Secretary Clinton made her first trip to Egypt since Mohammed Morsy was sworn in as the country's first freely elected civilian president amid a power struggle between elected officials and the military. The Egyptian people, not Washington, will ultimately decide who wins.
Those demanding that Western leaders turn against SCAF for its numerous political and human rights violations, most recently issuing constitutional amendments that appear to enshrine its political influence well after the president takes office, may be reversing cause and effect. Just as Washington continued supporting Mubarak while he violated human rights and amended the constitution to guarantee his son inherit Egypt, Western policy makers will likely continue to tolerate SCAF, like Mubarak, as long as the Egyptian people do.
SCAF still enjoys the confidence of more than 80% of the Egyptian people according to an April Gallup poll, while roughly the same percentage sees on going protests as "bad for the country." Unless this calculus changes, American policy likely will not.
Speaking after the ouster of Mubarak, a prominent Egyptian human rights leader remarked that activists in his country used to look outward for help, ignoring their fellow citizens. Pro-democracy activists would carefully document their government's transgressions in reports aimed at the international community, hoping that outside pressure could force or shame their government into reform. It never did.
However, a vital shift in activist strategy changed the course of history.
Khaled Saeed's fatal beating inspired the now fabled "we are all Khaled Saeed" Facebook page and other on line platforms that took human rights violations to the people, catalyzing the country's uprising. When activism turned inward, targeting ordinary Egyptians with awareness campaigns of police brutality and other transgressions, pressure from the bottom eventually forced change at the top. It was only then that Washington distanced itself from then President Hosni Mubarak, a long time US ally.
In the same way, the end of Western support for Egypt's generals will ultimately be the result of--not the cause for--the military's loss of political power.
This is not to say most Egyptians support the military's consolidation of influence. The majority of the public want the military out of politics after the president takes office, and even more expects them to hand over power. Moreover, most Egyptians see no role for SCAF in choosing the Constituent Assembly tasked with drafting the country's new constitution, one of many powers the new constitutional amendments grant the military.
Nor are many Egyptians likely to welcome the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision to dissolve parliament, which up until this weekend was the only part of the country's current government with any democratic legitimacy. Though less than half said a parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood is good for the country, the vast majority thought the elections that brought them to power were fair and honest.
The question now is will SCAF's latest power grab turn public opinion against them and lead to widespread demands for the military to relinquish power, or will the people's economic woes, frustration with instability, and state media stories of foreign meddling lull them into submission? The outcome of this struggle between Egyptian outrage and exhaustion will determine the Western response.
External pressure, especially from those who supply a third of the military's budget, can produce some concessions. However, without the legitimizing leverage of a popular outcry, the SCAF will easily deflect Western concerns as outside meddling.
One of the welcomed casualties of the January 25th Egyptian uprising appears to be the regional image of an all-powerful America, responsible for everything that happens in the Arab world. Despite the conspiracy theories surrounding the revolution, today more than 80% of Egyptians believe people's desire for change, not foreign interference, produced the Arab uprisings. Ordinary Egyptians realize the extent of their own impact and the limits of Washington's. Their advocates should as well.
Dalia Mogahed is Executive Director and Senior Analyst at Gallup. She co-authored "Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think". A version of this article appeared in Assyasy Magazine.
Follow Dalia Mogahed on Twitter: www.twitter.com/dmogahed
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2- The Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the parliamentary elections and now presidency, has earned the military, and even Mubarak's regime, a lot of compassion, even from the liberals, leftists and LGBT rights' supporters who were screaming at the top of their lungs in Tahrir Square against Mubarak and military for the last fifteen months. Like what happened with the Muslim Brotherhood, earning unexpected support from the liberals who wouldn't support Shafiq, SCAF has earned the unconditional support from 'radical' liberals who wouldn't accept the results of a democratic process unless it came with a Nasserist, Che Guevara-like, flower power-oriented, weed-smoking astronaut to power. I personally have dealt with hardcore revolution frontliners whose political speech has been redesigned to target the Islamists.
1- The Egyptian public that supports SCAF is the same population that didn't exactly welcome the revolution and saw it as a threat to the country's stability and 'economy'. This big piece of the Egyptian population doesn't base its decisions on any party's political performance or orientation; it didn't happen with Mubarak and it won't happen with SCAF. Their support for any political party isn't based on reason or the monitoring of someone's credibility and the intact analysis of its motives. They are mainly sentimental and hardcore practicers of idolatry. They always use the word 'symbol' in their statements. Mubarak is the symbol of Egypt. The military is the symbol of Egypt's power. Egypt is the symbol of civilization. The respect SCAF and the military has received is not based on its current conduct of the state, but rather on former achievements of army and intelligence, such as the 1973 war or many of the make-believe intelligence victories over Israel (which have been compiled in a comic video released by the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate a few days ago).