Not surprisingly, in Western media the recent Palestinian-on-Palestinian fighting in Gaza and the West Bank is usually discussed in terms of what's best for the U.S. and Israel. And usually in simple terms: Gaza as a bastion of the radical Hamas party, which must be isolated and punished, and the West Bank as the domain of the moderate Fatah party, which must be engaged and supported. (As demonstrated by President Bush's commitment of financial aid to Fatah and its leader Mahmoud Abbas on Monday.)
But -- as an excellent piece in this week's New York Times Magazine finally begins to illustrate -- the current conflict within the Palestinian territories is not just about party versus party, good guys versus bad guys, but about what it means to be Palestinian, in the fullest sense imaginable. This debate represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the Palestinian national project, and it requires a response from the West that is much more far-sighted and inclusive -- of all Palestinians, no matter what their party affiliation -- than the one currently in place.
The article, "A Life of Unrest," by Steven Erlanger, focuses on Khaled Abu Hilal, a former member of Fatah in Gaza who joined Hamas out of disgust for Fatah's corruption and "collaboration" with Israel and the U.S. in implementing the now defunct Oslo Accords -- a story common among many Palestinians these days.
"I am pro-peace and anti-Oslo," Hilal said. "Oslo is a project for treason, not for peace...Palestinians [now] understand that a real peace is built on struggle, and it is made between enemies, not friends. The government that is an enemy to Israel but chosen by the people is the one able to make peace."
There is much in this quote that should rightly give cause for pessimism about the future prospects for peace. But unlike Yasser Arafat, who told the West what it wanted to hear, Abu Hilal clearly means what he says. And he says he wants peace. He believes in a two-state solution, but instead of the "solution" supplied by Oslo, he wants to live in a Palestine with honor -- one that is truly independent, and not reliant on Israel or the U.S. economically or politically for its very existence.
Hilal's position, then, is not necessarily an indication of radicalism or violence or terrorism, but of a form of Palestinian nationalism that is finally beginning to mature, by tackling -- sometimes more and sometimes less successfully -- the fundamental issue of what a Palestinian state should be, and what values it should represent.
In the Beginning -- and I use those words fully aware of the Biblical allusion -- Palestinian nationalism was born as a purely reactionary phenomenon. It originated, primarily, as a response to the creation of Israel.
Admittedly, the point I'm making here is very contentious: Palestinian and Israeli partisans have written -- and continue to write -- dozens of books arguing about the origins of Palestinian nationalism. Why? Mainly because of the idea that a Palestinian nationalism born in opposition to Israel would somehow lack legitimacy or authenticity.
That's just silly. Many modern breeds of nationalism started out, in large part, as responses to enemies or outside forces, but that makes them no less legitimate now. There would have been no American revolution without a repressive Britain to revolt against. Modern Zionism is in large part a European phenomenon, a reaction to European Ant-Semitism and other nationalist trends that were sweeping the continent at the time. And even Biblical Zionism was born in response to the oppression of Egypt and the Pharaoh.
No, there's no shame that Palestinian nationalism has its roots in opposition to Israel. If anything, it's logical. But like those other nationalisms, Palestinian nationalism does need to evolve beyond a reactionary stage, or it will not be able to thrive, or even survive.
Allow me to illustrate: When living in Jerusalem in 1999, during the tail end of Oslo, I went on a day trip to Ramallah with some Palestinian friends to buy some ice cream. After we finished, we got in their car, and my friend Eli asked me for my trash -- a napkin, a paper cup. I handed them over, thinking he'd put them in a plastic bag. Instead, he rolled down the window. "If we're in Israel," he said, "then we have to wait to throw this out in the garbage. But now we're in Ramallah, Palestine -- so this is what we do!"
And Eli promptly dumped the trash into the street.
Eli didn't litter because he was a dirty guy -- on the contrary, his house is a lot cleaner than mine ever was. He littered, perversely, as an act of nationalism. Making a statement against Israel was so important to him, he didn't even think of the harm he was doing to his own country in the process. His nationalism was stuck in a reactionary mode.
How can Palestinians move beyond this to a more positive expression of their identity? What needs to take place is a national conversation about what it means to be Palestinian, beyond pure resistance to Israel. People like Abu Hilal -- and more broadly the conflict between Fatah and Hamas -- are evidence that this may be finally happening.
For all the chaos that's ensued, the Palestinian elections that brought Hamas to power forced Palestinians to finally look inward, to challenge themselves -- ideologies clashed, systems of patronage came into conflict, and ingrained power structures were shaken up or torn down completely. It isn't pretty, but it's necessary. And the process has just begun.
Of course, just because the cauldron has been stirred -- and shaken, and dumped onto the ground and stomped on, for that matter -- doesn't mean everything will change immediately, or even for the better. "Resistance" against Israel continues to dominate the thinking of Abu Hilal and the majority of Palestinians. It's part of their reality, because Israel is their reality.
American nationalism and Zionism -- both modern and Biblical -- were able to evolve and grow beyond their antagonists in large part because they were able to carve a space of their own, where they could develop free of their enemies' interference. The Americans had an ocean between them and Great Britain, the Israelis had the Mediterranean between them and Europe, and the Israelites had a desert -- and 40 years of wandering -- between them and the Egypt.
Palestinians crave this kind of space on a very deep level.
Unfortunately, the very nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes this type of independence hard -- even impossible -- to come by. On a purely geographic level, Israel may have disengaged from Gaza, but Gaza cannot disengage from Israel: it's virtually surrounded, its borders completely controlled by Israel. The West Bank is better, but not by much: it's larger, but still landlocked and dotted with Israeli settlements.
But even more important than geographical space is psychological space -- honor, dignity, and independence -- a measure of which can still be attained. Oslo never provided this kind of space, which is why it failed. Perversely, even while claiming to start Palestinians on the road to independence, Oslo made Palestinians even more dependent. It allowed Israel and the U.S. to buy off the corrupt Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership, which was all too ready to accept the cash, in exchange for keeping Palestinians under control and suppressing any dissent or political Islamism. The PA was not an independent government but essentially a proxy for Israel and the U.S. The system backfired because eventually Palestinians became fed up. When Arafat tried to channel their rage into a new Intifada, much of it became directed at him and Fatah instead.
As a result of this upheaval, Palestinians have arrived at a new possible turning point in the evolution of their nationalism. Thus far it's been bloody and not very productive, marked by a winner-takes-all mentality. In part this is because international ostracism of the Hamas-led government, while forcing conflict between the rival parties, squeezed the Palestinian people so hard -- actually shrinking their psychological space -- that it also cut off any chance for real debate. But the situation can still be turned around. There is still chance for Palestinians to have a real conversation that will allow them to develop into a more productive national entity. But they need that space -- the sense of independence, honor and dignity--to have that conversation.
How can the U.S. and Israel encourage this process? Throwing a lot of money at Fatah, its leadership, and its affiliates -- as the U.S. and Israel are now doing -- simply repeats the same mistake that Oslo already made. Foreign aid may fill the PA's coffers, it may give many Palestinians much-needed paychecks, and it may even help temporarily repress Palestinian Islamists.
But as long as Palestinians -- of any party affiliation -- feel beholden to Israel and the U.S., as long as they don't have dignity, honor and space of their own, their nationalism will remain reactionary, they will continue to define themselves by their hatred of Israel rather than by a positive ideology of their own, and they will continue to lash out against Israel whenever it suits their needs.
This isn't to say that the U.S. should disengage; obviously there's too much at stake, and the Bush administration has shown all too well the steep price of apathy. But taking sides by throwing money at Fatah could be just as dangerous. Even if somehow the West Bank does transform into a docile pro-Western pussycat -- highly unlikely -- Gaza will probably become even more resentful, more militant, more of a raging tiger. (Ah, cheesy metaphors, how I love thee!)
Paradoxically, the best way to give the Palestinians "space" in this situation may be to engage with them -- all of them. That means diplomacy. Intensive, hands-on, old-school shuttle diplomacy. But not shuttling between Jerusalem and Ramallah -- shuttling between Ramallah and Gaza City. In other words, reach out to both sides, not just one.
A conversation about what it means to be Palestinian must by definition include all Palestinians. Yes, Fatah's cosmopolitan, secular, pragmatic values still represent the majority of Palestinians, and they must be encouraged. But Hamas must be included, not just because so many Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank belong to Hamas, but because Hamas has more revolutionary credibility -- street cred, if you will -- than Fatah. (Abu Hilal was right when he said only an enemy can make peace with Israel; the same often holds true for Israel -- it's no coincidence that hawks like Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon helped make some of Israel's most sweeping concessions to its neighbors.) The West doesn't have to bankroll Hamas, but it can't cut it out, either.
Most important, only by reaching out to Hamas -- perhaps through new envoy Tony Blair -- can the U.S. begin to repair its own credibility among the Palestinians. Such an overture -- along with very strict prohibitions against terrorism, of course -- is the only way Palestinians will begin to believe that the U.S. is honestly looking out for their interests and not just Israel's. (Which is ironically the only way the U.S. can really advance Israel's interests in the first place.) Only then will Palestinians stop feeling so defensive, and instead feel the dignity and independence -- the psychological space -- they need to sit down with each other and tackle the difficult national issues ahead of them.
Sure, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have already tried to bring Hamas and Fatah together, to no avail. But neither Egypt nor the Saudis have the stature of the U.S. (The reason Fatah can afford to ignore conversation now is precisely because it has America's backing.) And instead of trying to impose some kind jerry-rigged, ham-fisted "unity government" designed to please the West--which is really just as reactionary as a government that exists only to destroy Israel -- assist the different elements of Palestinian society in coming to an accord that serves their needs. An agreement that begins to define a Palestinian nationalism based on positive values -- not simply reactionary resistance -- and on an authentically Palestinian vision for a future state.
Ultimately, only the Palestinians themselves can decide to take that critical step toward a viable, productive, mature nation-state. Whether they can or will remains to be seen. But as much as possible, the U.S. and Israel need to give them the space to take that step.