Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan visits Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar this year, burdened by his differences with the United States, Germany, and the European Union, and by his domestic problems and his weak position in the Turkish-Russian-Iranian triangle in Syria. Erdogan denies that he has a project of putting Muslim Brotherhood in power, with a view to guarantee Turkish dominance through the so-called moderate Islamic model, and denies all the same the failure of this project. Erdogan visits Saudi Arabia amid Saudi resentment over the deployment of Turkish troops to Qatar, described by Saudi sources as “provocative” and would certainly affect the climate of the meetings, if these are not cancelled. Then there is the Kurdish question, which continues to vex Erdogan in Syria, while serving as a bargaining chip in Iraq, amid major shifts on the ground, including military ones in Syria and political ones in Iraq, with the approaching referendum on the independence of the Kurdistan region. And of course, Erdogan is haunted by his domestic nightmares, which have imposed on him a ‘siege mentality’ prompting measures like the detention and sacking of thousands, including generals, following the failed coup against him one year ago, an attempt he fears may be repeated. Erdogan’s problem is that he imagines himself a leader like Russia’s Vladimir Putin, but he lacks the personal characteristics as well as the capacity to replicate his successes, with the result being that Erdogan has shackled himself with failed projects such as the Muslim Brotherhood, not to mention his obsession with the Kurdish question, the arbitrariness of his challenges to Europe and the Gulf, his schizophrenic dealings with the United States, and his obscure vision for Turkey.
The Saudi message to the Turkish president shortly before his trip to Riyadh is “don’t interferer,” according to one diplomatic source, in reference to the crisis with Qatar. The source said that Erdogan will probably hear from the Saudi officials something along these lines: “You are a dear brother representing a major power, but there is no need for provocations like Turkish military presence in Qatar, because no one mentioned any military options. All sides must avoid military escalation, so kindly stay out of the issue and don’t intervene as a direct party.”
Most likely, the Turkish leader will object and insist that Turkey has a sovereign right to decide the nature of its relations with Qatar, and that the purpose of Turkish military presence in Qatar is not to confront Saudi Arabia. If so, why are the Turks insisting on it, and what does this entail for Turkey?
First of all, it is toxic for Turkish-Gulf relations, the source said, and isolates Turkey itself. Saudi Arabia may be prompted to stop helping to mend Turkish-Egyptian relations, and reduce strategic cooperation with Ankara that had been agreed in the past, replaced by tension and coolness that benefit neither Turkey nor Qatar, the source added.
The Turkish presidency says that Erdogan sees Saudi Arabia and Qatar as two friendly countries, and that his visit is in support of the Kuwaiti mediation to resolve the crisis with Qatar.
The Saudi message to the Turkish president is that his insistence on continuing a military relationship with Qatar will turn his country into a party to the conflict and spoil its role as a mediator.
The Saudi message to Qatar has recently shown more willingness to negotiate following the agreement reached between the US and Qatar on combatting terror, which must no doubt include an implementation and monitoring mechanism. The gradual resolution of the differences between Qatar and the Arab Quarter boycotting Doha – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt – and the implementation of their six principles is now a possibility. Abdullah al-Muallemi, Saudi ambassador to the UN, said that the implementation of the six principles is subject to discussion, stating that the US-Qatari counter-terror memorandum was a step in the right direction.
The Saudi diplomacy is attempting to entice Qatar to return to the Gulf fold, instead of allowing itself to become isolated in its immediate neighborhood. The collapse of the Gulf Cooperation Council would benefit Iran first and foremost, especially in terms of furthering its bid to establish a new regional security system that comprises GCC countries, Iran, and Iraq. Such a system requires inevitably the dismantling of the GCC security system, and would consecrate Tehran as a major regional power at the expense of the other members of its proposed security system. This was Iran’s dream under US former President Barack Obama, who distanced the US from the Arab Gulf countries and embraced Iran as an alternative partner. But under President Donald Trump, Iran’s dream may be difficult to realize, because US-Gulf relations have been restored to their previous warmth.
The collapse of the GCC would also lead to the division and fragmentation of its members, undermining their interests and weakening them, at the security, economic, and political levels. In truth, this collapse may be desirable to powers like the US, Russia, and the Europeans, for purposes related to oil and gas as well as arms deals. Turkey, Israel, and Iran may also desire this outcome, as it further weakens the Arab weight in the regional balance of power with Turkey, Israel, and Iran, three countries that tacitly collaborate to weaken the Arab states.
Turkey is part of a triangle with Russia and Iran in Syria, although some in the Gulf believe Turkey has an independent position that counter-balances the Iranians in this triangle. Both Turkey and Iran have religious ideological motives. Erdogan’s Turkey is standard bearer of the Muslim Brotherhood, who have hijacked the revolutions of the youths in Tunisia and Egypt in particular, in the name of a democracy that ends with elections, but does not honor the principle of separating the branches of power. Iran’s ideology today is based on the model of establishing a parallel militia alongside the regular army, similar to the IRGC in Iran, the Popular Mobilization in Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and whatever was being similarly done in Syria before Russia insisted on stopping it, clinging to the exclusivity of the Syrian army rather than the Iranian Basij model.
The US-Russian accords on Syria and Iraq converge on two points, in addition to the priority of eliminating ISIS and al-Qaeda linked groups.
Firstly, Putin and Trump both oppose what Obama once accepted, namely imposing religion on the state following the Turkish or Iranian models. They are both in favor of pressuring the IRGC, Hezbollah, and the Popular Mobilization but this does not mean at all a desire to topple the regime in Tehran. They also do not agree on designating Iran and Hezbollah on the terror lists, because Hezbollah is a strong partner on the ground in the axis that brings together Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime.
Secondly, Washington and Moscow claim to be against partition in both Syria and Iraq. Nikki Haley, US ambassador to the UN, recently expressed concern over the consequences of the referendum to be held on Kurdish independence from Iraq for example over the efforts to defeat ISIS, but at the same time said she appreciated the legitimate aspirations of the Kurds. Tehran too claims to be opposed to the partition of Iraq. Ali Larijani, the chairman of Iran’s Shura Council, warned against plots to divide Iraq, stressing that pursuing such policies would have destructive consequences. Addressing a Kurdish delegation after a meeting, he said that the project for partitioning Iraq will implicate the Kurds in conflicts that could destroy all their achievements. Hoshyar Zebari, the chairman of the Higher Referendum Council, said the vote carries risks but stressed the timing was right, and that the Kurds were not waiting for Baghdad’s permission. Turkey, for its part, does not seem to be opposed to an independent Kurdistan in Iraq, but is categorically opposed to any form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
The accords between Trump and Putin and US and Russian officials, according to the Washington Post, were behind Trump’s decision to end covert CIA support for Syrian rebel groups, which Russia sees as targeting its ally Bashar al-Assad and therefore undermines its interests. Trump’s decision suggests a radical change in his Syria policy since he took office, namely, to drop calls for Assad to step down immediately and agree a roadmap for Syria with the Russians. But practically speaking, the CIA program launched under Obama was full of gaps and was more symbolic than pragmatic. It is not known what Trump would have gotten in return from the Russians, but this deals is likely to be just one of a series of deals.
What remains a mystery in US-Russian accords is Iran, caught between Moscow’s rewards and Washington’s sanctions. The Gulf countries allied to the US have received reassurances and promises regarding Iran. But casting a quick look on the geography of the territories reclaimed from ISIS in Iraq and Syria is sufficient to understand that the Persian Crescent project is moving ahead, despite all threats and sanctions. There does not seem to be any real role on the ground for the so-called Islamic Coalition forces to fill the vacuum, nor is there yet a Gulf or Arab seat at the table of US-Russian accords, bearing in mind that Iran and Turkey are both represented through the Russian triangle.
The US measures against Iran and Hezbollah are proceeding according to a policy coordinated between the US Department of Treasury, the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security. In other words, Trump is forging ahead with what the Obama administration had failed to implement, to contain Iran and Hezbollah financially and politically, and even with legal action, to punish Iran’s for its ballistic missile program and its malicious activities. However, the nuclear deal remains outside of this escalation, with the Trump administration recently announcing that Tehran was abiding by the agreement, even though Trump had called it a bad deal on the campaign trail.
The sorting on the ground continues, with demographic and sectarian implications. All sides are aware of the demographic changes being imposed in the areas liberated from ISIS in Iraq and Syria, but the majority are burying their heads in the sand, as though ISIS will be uprooted magically and the extremism will be diluted by the international and regional arrangements being made for Iraq and Syria, along with the tragedy of the destruction of two major Arab peoples and states that were indispensable for counter-balancing Iran, Israel, and Turkey.
In order to avoid even bigger mistakes, it may be worthwhile for the key players in the Arab region to see the forest for the trees.