It has been weeks since the South Korean ship Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea near the disputed boundary between South and North Korea. As yet the cause is unknown--some government critics suspect a cover-up--but after raising the wreck South Korean officials said the explosion appeared to be external. Which implicates Pyongyang.
If the cause was a mine, a North-South confrontation still could be avoided. The mine might have been left over from the Korean War. Or if of more modern vintage it could have broken loose from its moorings.
If a torpedo was used, however, the threat of conflict rises. The Republic of Korea could not easily ignore a North Korean submarine stalking and sinking one of its vessels.
Seoul has promised "a firm response," though, argues Han Sung-joo, a former ROK foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, "that doesn't mean a military reaction or an eye-for-eye response." In fact, the South did not retaliate after earlier provocations, such as the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner and assassination attempt against former president Chun Doo-hwan which killed 16 ROK officials.
A military reprisal then could have triggered a full-scale war. Responding in kind this time also could spark a dangerous escalatory spiral with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
However, Seoul has spent the last decade attempting to pacify the DPRK, providing aid, allowing investment, and hosting summits. To do nothing would seem to be abject appeasement, undermining ROK credibility and encouraging the North to act even more recklessly in the future. If the word "firm" has any meaning, the South Korean government would have to do more than protest.
Still, the decision, though difficult, shouldn't concern the U.S. The South has gone from an authoritarian economic wreck to a democratic economic powerhouse. With a vastly bigger and more sophisticated economy, larger population, and greater access to international markets and support than the North, Seoul long has been able to defend itself. Pyongyang retains a numerical military edge, but its weapons are old, troops are undertrained, and industrial base is shrinking.
Thus, the South should be able to decide on the action that best advances its security. However, Seoul long chose to emphasize economic development over military preparedness. As a result, the ROK remains dependent on America.
Some 27,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the South. The U.S. retains formal command of all forces, American and South Korean, during a war. Seoul expects substantial U.S. air and naval support and ground reinforcement in the event of war.
Which means that ROK retaliation against the DPRK would draw the U.S. into any conflict. So Washington cannot help but pressure South Korean decision-makers to act in accord with American as well as ROK interests. In fact, that's what happened in 1983, when the U.S. insisted that Seoul not retaliate militarily after the bombing attack on President Chun.
The current situation also means that the destiny of America is essentially controlled by the North's Kim Jong-il. Ordering an attack on a South Korean ship could end up forcing Washington to go to war. Although the bilateral U.S.-South Korean defense treaty does not make American intervention automatic, it is unimaginable that an American administration would stand aside in a conflict.
This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the Cold War. Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America.
Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel.
At the same time, with the threat of a North Korean invasion dramatically diminished--whether or not Pyongyang was responsible for the ship sinking--Washington looks increasingly at other "dual uses" of American forces stationed in the peninsula. However, Seoul is unlikely to assent if the U.S. tries to turn the ROK into an advanced base in a regional conflict, particularly against China. Indeed, the South Korean government would be foolish beyond measure if it allowed Washington to turn the South into a military adversary of the ROK's increasingly powerful neighbor, a nation with a long memory.
What value, then, is the alliance?
Some proponents view it as a useful tool of nonproliferation, discouraging South Korea from developing a nuclear weapon. However, that possibility remains remote. Although nuclear negotiations with the North hardly look promising, China might yet forcefully weigh in to halt the North Korean program. Moreover, the U.S. could maintain a nuclear umbrella over the ROK without keeping conventional forces on the ground in South Korea, which only act as nuclear hostages vulnerable to DPRK intimidation.
Moreover, the most powerful incentive for Beijing to apply significant pressure on the North to denuclearize (and not just return to the Six-Party talks) is the threat of further proliferation. The People's Republic of China does not fear a North Korean atomic bomb. The PRC might not worry unduly about a South Korean weapon.
But Japan and even Taiwan might consider joining a growing nuclear parade. That possibility should raise more than eyebrows in Beijing, encouraging a vigorous response to halt the process at the start. The best way to keep the ROK and neighboring states non-nuclear is to make the North non-nuclear. The best way to make North Korea non-nuclear is for the PRC to use its full array of diplomatic and economic tools on Pyongyang.
Should it become clear that the DPRK was responsible for sinking the Cheonan, Seoul will be under pressure to act. Ryoo Kihl-jae, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, predicts the government's response will be "to supplement the current military defense system in a crisis situation."
But that should have been done long ago. The lesson of the Yellow Sea incident for both the U.S. and South Korea is that it is long past time for the ROK to take over responsibility for its own defense.
Whatever the two nations' military relationship in the future--their cultural and economic ties will remain natural and vibrant regardless--it should be based on global cooperation in areas of shared interest. The old Cold War mission of America protecting South Korea from the DPRK should be gracefully retired.
1. The US MUST sign a peace treaty with NK to formally end the war. Technically, the Korean War has never ended.
2.The US MUS recognize NK and normalize the diplomatic relationship with NK.
3. All the US troops in SK MUST come home.
And Bandow must read John Feffer's books on Korea before writing another article on Korea.
SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN ALONE CANNOT COUNTER-BALANCE NORTH KOREA AND CHINA!
HOWEVER, CHINA AND RUSSIA WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE THE US OFF THE SOIL OF SOUTH KOREA. FOR THAT MATTER SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD LIKE THE US OFF THEIR SOIL AS WELL. THEY MAY LIKE IT ENOUGH TO DIS-SOLVE NORTH KOREA AND AGREE TO ASSIST IN FINANCING RE-UNIFICATION.
A UNIFIED KOREA WITH A GROWING ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN WOULD CREATE A PEACEFUL BALANCE FOR THE US TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA (AND JAPAN IF NEED BE) DURING PEACETIME...A CLAUSE COULD BE PUT IN TO RE-ACTIVATE KOREAN AND JAPANESE BASES IN TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER NECESSITY (NATURAL DISASTER , SECURITY, ETC)
PLAN FOR IT, PROPOSE IT, NEGOTIATE IT, EXECUTE IT...LEAVE A VACUUM AND WAR WILL FOLLOW.
Author's implication that an alliance ( any alliance) has no value is wholly without merit.
One can debate placement or strategic value of various military bases. But questioning alliances with important economic and strategic partners can only arise out of the serious misunderstanding of international politics.
The only antiquated chimera is the thought that the US sghould continue with its interventionist policies that fuel much of the anti-american sentiment around the world
no one is suggesting being "isolationist" which like liberal or protectionism, is a word used in its extreme to stifle discussion, but certainly we can do a much better job of minding our own business and letting other provide for their own defense - not to say we wouldn'thelp if there was a conflict
Instead of trying to defend stillmind, why don't you address my questions:
- Provide the source of your assertion that "the average cost increase on a chinese tire was $3.50 there has been zero cost increase for tires". I know you just made that up. Prove otherwise;
On your argument that foreign car companies receive subsidies and have protected markets at home, have you forgotten that: Chrysler has now had two US government funded bailouts without which it would have disappeared; Almost two-thirds of GM is now owned by the US government, which saved it from disappearing through an injection of tens of billions of dollars; and
Imported light trucks are subject to a tariff of 25% (which helps to protect your favorite, the F-150)?
On your statement that virtually no computers are assembled here any more, does that include the over 27,000,000 electronic computers that were made in the US in 2008 - http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/cir/historical_data/mq334r/index.html?????
This is precisely what author of this article is suggesting , with you following on the coattails.
2.) If war happens betweent the two let them deal with it.
3.) provide logistical support to the South Koreans in the event of war but little to nothing else.
We are not the worl'd babysitter. Let them deal with their problems.
Plus add in the problems with our foreign intervnentionism and entanglements feuling much of the anti American sentiment around the globe, should spell to any common sensical and reasonable thinking person that its past time to pull back and start taking care of and minding our own business at home
The DPRK could do a lot of damage before they go down.
Southeast Asia is strong and vibrant. Let's give them the oppotunity to deal with their local problems like Kim Jong Il.
Oh, and the region is NORTHeast Asia, not Southeast Asia.
US market open to Korean goods, Korean market for US goods not so much
Korean automakers exports cars to the US at 100 to one over US autos in Korea
Let's hope that the transition is peaceful.
And in our imperfect ACTUAL world, the US would eventually get drawn in. The "savings" of removing our troops would be all for naught. Helping democratic allies like South Korea, Taiwan, or Japan defend themselves is pennies on the dollar compared to what would be lost otherwise. And we get more than that back in terms of our democratic values and our commerce spreading across the Pacific.