In the wake of Osama bin Laden's death, Americans have shifted their attention to two key questions: What's up with our "ally" Pakistan? and Why are we still in Afghanistan, anyway? This questioning is understandable, perhaps even necessary, but it's also precisely why Pakistan continues to play its dangerous double game.
Malou Innocent has convincingly reiterated how Pakistan has a different set of geopolitical interests, leading it to fund and equip some of the very people we consider our worst enemies. Innocent even goes so far as to say that Pakistan's behavior underscores the futility of our continued presence in Afghanistan. Unintentionally, I'm sure, she makes the very point that lies at the heart of Pakistan's calculus: that the U.S. has no permanent interests in the region, and will eventually go home. When, not if, that happens, Islamabad believes it will still need arrows in its quiver to ward off enemies and protect its interests -- especially vis-Ã -vis India.
It's well worth reading journalist Dexter Filkins' lengthy investigation of this problem in 2008. (It helped win the Times a Pulitzer.) Whatever the rhetoric, many Pakistani leaders see counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. as part of a larger strategic game -- one whose purpose is to ensure the survival of the Pakistani state. In assuring the U.S. of their seriousness, while at the same time tolerating and even assisting Islamic militants within their midst, Islamabad has successfully landed billions in aid while retaining a key asset. Meanwhile, what otherwise might have been a short military operation to kill bin Laden and rout al Qaeda has yielded ten years of investment, training and relevance. Pakistan may not have been shielding bin Laden, but the jihadi threat was essential to keeping the aid flowing, keeping the economy afloat, and -- ironically -- to keeping the U.S.-Pakistan relationship alive.
It would be reprehensible to excuse the duplicity, given the thousands that died here at bin Laden's hands. And I'm not. But it should also be acknowledged that if you review our history, the calculus appears essentially right. Thirty years ago, we imposed harsh sanctions over Pakistan's nuclear program and human rights record -- then almost immediately reversed ourselves so we could funnel arms to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Twenty years ago the Soviets fall, and within a year we discover nonproliferation and human rights again. Back come the sanctions. Ten years ago, we lift sanctions and again turn on billions in aid to buy support in pinning down al Qaeda. Today, we've nailed bin Laden, we're questioning Pakistan's worth and we're looking over the horizon to a strategic partnership with India. Leaders in Islamabad can perhaps be forgiven for thinking that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is less like a "bad marriage" than an illicit affair: we both keep coming back for something we want, but there's no real faith in a future.
Congressional outrage and calls for the U.S. to "reframe its partnerships" sound reasonable, but also seem to validate Pakistan's calculation that the friendship and support of the U.S. is (at best) transactional. But wait, aren't all foreign relations transactional?
No. To illustrate the point, let's look briefly at another bilateral relationship (one that really is like a marriage). Sixty years ago, Pakistan and China began a mutually-supportive strategic relationship, a relationship that has now endured several cycles of U.S. engagement and disengagement. Pakistan granted the PRC much-needed diplomatic recognition, mirrored Chinese positions on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet, and later served as a trusted intermediary in brokering an opening with Washington. In return, China provided economic, military, and technological assistance, including the technology Pakistan most coveted -- that needed to build a nuclear weapon. True, China cannot today match the level of aid or technology offered by the U.S. (hence its allure), but it also makes no demands on Pakistan in return. And unlike the U.S., it will always be right there across the border; there is no "going home."
This is not to say that we should be more like the Chinese; there were, after all, good reasons behind each strategic turn. But the on-again, off-again interest in Pakistan and the Af/Pak region would leave almost anyone cynical about U.S. intentions -- as indeed most people in Pakistan are. If we really want to produce a change in Pakistan's behavior, our only choice may be to give up the idea of leaving entirely -- and to do that, we would have to do some serious soul-searching as a nation about who we are and what we're trying to accomplish in the world.
For Pakistan it remains a dangerous double game, to be sure. By continuing to tolerate groups like the Haqqanis and the Taliban, Islamabad is gambling that they can keep the country together without starting a war with India (or within Pakistan itself). They may prove to be wrong about that. But in fairness, it wouldn't be the first time a country has risked catastrophic blowback in order to cultivate a proxy force against a strategic enemy. Thirty years ago, in Pakistan, that nation was us.
The US and others who point accusing fingers at Pakistan and querulously demand why it is doing business with unpleasant, extremists have short memories. These are the same extremists whom the US and its allies happily trained and nurtured to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.
In 1979, fixated on defeating the Soviets, the West, Saudis, Egyptians and Pakistanis had no qualms about supporting and training those who espoused a twisted, violent interpretation of Islam. The Americans wanted to bleed the Soviets white, and the Pakistanis were only too eager to help. Ten bloody years later in 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Americans pulled out of Pakistan without a backward glance. The Afghans and Pakistanis had little to celebrate after a grinding conflict that left 1 million out of Afghanistan’s 15 million population dead, and 5 million refugees in Pakistan. Even now, more than 20 years after the Soviets left, nearly 3 million Afghan refugees still remain in Pakistan.
The US and its allies will leave Afghanistan again in a year or so. When the US pulls out this time, Pakistan will again be left on its own.
When Saudi & Yemini Mujahideen entered Afghanistan (encouraged by the US) to fight the USSR invaders, they brought with them their conservative Wahabi brand of Islam. The Afghani tribes had not been known for being particularly strict Moslems. However, they had a tribal honor code called Pashtunwali...& a slew of tribal customs that fit hand-in-glove with Wahabism. When Pastunwali & Wahabism met a poisonous brew was born, which evolved in 2 paths, the Taliban (which is more local) & al-Quaida (which is international).
Add to this the already strong presence in the ISI (Pakistani Intelligence) & the Pakistani military of Pashtun tribesmen. The Pashtun have always been fighters, so their natural place in Pakistan was the military. Who was this element in the military & ISI going to support? Certainly not the urbanized, East-facing, non-Pashtun populace & government of the Indus Valley.
We in the West do not understand how honor can be a trap for people. We used to fight duels over honor. Honor was all important to La Familia. The Samurai in Japan would sacrifice their families to save face or the honor of their masters.... even if it might bring dishonor to themselves.... the death with honor would assuage any dishonor.
So it can be with these tribal honor codes. Whoever it was in Pakistan that was sheltering bin Ladin, may have been doing so because of Pashtunwali & tribal obligation... trapped by the promise of a tribal chieftain in Afghanistan... someone they didn't know & w/o their consent... but who was of their tribe... & so, when the chits got called in, the promise had to be made good. Osama would have known the rules quite well.
Because it has been very lucrative for them. They create the problem (Islamic Extremists) and we pay to destroy them.
Its not that simple of course. Pakistan is a large, complicated country. And different elements are playing different games. i suspect elements of the ISI and military are playing other elements of the ISI and military much like they have played the USA. certainly the elected government has been left in the dark.
BUT: Pakistan played Bush/Cheney for all they were worth. President Obama is an entirely different sitory.
Pakistan just found out with the killing of bin Ladin that the USA is not so easy to play any more.
P.S. The idea of Afghanistan being a "strategic reserve" for an undefendable Pakistan is absurd in light of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.
Neither India nor Pakistan can afford to go to war.
The author David Millar states he "understands" Pakistan's support of terrorists: "It should also be acknowledged that if you review our history, the calculus appears essentially right."
Really? You can understand how a nation can have an open policy of having Islamic terrorist training camps? You can understand how deliberate, violent attacks in NY, London, Madrid, Mumbai are reasonable strategic acts? Looking at the dead and bloodied bodies of innocent men, women, and children and watching their distraught families doesn't affect you much?
David, are you that much smarter than the rest of us? Or are you just an immoral/amoral person who is not that smart? I found my answer in your article.
And yes, I *can* understand how a nation can have a (covert) policy of training and supplying irregular forces to affect another country's political future. We unfortunately have blood on our hands from the many anticommunist forces that we fostered during the Cold War-- many of whom were not fully controllable or respectful of human life.
It actually affects me very much. But I ask myself: would taking an eye for an eye put a stop to the violence on the innocent? No; and more than that, its self-indulgent. I see no conflict between responding ferociously to those who attack us and looking deeply at the causes that put people there in the first place.
That's funny. For some reason I'm singing, "The moment you walked in the room, I could tell you were a man of distinction, a real big spender . . . ."
All those campaign contributions, that is. Too bad there's only one Court of St. James . . .
Has become a perfect weave;
What's constant in the process
Is the purpose to deceive.
So wrap it up in doublespeak,
Around it rumors wreathe,
Then underhand it to a scribe
Who gratefully receives
Exclusively your tricky gift
With which he is well-pleased--
A Machiavellian macrame,
The warp and woof in fine array.
Unravel it he might, if dutiful,
But hangs it in the public square
And shouts to all the world:
"It's beautiful!"
.