Iran scored a rather impressive diplomatic victory this week with the EU-3 left scratching their heads as to what the next moves might be in the nuclear standoff. From a clever Farsi date interpretation of when the EU proposal was due, "aval" or "avayel", "first of" or "beginning of" August, to the nuclear message sent by Iran while Khatami was still president, the Iranians played their hand masterfully while the Europeans seemed at a loss as to how to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat.
(How the Europeans could not have known that timing their nuclear proposal to coincide with a new regime in Tehran would not only not make a difference to the Iranian response, but actually anger the Iranians, is beyond comprehension.)
New Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's inauguration was quickly followed by Iran's resumption of the nuclear fuel cycle, planned out meticulously to be in complete compliance with the NPT and the additional protocols. The IAEA, recognizing that the suspension of the fuel cycle was voluntary, after much stalling (in the hope that the Iranians might not be serious (!)) had no choice but to eventually break the seals at the Isfahan plant and allow the Iranians, under camera surveillance, to resume converting yellowcake to gas.
For all the threats of taking the Iran dossier to the U.N. Security Council, it is now apparent that either the Iranians really didn't care (which they claimed), or knew that the IAEA board, despite pressure from the U.S., wouldn't take such a drastic step. Presumably, unlike the diplomats of the western powers, the Iranian diplomats had done their homework well.
It is all well and good for President Bush and the EU-3 to claim a victory (if an appeal from the IAEA for Iran to resume its suspension of the nuclear fuel cycle can be called a victory), but the reality is that Iran called a big bluff and took the whole pot. Even if in September, the IAEA takes a stronger stand and somehow manages to get the Iranian nuclear program referred to the U.N. Security Council, there is no guarantee that sanctions will be imposed. It is hard to imagine how China, for example, would go along with sanctions on a regime it does much business with when that regime hasn't broken any international treaties.
The options for the west are now limited to negotiating a comprehensive nuclear treaty that includes Iran's right to convert and enrich uranium (all carrots and no sticks), or for the U.S. and/or Israel to take out the Iranian nuclear facilities with air strikes (no carrots and all sticks). Option one will be the decisive goal scored by the Iranians, and option two, as tempting as it might be to Cheney et al, will be quite a spectacular goal scored (in terms of PR at least) for the 'Islamic Revolution': it will ensure decades of continued theocratic rule over a martyred Shia nation.
As to the title of this piece, in case anyone is wondering why Iran's score is three rather than one, the first goal for Iran was her almost complete victory in Iraq (and the nought for the west is the very quagmire that is that first goal). The second goal is the subject of this piece, the nuclear score, and the third is President Bush's backing off any threats to bar President Ahmadinejad from coming to New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly on September 14th (Mr. Bush can't be reading the Huffington Post, can he?). In a classic Iranian twist, that third goal wasn't dependent on the U.S. issuing or denying Mr. Ahmadinejad a visa (for either way Iran scored, and scored well), but merely on the subject being raised in the first place, which is why our score remains firmly stuck at zero.