Syria's Bashar Assad pulled almost all the cards out of his sleeves, but in vain. The uprising is just intensifying rather than subsiding. According to his own propaganda machine, his adversaries are "extreme" Muslim elements. In other words, the majority Sunni population, which is determined to bring his regime down. This is not going to happen immediately, but the end is in sight and it is about time to assess possible implications with regard to three of Syria's immediate neighbors and Iran. Let's start with Israel. In the old days, when Syria was the unstable country of the Middle East, with constant coups and rulers whose time in power was measured in months, tensions along the border with Israel were the order of the day. As if by Pavlovian reflex, internal tensions in Syria led to provocations and one fateful war in June 1967.
This state of affairs ended in the aftermath of the 1973 war, and the once volatile border became so peaceful for almost four decades, which also corresponded with the Assad dynasty's control in Syria. This was so, because the advent of Hafiz Assad signaled an end to the era of chronic instability, despite the fact that the regime has never been legitimized by most of the Syrian population. However, Assad proved strong enough to dominate the domestic scene and subject it to the priorities of his foreign policy, as opposed to what it was before him.
The regime realized its strategic/military vulnerability towards Israel and acted with utmost responsibility in times of crisis. Their adversaries in Syria used the derogatory slogan that Hafiz was Assad [Lion in Arabic] in Lubnan [Lebanon in Arabic] and Arnab [Rabbit in Arabic] in the Golan...
Bashar is not likely to change this policy, and so long as his control over the military remains as it is today there is no danger of a war with Israel. Lebanon was the arena of limited-scale, managed Israeli-Syrian collisions in the past, particularly during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and on occasions since then. As of 2005, there is no Syrian military presence in Lebanon, so there, too, no collision with Israel is in the offing.
It is a completely different story with regard to the Syrian crisis and Lebanese politics. The gradual collapse in Damascus causes ripples in Beirut. The defections from the traditional pro-Syrian coalition there start resembling a stampede. The latest is the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, the veteran Sh'iite politician Nabih Barri, perhaps Assad's longest and most trusted ally in Lebanon, who has seen it all for over three decades. Barri is on record now, supporting the continuation of the status-quo in Lebanon, with Sa'ad Hariri as the caretaker PM, thus thwarting the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran plan to nominate their stooge Najib Mikati as the new PM.
This leaves Hezbollah in a very vulnerable position, and its leadership will have to make a crucial decision in the very near future. Should they also adopt an attitude of wait and see with regard to the events in Syria and accept a lesser role in Lebanon than what they envisaged to themselves until now, or will they try to create a game changer by provoking troubles with Israel.
This decision will be made in tandem with Iran, and that is exactly why it is a close call. If the decision is purely that of Hezbollah, it seems very likely that Sheikh Nasrallah will remember the lessons of the confrontation of 2006. Brinkmanship and toxic rhetoric yes, but no full-scale confrontation. On balance, I believe that the Iranians will go along with it. What can happen is an attempt to commit a spectacular act of terrorism aimed at Israeli or even an American target.
And then there is another of Assad's neighbors, Turkey. Not much attention is given to the fact that Turkey has a population of half a million Alawites. It is a distinct and undesirable possibility that the intensifying sectarian Sunni-Alawite confrontation in areas adjacent to the Syrian-Turkish border could lead to a movement of Alawite refugees to Turkey, and an ensuing restiveness among the Alawites there.
Another possible implication is the reactivation of the anti-Turkish Kurdish PKK using Syria's territory. With the growing troubles in the Kurdish areas of Northeast Syria this danger looms large. Syria has always wanted its Arab neighbors, Israel and the US to acknowledge its centrality in Middle East politics, but surely wished it to be under happier circumstances.