treated Iran very reasonably. Were it not -- in the present case of fuel element manufacturing for the Tehran Research Reactor -- for the recent dim-witted public declaration of a French official saying that France would not deliver the Tehran reactor fuel if not satisfied with Iranian behavior. With such a loaded historical background, many Iranians hesitate to entrust Russia and France with their nuclear crown jewels.

If not Russia, who could be acceptable partners of Iran for safe-keeping its stocks of enriched uranium? I see two possibilities, the US or a small European country (such as Sweden or Switzerland, two countries with a solid nuclear experience and infrastructure).

Of course, the US solution is a very long shot. Still, there are signals that some Iranians would prefer to get higher enriched uranium from the US to feed the American-made Tehran reactor, while others would like to purchase from the US modern electronic control equipment for the same reactor. Indeed, a US focal point exists. The original reactor supplier (General Atomics of San Diego) is still associated with the French company CERCA that manufactures fuel elements for such reactors, and is also a primary supplier of electronic control equipment for nuclear reactors in general.

Thus, under a US arrangement, the US would play the role of prime contractor by 1) securing the storage somewhere outside Iran of most of the low-enriched Iranian uranium, 2) having batches of this uranium enriched in Russia, 4) letting this uranium be manufactured into fuel elements at CERCA in France and 5) taking formal delivery of the finished fuel elements. Subsequently, towards the end of 2010, the US would deliver fuel and electronic equipment for the third operating phase of the Tehran Research Reactor. Incidentally, remember that such activities do not fall under UNSC sanctions, since the reactor serves medical purposes.

If Iran and/or the US should not yet be ready to deal so directly with each other (quite likely), the parties could turn to a European arrangement, namely the storage of Iranian uranium in a small European country, a country deemed trustworthy by both Iran and the international community, a trade partner of Iran with a high degree of political independence. This country should be outside the Middle-East region and be at a short distance from Iran.

Within the European Union, countries like Sweden, Finland, and Austria (with its IAEA headquarters and technical facility) would qualify, as well as Switzerland outside the Union. On a regular basis (e.g. monthly to quarterly), uranium dioxide would be shipped to the partner country. Low-enriched uranium oxide is hardly radioactive, therefore easy to transport and to store. There are containers approved for air transport. The frequency of air shipments would be dictated by the objective of not keeping more than some 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in Iran from the production cascades at Natanz and Fordo. At all times, the material would remain the property of Iran. The stored uranium could be freely transferred by Iran to a fuel manufacturer of its choice, but not repatriated.

The bottom line? The Obama Administration made an enlightened move by opening negotiations with Iran without preconditions. The "Geneva Talks II" should stand, in particular on the issue of shipment of most uranium stock outside Iran. The IAEA played a remarkable role in bringing about a first agreement. Storing this uranium -- not in Russia as foreseen by the talks in Geneva and Vienna -- but in Europe, would still be in line with the objective of the Geneva Talks. This would be no additional concession to Iran. Before slamming the door, these two alternative arrangements deserve consideration. "Failure is not an option", as pointedly stated by the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei.

Comments

[HypocrisyStinks]

Iran has been cheated and deceived numerous times by the West. You can't blame them for not trusting the West - especially France! I have no idea why Iran even agreed to any discussions at all. Their programs is lawful and under the inspection of IAEA, who, by the way, were right about Iraq.

Iran has a natural right to harness nuclear technology, even for military purposes. Indeed, if Israel had the right to possess and stockpile hundreds of nuclear warheads, that are being trained at Muslim cities such as Cairo, Istanbul, Tehran and Damascus and probably Mecca and Medina as well, why on earth would Muslim states such as Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia not have such a right? After all, are Jewish nuclear bombs kosher? Are they altruistic? Are they innocuous?

[Nargit]

This is a rather odd view on what a country should with its lawfully acquired stockpile of low-enriched material. Given the decades of deception, threats, and open support for aggression by western countries, why shouldn't Iran assume that they intend simply to steal the material, in fact the most likely course of action? How about US returning to Iran billions of its assets in order to alleviate this obvious concern? Can anyne imaging US or France or Israel keeping their nuclear stockpiles in a small European country?

[AirForceBlue]

Talks.....­......with Iran. An oxymoronic term if there is such a thing.

The chess masters again put the West in check after this latest decision about turning over or not to Russia their enriched uranium, thus continuing their furtive activities while the West "dithers." Their next move was telegraphed when they proposed "in small batches," so there you have it, another delay while they continue on with their business.

Meantime, Israel has become still. Perhaps they've begun their particular countdown for a strike against Iran, maybe not the nuclear plants but, hopefully, to take out the entire leadership. All it would take is one tactfully placed missile hitting a "patch" on Iran's Parliament front door. Yeah, it's really that simple, only the aftermath becomes complicated when dealing with the fools' leadership in the West.

[BiBiJan]

Article IV of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) states:

”Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf

[AirForceBlue]

So you contend Iran's pursuit of nuclear power is for peaceful purposes. OK, hope you are right.

[willact723]

In all sincerity, what do you suggest then?

[BiBiJan]

By "the fools' leadership in the West" does AirForceBlue mean American taxpayers or the US military having to fight the WWIII?

[AirForceBlue]

Somewhat off topic -- but, I endorse President Obama's intention to cooperate with the world, in effect, no more USA going alone. We have had world leadership and acted upon it since WWII resulting in about one hundred thousand of our youth in graves, and our Treasury sacked by those holding our coats as they guffawed, "let the Americans do it."

Israel's ball.

[Inquisitr]

How long do we keep playign this game with Iran?

It has lied, and been cuaght lieing multiple times. Continues to talk about how thier nuclear program justifies thier missle program, and are turning down the deals we offer them, all the whiel the reformists beg us not to legitimize this goernment in any way shape or form.

What do we do when we make that second offer adn Iran turns it down again? Because they will. Being the enemy of America is their claim to fame in the middle east.

[BiBiJan]

In a September 17, 2009 press statement, IAEA stated:

”With respect to a recent media report, the IAEA reiterates that it has no concrete proof that there is or has been a nuclear weapon programme in Iran.”
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2009/MA200919.html

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Key Judgments: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities - November 2007 says:
"Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be."
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf

Thomas Fingar, who stepped down Dec. 1 from the post of deputy director of national intelligence and as chairman of the National Intelligence Council, said

"I still stand by the judgments in that estimate," Mr. Fingar told a small group of reporters, referring to the November 2007 report. "We've had other teams look at this. Everyone who has, has affirmed the judgments we made."
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/dec/10/official-stands-by-iran-nuke-report/

[kobrock1]

Who said proliferation was a dirty word. It's time more theocracies come to embrace the wonder and splendor of enriched uranium. What else could the Iranians use to meet their high energy demands?

[BiBiJan]

Mr. Pellaud,

You have laid out a clear case why the contentious nuclear issue should NOT have been the first issue to be tackled among Iran and P5+1, at least not in the terms that it was. It is a short term relief, and each incremental step will only serve to highlight the depth of the mistrust.

Here's an idea from a self-confessed non-expert:

US should have offered a commercial contract to build and own, in Iran, a reactor fuel manufacturing plant. Iran could have signed a 'commercial' contract to supply this plant with all her LEU production out of her enrichment plants. The custody of the existing stockpile of LEU would be transferred to the new company, immediately.

The reactor fuel for the Tehran medical isotopes reactor should have been purchased in the international market.

[Bruno Pellaud - Huffpost Blogger]

Right on, BiBiJan!
This is exactly what should be offered to the Iranians once they have engaged in a confidence-building relationship. This is how I formulated your proposal in a recent note to a colleague in government: "Subsequently, establishment of a domestic fuel fabrication capability (LEU oxides to fuel bundles) through an international consortium-company in Iran for building and operating a “Fuel Fabrication Plant” for producing fuel rods for nuclear power and research reactors. LEU stocks produced in Iran to be stored at the site of the Fabrication Plant under joint shareholder control and then used for fuel rod fabrication. The site of the Fabrication Plant to be identified very early, to be freely accessible to other shareholders and to serve as storage site for all the LEU produced previously and subsequently in Iran." Other, bolder academic people had proposed a joint international enrichment plant. Well, I would not give Iran modern enrichment technology before a long, long time. But fuel fabrication is harmless. Therefore, storage abroad first, then maybe a joint fabrication plant!

[BiBiJan]

Thanks for the reply. Just goes to show if one strives for peace, even a non-expert can stumble on a workable solution.

Personally, I'd like to see Iran brought into the fold in all fields a tad earlier than a long, long time.

http://www.bibijon.org/iranimage/

[billrowe]

Iran does not owe anybody any sort of confidence building measure because it is Iran that has been on the receiving end of hypocritical and illegal sanctions and related misinformation. No way should it agree to send its low enriched uranium out of the country in one shipment since it will not get the enriched fuel back without it being held hostage to other illegal conditions. The shipping of the uranium in small batches only as the enriched reactor fuel is received is the only way to go. Refusal by the partners to accept that arrangement only highlights the other agenda of eliminating Iran's enrichment activity. If the deal sinks, then Iran should go ahead and enrich the fuel to 20% and make the fuel elements themselves.In any case the required amount of low enriched uranium will be used up and not available for weapons use, and Iran gets the additional learning experience of expanding their enrichment capability to higher levels.Iran needs to give the partners the polite diplomatic middle-finger salute and go ahead with building their own fuel.