After a very bitter debate, Iraqi Parliament passed a law to officially regulate the current and future role of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs), a group of supportive fighters who helped save Iraq from a complete political and security disaster in the wake of ISIS invasion of Mosul on 10 June 2014. Like everything Iraqi, the law was criticized inside the country and in some international circles as well. Paradoxically, some of the critics spent much time in the past criticizing Iraq for allowing many fighting groups to operate outside the law.
The PMFs, or al-Hashd al-Sha’bi as it is called in Iraq, came into being after the near total collapse of the Iraqi Armed Forces that led the second most populated province in Iraq to fall in terrorist hands. Within a matter of hours, terrorist sleeping cells emerged in several other cities in Salahuddin, Diyala, and Anbar Provinces as well as the outskirts of Baghdad, the areas known as Baghdad Belt, putting the Iraqi capital within reach of terrorist hands. Vulnerable Iraqi communities, Christians, Yazidis, Shabak, and small Shia communities in northern Iraq, among others were ruthlessly massacred or driven out of their homes and their belonging were looted by locals or confiscated as property of the so-called Islamic State that was established in invaded areas. In Salahuddin Province, at least 1,700 unarmed Shia cadets were shot in cold blood by local tribesmen who gave allegiance to ISIS to cover their sectarian crime – the Camp Speicher Massacre, which is the worst single massacre in post-Saddam Iraq.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the scholar with highest Shia authority, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) asking Iraqis “to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places.” This was the first such fatwa in a century, and it was drafted, as he told me, only after seeing no credible signs of assistance from the international community, as Iraq was collapsing.
Originally, the fatwa was asking Iraqis to join the Iraqi Armed Forces, but these were in no shape to even receive help. Volunteers were often send back home because the Iraqi Army Units has no capacity to train and equip them in time to mobilize against the ongoing ISIS offensive. Meanwhile, the political elite were half-heartedly monitoring the security events as they were selfishly immersed in the formation of a new government, following the March 2014 general elections. But other key players in Iraq were more interested in the security situation and impact of the threat to Iraq and the region.
Iraq had many Shia fighting organizations that operated between 2003 and 2011, then dropped their weapons after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq, but they never fully dissolved themselves. Badr Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hizbollah were the first to re-establish themselves and recruit volunteers. Close to Iran, they managed to secure weapons and other equipment very quickly – many volunteers brought their weapons from home – and in a matter of days, they were making a significant difference in blocking ISIS, along with the Iraqi Security Forces that remained standing. They fought in Samarraa, in the Baghdad Belt, in Diyala and even in the ISIS heartland areas, Baiji and Falluja. Other Shia groups were formed, or remobilized, in due time: the Sadr Movement mobilized its remaining elements of Jaish al-Mahdi, calling them Saraya al-Salam, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq formed Saraya Ashura, and the holy Shrines of Karbala and Najaf formed their own forces. By mid-July, it became clear that Iraq was safe and it did not need foreign forces to defeat ISIS.
As the fight against ISIS unfolded, many non-Shia fighting forces came to the scene. Iraqi Christians, who were among the primary victims of ISIS, formed their own fighting forces and joined the PMFs, as did the Sunnis who refused to allow ISIS access to their towns. Like their Shia counterparts, some of these forces pre-dated the ISIS invasion of Mosul. Some of them were part of the tribal forces that fought against al-Qaeda in the dreadful years of 2006 and 2007, while others were formed as standing tribal security forces providing themselves a sense of security in the absence of government protection.
Until the passage of the PMFs law, most international media organizations and Iraq analysts called them “Iran-Backed Shi’ite Militias” – many still do this – and considered their existence a threat to the future of Iraq or, at best, a means to further Iranian interests in Iraq. Even their role in fighting ISIS is still being interpreted as an implementation of Iranian policies. This law will address these concerns. While it is true that leadership in some PMFs are close to Iran, and some of them are indeed on Iranian payroll, the undisputed fact that the overwhelming majority of the Shia who joined the MPFs to fight ISIS have unshaken loyalty to Iraq and firm religious adherence to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who presides over the Iraqi Shia authority in Najaf and is the most widely followed Shia Marja’ (religious authority) worldwide. Obviously, the Sunnis and Christians in the PMFs are not Iran loyalists. This law will place all PMFs under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, Iraq’s Prime Minister, who will appoint their commanders, subject to parliamentary approval, and will be the sole authority on their structure, internal affairs, and combat operations. Under the law, all current leaders of the PMFs will have to choose between political roles and PMFs affiliation and the fighters, like the rest of Iraqi Armed Forces, will not be allowed to have political affiliation. The law will also ensure that the PMFs will have a balanced demographic and geographic representation in the PMFs rank and file. More importantly, those who volunteered to fight and die for their country during the most difficult days in its recent history will be recognized and their families will receive equal benefits to those given to the families of fallen Iraqi soldiers and Federal Police.
The fact that must be recognized it that these PMFs are there on the ground, with more than eighty thousand armed men who possess real combat experience better than many armies in the region and they are more popular than any civilian or military institution in Iraq. They control large areas in the country and, having shed their blood in defense of their country, they are not going to accept a “Thank you, now disarm and go home” kind of a reward. We saw what happened to Iraq when the former military was misguidedly dismantled and denied any benefits in 2003 by the U.S. administrator of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer. They became an insurgency that cost Iraq and the U.S. a great loss in blood and treasure. We also heard much criticism of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for not adequately recognizing the services of the tribal forces that fought al-Qaeda in 2007 – paradoxically by the same people who call for disarming the PMFs. Leaving these fighting groups without a law to regulate them and a mechanism to recognize their patriotic sacrifice for Iraq is the wrong policy. Also, any talk about dismissing these forces at this time, or even in the short term, is foolish. Iraq and the entire region still have a long way to achieve stability and decisively defeat the forces of evil that keep coming back after every defeat.
Instead of condemning the PMFs or drawing them to an unnecessary fight against their government, it is more prudent to help Iraq implement this law in a way that makes these forces a valuable security asset for the country. The U.S. and the international community can advise the Iraqi government on how to incorporate the PMFs into its security forces and implement the law to strengthen its defense and security capabilities. When this is accomplished, the burden of fighting terrorism will not require American or other foreign forces. All we need to provide Iraq will be the needed arms and training. Those who advise the Iraqi government to confront the PMF, motivated mostly by their paranoid fears of Iran or the Shia, can have their concerns addressed by the good implementation of the law without fully accepting their misinformed advice at face value. If the Iraqi government cannot make friends, the least it can do is not to make enemies.
Abbas Kadhim is Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University and Founding President of the Institute of Shia Studies. Twitter: @DrAbbasKadhim