The reality of the current Iranian nuclear crisis isn't that it's a result of the failure of European diplomacy; it's that it is a result of the failure (or more accurately the lack) of U.S. diplomacy, for the U.S. has not been engaged in any actual diplomacy with Iran. Whether Western governments (and Israel) are correct in their analyses that Iran intends to build (and use) nuclear weapons or whether the Iranians are being honest in their assertion that the use of nuclear energy is only for peaceful purposes is quite irrelevant now. What is relevant to defusing the crisis is what might be done to satisfy the demands of both the international community and Iran. What is it that the West wants from Iran? A guarantee that they will not develop nukes, and a true guarantee can, as the Western leaders correctly state, come only if Iran forgoes its rights under the NPT to control the uranium enrichment process. What is it that Iran wants? It wants its rights under the NPT to be recognized by Western countries, and wants to be treated as an equal on the world stage. The Iranians feel as though they are being discriminated against: they cannot understand why, even with the most intrusive IAEA inspections, they should not be allowed what every other signatory to the NPT theoretically is. They are also dismayed that after some two years of negotiations with the so-called EU-3, nothing of any significance was offered to the Iranians to justify their giving up some of their international rights. The Europeans seriously miscalculated the Iranian government's resolve in the matter, and the Iranians aren't completely incorrect in stating that the final "insulting" offer to them by the EU-3 smacked of colonialism. How could the Europeans, who all have embassies (and presumably spies) in Tehran, have thought that offering Iran (with U.S. blessings) some spare parts for civilian aircraft, not objecting to membership in the WTO, and handful of other minor concessions on trade and economic policies would convince the Iranians to accept second-class citizenship in the world's nuclear club?
From the beginning of negotiations over Iran's nuclear ambitions it should have been clear that the U.S. had to be involved more directly. Many on the left and in the MSM applauded the Bush administration's cautious endorsement of diplomacy over armed conflict (as opposed to the way they went about disarming an already disarmed Saddam Hussein), but ignored the fact that without the U.S. actively involved (and that means face to face) in that diplomacy, it would go nowhere. The Europeans have neither big enough sticks to wield nor enticing enough carrots to offer. The reason European countries can't or don't sell aircraft or even arms to Iran is because of U.S. sanctions and not because they haven't wanted to. What else can the Europeans offer Iran that it doesn't already have (or get) from them? It is also hard for the Iranians to imagine that Peugeot would stop building cars in Iran (and Mercedes Benz has already, in the last few years, outfitted the entire, and I mean entire, nation's police force with brand new cruisers made in Germany). But even if France forced Peugeot to end its joint venture with Iran Khodro (the automobile manufacturer), the Iranians probably won't care. They have the technology to build their own cars, as is evidenced by the introduction of the home-designed and built Samand, and there's always the Chinese, who would love to expand trade with Iran at the expense of the West. As for aircraft, the Khatami government ordered and paid for a presidential VIP aircraft from Airbus a few years ago and it sat undelivered in France because of U.S. objections (ten percent of an Airbus is made of U.S. material, and therefore subject to the embargo) until it was finally flown to Iran (as a carrot) in the fall of 2005. Whereupon Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the current president and who some call the Iranian psycho, ordered that it be sold or given to Iran Air for passenger use because he couldn't envision himself traveling in such luxury. Seems like a first generation passenger 747 or even an older 707 will do fine for Mr. Ahmadinejad.
The Iranian government certainly doesn't care about European or American consumer goods for its people. It does, however, care about technology (it would very much like some American technology), arms (it would prefer American over Russian, but who wouldn't?), it cares about money (the frozen assets, in the billions, in U.S. banks), it cares about survival, and finally, it cares about prestige. For the U.S. to directly engage the Iranians, it would have to consider eventually lifting sanctions and the embargo, it would have to be prepared to revoke Iran's membership in the axis of evil, and it would have to forgo sponsorship of "regime-change". (There isn't even an organized resistance to the Islamic Republic's regime, not unless you count the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, the somewhat hapless and under house arrest Iraq-based group whose Pol Pot-like leader Massoud Rajavi, might be even less desirable to both Iranians and the U.S. than the theocracy.) It cannot be forgotten in the arguments against Iran that U.S. policy towards the Islamic Republic still involves the goal of regime-change (and funds are made available by Congress to further that goal), and if that's not antagonistic to a regime, then I don't know what is.
Another reality of the current crisis is that whatever happens, short of armed invasion, Iran will probably end up with nuclear weapons unless there's a strong enough incentive for them not to. There is a good argument to be made for military invasion, in that a mere strike against the nuclear facilities would in all probability not destroy all of Iran's capabilities but instead could engulf the entire region (as the Iranians have threatened) in armed conflict. The only die-hard guarantee that the West can have that Iran never joins the nuclear club is all-out war. Iran would probably fall quickly in the face of American military might (of course there would have to be a draft, as we don't have enough cannon-fodder in uniform), and a puppet government in Tehran will do as it is told. Some Iranians might even be happy, but if we think the insurgency in Iraq is bad, Iran would make it look like a Saturday afternoon paintball game. Can we live with that?
If we say no, and if an air-strike against the facilities is no guarantee, then what are the other options? A real and complete embargo of Iran? That will not happen, Security Council or not. Neither China nor Russia will allow it (despite Thomas Friedman's assertions in today's NY Times that he knows best what's in the interests of China). No, the only answer to the standoff is if the U.S. begins direct talks with the Iranians, for it's only the U.S. that can offer strong enough incentives to the Iranians that would dissuade them from building bombs. And for some here's where there could be a problem: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran. Ahmadinejad, whose sophomoric pronouncements about moving Israel to Europe or Alaska (if not just wiped off the map), and whose childishly coy denial of the holocaust have made him the perfect reason why Iran cannot be trusted with nuclear technology, is undoubtedly a major obstacle to U.S.-Iranian relations. Who would want to negotiate with him? But one mustn't forget that Ahmadinejad does not control Iran's armed forces (the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, does) and although influential, cannot set foreign policy without the Supreme Leader's (and other clerics') blessings. If Khamenei decided that dealing with the U.S. could be advantageous to Iran and to his regime, Ahmadinejad would be sidelined so fast that he wouldn't know what happened to him. (It is not inconceivable that he would even be forced to resign if he caused too much trouble.) As such, he will probably go along with whatever the Supreme Leader wants, and if it's a U.S. Embassy in Tehran, then Ahmadinejad will live with it. Would Iran give up uranium enrichment in exchange for all the U.S. could offer? Perhaps not, but it would certainly compromise much further than it has so far. Maybe even a joint U.S.-Iranian consortium could control the development of nuclear energy inside Iran (and Ahmadinejad, no doubt with the approval of Khamenei, suggested as much in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last September). And why should that be unthinkable? With hundreds of American technicians and scientists on the ground, to say nothing of international inspectors, it would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible for Iran to divert fuel away to a nuclear weapons program. But what would stop Iran from suddenly kicking the Americans and inspectors out and start building bombs, one might ask? One answer is a strong economy, trade and relations with the U.S., and a sense of security; none of which they have now.
The Bush administration has made much of its diplomatic approach to the Iran situation. Condoleezza Rice seems at pains to emphasize at every opportunity that the U.S. is giving diplomacy a chance. Even Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney are uncharacteristically gung-ho for the diplomatic approach, it seems, as long as someone else is engaged in the diplomacy. And that's the rub: it is disingenuous to suggest that we're giving diplomacy a shot when not one diplomatic overture has been made to Iran by the U.S..
Perhaps it's with the knowledge that European and Russian diplomacy will fail without U.S. direct involvement and that U.N. resolutions will be meaningless that the Bush administration can so magnanimously argue for diplomacy. After all, they do still have three years in office to realize their dream of regime-change in Iran.