On November 26th, 2008, ten Pakistani youths wreaked havoc on the streets of Mumbai, killing over 170 people and injuring hundreds more. When Muhammad Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor of the group, was asked at his hospital bed why he had taken on such a mission of at the behest of Lakshar-e-Taiba, any mention of religion, martyrdom, or hatred toward the West was noticeably absent. His response, in fact, was quite simple: terrorism pays. "[My father] said, 'These people make loads of money and so will you. We'll have money, we won't be poor any more... Look at these guys living the good life. You can be like them.'" The story of Kasab is not an aberration, but the sign of a world where economic accessibility is fundamentally linked to both security and stability.
As the United States continues to wage a massive counter-insurgency campaign across the greater Middle East, expending large amounts of blood and treasure to neutralize threats to our global order, it needs policies that accurately address this correlation. The vast wave of technology and information made available in the past two decades has given millions of people access to markets, ideas, and communities beyond their own neighborhoods. Yet it has also enabled those who are disaffected to join ranks and sabotage this very system. The highly complex security threats of today have advanced with the globalization revolution, yet US policies designed to counter these threats are still top-down, heavy-handed, and mired in silos.
The biggest problem the US currently faces in its foreign outreach is one of adaptability and compartmentalization, where the policies and goals of the military are largely independent of those for the State Department, CIA, or Chamber of Commerce. For a country like Pakistan, whose economic stability is a top priority for all of these sectors, the US simply does not have the liaison devices in place to formulate a comprehensive strategy, where for example, our trade policy does not run counter to our aid policies. The lack of horizontal information-sharing and planning in the case of Pakistan creates a vulnerability where disparate initiatives may ultimately work against one another.
Of the more than twelve billion in US aid to Pakistan from 2002-2009, only a quarter went to development and economic assistance, with no serious initiative for capacity building in Pakistani industries. Large amounts of military aid were siphoned off to fund the Indo-Pakistan border rivalry, which played against US defense efforts in Afghanistan and its diplomatic ties with India. Of greater note, while congress has approved billions more in aid for Pakistan, US tariffs on Pakistani textiles--their greatest export--stifle Pakistan's ability to compete in the US market. As the US is Pakistan's largest investor and trading partner, this has the deleterious effect of taking money and jobs out of the hands of Pakistani businesses and laborers, at the same time that US aid goes into the hands of a government that is vastly corrupt. These contrasting policies have failed to bolster Pakistan's economy and institutions, making Jihad-for-pay an alluring option for many apathetic youths.
The problems that countries like Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia face today are less about religious fanaticism than the economic conditions that incentivize the business of terrorism. The Muhammad Ajmal Kasab's of the world cannot be deterred with traditional military intimidation, nor won over by top-down government aid. US agencies concerned with bilateral outreach must adapt to the dynamism of the threats they face, which will require an emphasis on broadening economic opportunity as well as serious revisions in planning across sectors.
