In the midst of wholesale criticism of Pres. Bush's decision to escalate of the war in Iraq, his opponents have found safe cover. It's easy to pile on when a policy is so obviously calamitous and futile. Yet in the background serious discussion is going on about what a feasible strategy would be, a good deal of it centered on one book, Alistair Horne's "A Savage War of Peace." Horne is a British historian, and his 2002 book analyzes the French failure to defeat insurgents in Algeria between 1954 and 1962.
After scrutinizing the two conflicts, Horne finds five sources of peril that make victory nearly impossible in Iraq:
1. A conventional army is trying to defeat an unconventional enemy.
2. The enemy concentrates on soft targets, particularly the police, to cause maximum instability.
3. Torture and abuse have become acceptable methods (it was France's use of torture against the Algerians that disgusted the French public and ultimately led to defeat).
4. Borders are porous, allowing the incursion of money and arms from neighboring countries.
5. There is no viable way to disengage from the conflict. Violence continues to breed violence.
These conditions seem glaringly obvious in Iraq at this moment. What's striking about them is that religious fanaticism and civil war--the two most hotly debated aspects of the current war--play no part. Sheerly in terms of strategic position, America faces circumstances beyond its control. By implication, there is no realistic road to victory, perhaps not even to stalemate. As long as these five perils exist, the enemy (however loosely one defines that term) holds an enormous advantage.
Horne points out that Algeria isn't a perfect match with Iraq. He is fond of saying that history doesn't repeat itself, only historians do. Algeria was a war for independence against a colonial power. The country's borders were successfully sealed by the French. Three to four million Frenchman lived there. Religious factionalism played no significant role. Even so, we seem to have found a comparison that works better than Vietnam. Anyone who takes an anti-war position is obliged to consider each of the five perils fairly and objectively. Thinking in a bipartisan way, what can we realistically do about them? The options are dire.
1. A conventional army is trying to defeat an unconventional enemy.
To overcome this problem, America would have to train a massive counter-insurgency force to blend in with the Iraqi population. This implies, of course, that they speak Arabic and look anonymous to everyday Iraqis.
2. The enemy concentrates on soft targets, particularly the police, to cause maximum instability.
To protect the police, they would have to be cordoned off. Actual patrolling of the streets or opening the doors of police stations would be kept to a minimum.
3. Torture and abuse have become acceptable methods.
This is one point we definitely can control. Horne urges the U.S. to eschew torture immediately and completely.
4. Borders are porous, allowing the incursion of money and arms from neighboring countries.
This problem can only be solved in one of two ways, both unavailable: post enormous troop strength to patrol Iraq's entire border or attack and defeat Syria and Iran, the two nations that are offering aid and comfort to the insurgents.
5. There is no viable way to disengage from the conflict.
No experts, civilian or military, can seem to agree on an exit plan that doesn't lead to a catastrophe greater than the current one.
In short, four of the five problems have no solution in practical terms. Any possible solutions are fraught with their own perils, however, and could make a horrible situation even worse. Facing this fact is bitter. With no viable way to end the Iraqi conflict, America will twist in the vise as it closes tighter and tighter. Both the pro-war and anti-war sides will remain paralyzed while publicly fighting a war of words. The administration will "move forward" by doing more of the same. In a recent interview Horne was asked if his analysis of Algeria offered any solutions for Iraq. He skirted the question by saying that personally he felt there was still hope in this war. Where that hope exactly came from he didn't elaborate.
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