Pragmatists can also be progressive. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou is a case-in-point. Over the last three weeks Ma has set the stage for meeting with his counterpart in Beijing, and now appears to have a found a means of addressing Taiwan's economic woes. Neither of these developments comes without controversy, but Ma has demonstrated an ability to ignore or assuage opponents without significantly compromising his long-term agenda. There is much to learn from watching this masterful politician at work--and Washington should be applauding his performance.
Over the last year Ma has succeeded in reopening direct links to the mainland, facilitated implementation of military confidence-building measures, and won a place for Taiwan in the World Health Organization. All unprecedented developments. Furthermore, Ma's administration has fostered a "mature" conversation with their mainland counterparts thereby opening the door to reciprocal outreach from Beijing. For the first time in almost 20 years cross-Strait relations seem destined to yield more than heated name-calling and threats of armed intervention.
I am pleased to report that pattern continued in June 2009. On 11 June, President Ma announced he would be willing to serve as the chairman of the ruling Nationalist Party--the Kuomintang. This seemingly trivial development--what national leader doesn't want to head his or her party?--could potentially result in Ma meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. You see, while Ma is not welcome in China as the president of Taiwan, he is fully able to visit Beijing as the Kuomintang chairman. Instead of meeting as the leaders of two independent states, Ma could sit down with Hu in their roles as heads of their respective political parties.
This is not idle speculation. Ma faces no opposition in the 26 July 2009 Kuomintang election. The incumbent, Wu Poh-hsiung, is stepping down and no other candidates have announced an intention to challenge the President. Barring unforeseen circumstances, Ma will be elected and begin serving as the Kuomintang chair on 12 September 2009.
So, when could Ma then meet with Hu? Now we are going to have to engage in a little crystal ball gazing. In April 2005, then-Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Lien Chan met with Hu Jintao in an effort to open a dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The resulting KMT-CCP forum has focused on economic and cultural issues--and provided a handy means of conducting a back-channel, cross-Strait conversation. In May 2009, the outgoing Kuomintang chair told reporters, "In my opinion, it is natural for the leaders of our two parties to hold discussions once a year." As this statement came only a day after Wu had met with Hu Jintao, one suspects the two sides had agreed to annual schedule prior to the press conference.
This data in hand, let's return to divining a date for Ma to publicly shake hands with Hu. Political analysts and media outlets on Taiwan believe such a session could occur in 2012. They come to this conclusion as Hu's term as the Chinese Communist Party chairman expires that year...and such a historic meeting with Ma would help secure the Chinese President's legacy. Other sources are not so patient. One Kuomintang legislator has gone so far as to argue Ma should meet with Hu as soon as possible after assuming the chairmanship.
China's reaction to the whole affair? The state-owned China Daily on 11 June 2009 declared the prospects of the highest-level talks between the mainland and Taiwan had soared as a result of Ma's bid for the Kuomintang chairmanship. The newspaper went on to optimistically note, "Although Ma has to visit Beijing in his capacity as KMT chairman and talk to Hu in his role as general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, the unprecedented meeting will signal 'great reconciliation' between the mainland and Taiwan."
I can hear the critics already. The standard charge is now about to be levied..."Ma and Hu are simply conducting a relationship between the KMT and mainland China. Ma does not speak for the people of Taiwan." Misinformed poppycock. Popular support for independence on Taiwan is not as widespread as some Cold Warriors would have us believe. In December 2002, a poll of Taiwan's residents found about 32% of the people polled said that Taiwan independence is better for the nation's interest than unification with China. Nearly 20% said they preferred the status quo--de facto independence. Approximately 21% said that unification with China would be better for the nation's interest than independence, and 27% were undecided.
In December 2008, a poll conducted by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council showed a dramatic shift from even this lukewarm support for independence. A poll of 1,068 adults found 91.8% favored maintaining the status quo, up from 78.6% in the Council's 15 October 2008 survey. This was the highest level of support for maintaining the status quo since Taiwan began to conduct surveys on cross-Strait ties in the 1980s. Only 6% of the respondents backed Taiwan immediately declaring independence and just 2% wanted immediate unification with the mainland--compared to 14.8% and 1.7% in the 15 October 2008 poll.
How do we explain these numbers? Two phenomena are at work. The first is primarily economics, the second is sociological. In 1991, the volume of cross-Strait trade--a distance of less than 150 miles between two populations who largely speak the same language--accounted for just $8 billion. In 2006, that same figure was $115 billion...and growing. As the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations has observed, in 2005 investments on mainland China accounted for more than half of Taiwan's overseas spending. (Taiwan officials claim businesses on the island have invested over $74 billion on the mainland as of January 2009.) By 2006, China had become Taiwan's top export partner and its second-largest import partner. In addition to these monetary links, Taipei now estimates up to 1 million Taiwan citizens live on mainland China--the bulk of this population is said to be businessmen and their families.
The sociological explanation for this diminished interest in a formal declaration of independence is less obvious. More than a few Western scholars believe a growing sense of nationalism among Taiwan's population will cause the island to permanently separate itself from the mainland. A comprehensive study published by the East-West Center in 2006 boldly refutes this claim. Using data from surveys, interviews, focus groups and previous research, the East-West Center found "holding a Taiwanese identify does not equate to supporting independence or opposing better cross-Strait relations."
Even more significantly, the East-West Center research discovered nationalism on Taiwan varies by generation. To quote the study, nationalism "is a strong force mainly among [Taiwan residents] born between the early 1930s and the early 1950s, while younger [Taiwan citizens] generally hold pragmatic views about cross-Strait economic and political interactions." For the moment, this generational difference is problematic because the older cohort largely dominates the island's political leadership. In the future, however, as the younger Taiwan residents shift into the leadership roles "we can expect them to adjust the island's mainland policy to promote engagement without surrendering [Taipei's] political autonomy."
In fact, there are already signs of this shift in emphasis. Ma's election on 22 March 2008 is now perceived as a repudiation of the pro-independence politics that played so prominently during his predecessor's administration. We should also note Ma's victory was not in dispute. Ma defeated his opponent by more than 2 million votes, winning with a margin of 58 to 42%. As the Congressional Research Service observed, Ma's walked into office with a promise to address the island's economic woes and to improve Taiwan's damaged relationship with the mainland.
This brings us to Ma's recent achievement on the economic front. On 30 June 2009, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs announced Taipei will immediately allow mainland Chinese to invest in 64 manufacturing sectors, 25 service sectors and 11 public infrastructure projects. In addition, Chinese companies will now be allowed to purchase real estate on Taiwan, including commercial property and residential homes. (The latter announcement was coupled with change in visa requirements--mainland Chinese who own real estate on Taiwan will be allowed to visit the island independently and stay for up to four months. Previously, mainland Chinese were compelled to travel in a group and could only stay a maximum of 14 days per visit.)
The relaxation of investment regulations--while hailed as a further sign of warming cross-Strait relations--are more evidence of Ma's pragmatism than his diplomatic aplomb. Taiwan's economy contracted a record 10.24% during the first quarter of this year, and the island's unemployment rate has now reached an unprecedented 5.84%. Quite frankly, Ma is looking for mainland Chinese to serve as an economic stimulus package. I'm not convinced this will work. The new investment legislation comes with protectionist measures that may deter would-be shoppers. Chinese funds cannot enter Taiwan without government permission. The laws ban funds from the People's Liberation Army or Chinese companies who support military functions. And, the legislation prohibits investment in "monopoly industries," i.e., electricity, fuel suppliers, or firms that play a key role in domestic economic development, financial stability or national security.
While it is too early to gauge the success of Ma's latest economic maneuver, this pragmatic policy shift was probably warmly received in Beijing. Like his bid to set the stage for a meeting with Hu Jintao, Ma's pragmatism on the economic front bodes well for cross-Strait relations and suggest a progressive agenda that could dramatically reduce tensions in the region for years to come. Yes, there is much to learn from this masterful politician...let us hope Washington is taking careful notes.