I was watching the Iranian delegation's reaction as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton directly addressed her Iranian counterpart, Manouchehr Mottaki, during the Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain on December 3. Mrs. Clinton once again extended the US hand and reiterated President Obama's offers of reconciliation. But the delegation's body language was telling: Some did not even bother looking at her; others just sneered. (Mottaki was abruptly fired ten days later, a sign of probable dissensions within the regime.)
Another meeting between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the US, of course, and Germany) is underway this weekend, this time in Istanbul. Expectations are low.
The last meeting, in Geneva in early December, ended with no result other than agreeing to meet again in Istanbul in late January. Recent reports from Turkey indicate that Iran President Ahmadinejad is talking about future rounds of negotiations in Brazil and Iran.
Iran has learned from North Korea that one can extend a negotiating process for years, while becoming a nuclear power at the same time.
So it's time for a plan B. If there is no substantial progress, the P5+1 should consider declaring that unless an agreement occurs within, say, three months, the diplomatic process will be over.
Negotiations with Iran have been going for more than seven years. For the West, the benefit of such negotiations has been limited essentially to ensuring that Russia and China support Security Council sanctions. For Iran, the value has been to foster an image of openness to dialogue and willingness to compromise, without ceding one inch.
As the November 2010 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency made clear, Iran now has more low-enriched uranium than is needed to build one bomb. Its continued production of 20% enriched uranium brings it closer to the military threshold. Meanwhile, the Arak heavy-water reactor is nearing completion: it will open another pathway (the plutonium one) to the bomb.
The value of a political ultimatum would be to dash Iranian hopes of a legitimization of its program, and to create the perception that a US military strike against Iran's nuclear installations is a real possibility. Such an ultimatum, coupled with fear of a US strike, would destabilize Iranian leaders, disrupt Iran's strategy and create a debate within Tehran between those who are genuinely interested in negotiating the abandonment of Iran's military option and those who believe that Iran should cross the nuclear threshold.
Between 2003-2005, it was legitimate to think that Iran could be persuaded to abandon its military activities in return for nuclear energy cooperation and other benefits of reconciliation. But things have changed. Tehran's investment in its nuclear program has increased considerably. As time passes, the hypothetical price that Iran would pay for abandoning its military option has gone up. In addition, the regime has radicalized.
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that Iran was never really interested in an arrangement with the West, that the regime's opposition to the US is part of its political DNA: It could not survive reconciliation with the West.
While abandoning the diplomatic process would diminish the prospect of additional UN sanctions, the most efficient sanctions have been those implemented unilaterally by the US, European Union, and like-minded countries.
If the process were officially terminated, Western countries would increase their pressure on Iran by imposing additional unilateral sanctions and by making it clear that they would be ready to use any means to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed country.
There is historical evidence that Iran caves under pressure. In 1988, Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq after stating for years he would never do so. A lesser known example is Iran's cessation of sponsoring terrorist attacks against the US after the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, following warnings by the administration. In 2003 Tehran halted (temporarily) its military related activities because of international pressure. And in the past four years, each time a UN resolution seemed ready for a vote, Iran signaled it wanted to negotiate.
The best hope for a peaceful resolution of the crisis is a combination of increased pressure and domestic difficulties (partly the result of sanctions), creating the belief among Iran's leaders that their regime may be endangered.
Of course, there would still need to be an opening. The P5+1 would have to make it clear that should Iran accept its 2008 offer of a comprehensive settlement of the dispute, negotiations would resume immediately, provided that all sensitive nuclear activities were suspended pursuant to UN resolutions.
There is no perfect solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. But, after seven years, it's time we try something else.
The author is Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris