There are striking parallels between Syria today and what happened in Bosnia in the 1990s.
More than 100,000 people died and several million were displaced in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995. The conflict between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniak Muslims seemed intractable. However, the US facilitated training and the delivery of sophisticated weapons to Bosnia's army helping it to regain large swathes of territory. Air support enabled battlefield victories, setting the stage for negotiations. Not only did American diplomacy succeed in bringing the warring parties together, but US mediation, ably led by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, helped forge the Dayton agreement.
US officials recently announced plans to deepen security cooperation with the Kurds in Syria. Washington hopes that a combined force of Syrian Kurds and moderate Arab militias will open a northeastern front against ISIS in Raqqa. The Kurds will also receive air support to establish a buffer along Syria's border with Turkey, putting pressure on Syrian armed forces around Aleppo to the West. Heavy and offensive weapons combined with intense air power will be needed to help shape the battlefield.
Assad presently has no incentive to negotiate. Russia's military support has convinced him that he can win the war or, at a minimum, hold out for more favorable terms. The military offensive should be linked to a diplomatic initiative, aimed at starting negotiations between Syria's warring parties. Military action will only be deemed a success if it results in a political transition and Assad's eventual removal from power.
The Dayton Agreement maintained Bosnia's territorial integrity while demarcating boundaries of de-facto states within Bosnia. Just as decentralization within a single state was central to the Dayton Agreement, Syria's future governance would be based on power-sharing via systems for self-rule and local security. An Alawite region, a Kurdish region, and Sunni Arab regions will constitute Syria's loose-knit confederation.
Bosnia's power-sharing arrangements were enshrined in a new constitution. It created a co-presidency, comprising representatives of Bosnia's different groups.
The Dayton Agreement set forth principles for the protection and promotion of human rights, as well as provisions concerning refugees and displaced persons. Institutions were established to address disputes and resolve future conflicts, including an arbitration tribunal, a Commission on Human Rights, a Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.
The parties were obligated to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. Obligations were enshrined by the UN Security Council. The Dayton Agreement would not have succeeded without robust involvement by the international community. Peace-building was supported by a Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which emerged from a Contact Group including the US, Russia, and European countries. PIC countries contributed to an international police task force and a peacekeeping force. Anticipating that the parties would occasionally be at loggerheads, the Office of the High Representative was empowered to enforce decisions when the co-presidency could not agree.
Success in Dayton would not have been possible without the support of Croatia's President Franjo Tudjman and Serbia's leader, Milosevic, who negotiated the Dayton Agreement on behalf of Bosnian Serbs. Foreign backers of Assad, Russia and Iran, may not be as willing to support a compromise. Turkey, Qatar, and other Gulf States may also be reluctant to pressure their Sunni Arab proxies.
The US must envision an end state for Syria. It should then work with countries that are close to combatants in order to convene them. Russia and other countries can play a role. However, the process must be initiated and run by the United States. Representatives from Russia and other countries were invited to Dayton, but they had a limited role on the margins of compromise.
The Dayton Agreement ended the war. It was a flawed agreement, but it was the best possible deal after four years of deadly conflict. With the benefit of hindsight, there should have been an implementation review in order to adapt the Dayton Agreement to changing conditions.
The peace agreement for Syria must include a plan for managed transition. Obama is right: Syrians will not tolerate Assad's murderous tyranny. Putin is also correct: Assad is indispensable to an agreement ending the conflict. While preserving Assad's position during the interim period, elections would follow, giving Syrians a chance to choose their local and national leaders. The interim arrangement should be upgraded after a few years.
Just as Dayton demonstrated America's indispensable role, it is time to stop leading from behind in Syria. There can be no progress without US leadership. Only the US, working with local partners like the Kurds, can help end Syria's long national nightmare.
David L. Phillips is Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights. He served as a senior adviser to the U.S. State Department, and worked closely with Ambassador Holbrooke. His most recent book is The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East.