A few years back when Washington was preparing for the then highly touted Annapolis Peace Conference, I remember commenting that I was "hopeful, but not optimistic." As we approach the latest incarnation of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, I'm even finding it difficult to be hopeful, though I will continue to try to be supportive recognizing, as I do, the consequences of failure.
Convening these talks at this time is certainly a gutsy move for President Barack Obama. Knowing that the odds of success are slim and the costs of yet another let down are great, one can only hope that the President and his seasoned and accomplished team (including Secretary of State Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell) have a trick or two up their sleeves, ready to play at the appropriate moment. But we've been down this road too many times, under far better circumstances, to easily give oneself over to the notion that this time surely will be different.
To begin with, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, while insisting that these talks occur without preconditions, has clearly defined enough conditions of his own (though being "too clever by half" by terming them "priorities"). His insistence, for example, that Palestinians recognize Israel as a "Jewish State," while viewed an innocent "no-brainer" to most Americans, is an especially loaded term for Arabs. Acceptance of this, unless carefully defined, permanently disenfranchises the 20% of Israel's population who are Palestinian Arabs. It is also intended to rule out any repatriation for Palestinian refugees whose "right to return to their homes" is considered an "existential threat to the Jewish State".
Netanyahu's further insistence on "security guarantees" is also seen as a logical requirement to many in the U.S., but his definition of security is overly broad including an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley while placing severe limits on the independence of the future Palestinian state's ability to control both its territory and access and egress at its borders.
What is especially troubling is the failure of those who are most optimistic about these talks to recognize that the language they use and the framework they have embraced is so thoroughly tone deaf to Palestinian realities and concerns as to be "Pollyannaish," at best, or insulting, at worst. For example, they flippantly toss out terms like "land swaps," "settlement blocks," and "Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem" without any acknowledgment of what they mean to Palestinians or what consequences each has in predetermining realities on the ground. For example, "neighborhoods in Jerusalem" to most Americans sounds like an innocent enough term, but to Palestinians it means sprawling massive settlements like the one on Jabal Abul Ghnaim, which was built, over the strenuous objections of the Clinton Administration, on confiscated land in north Bethlehem. Likewise, maintaining "settlement blocks" and accepting "land swaps" means that Palestinians must recognize as a "fait accompli" prior theft of land to build settlements deep in their territory -- colonies that were designed and placed with the goal of making the establishment of a future Palestinian state more difficult. And their easy dismissal of the "right to return" (saying without hesitation or qualification that Palestinians would have to forgo this right and accept, at best, a return only to a future Palestinian state) also ignores what for many Palestinians is the sine qua non of any peace agreement.
Granted that many of these concepts emerged out of earlier Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (like the unofficial "Geneva Accords" -- which I supported), but these compromises resulted from hard fought negotiations and were reached under dramatically different circumstances. Back then, the unofficial negotiators sat as peers and each gave way in good faith. Now, these same compromises that were reached as part of a package deal are viewed merely as a starting point for Israel's insistence on yet further compromises. Add to that the fact that back then, conditions were different and the two sides, themselves, were different. There was no barrier/wall delineating unilaterally the de facto Israeli border. There were one hundred thousand less settlers in the West Bank. And there was no political division of the Palestinian polity and territories.
All this considered, I find it hard to be optimistic and, while wanting to be hopeful, that too requires a bit of a stretch. Nevertheless, here's what I hope for. I hope that Hamas, which has been critical of the talks, maintains its current restraint and does not engage in reckless and dangerous acts of violence (as it did during the 90's in an effort to sabotage talks). I hope that the Israeli government or its settler movement do not engage either in provocations of their own or act to reignite passions by starting new construction or imposing new hardships on the Palestinians. Should either side behave badly, I hope the U.S. is balanced in its application of pressure. And since it is the U.S. President who wants these talks and understands, and has stated, that success is in "the national security interests of the United States", I can only hope that he has prepared a well thought out "Plan B" should these talks ("Plan A") fail to break the impasse. And finally I might add that I can only hope that this Plan B involves new thinking taking into consideration the just requirements and the concerns not only of the Israelis but of the Palestinian side, as well. This U.S. initiative might not be pretty and most certainly won't be perfect, but it will have to be seen by majorities as fair. Even then it will be a heavy lift requiring the President to sell the necessary compromises to both sides, building a constituency for peace that can reshape the political landscape making an Israeli-Palestinian peace possible.
It may be a lot to hope for, but that's where we are.
Robert Naiman: "Palestinian Gandhi" Convicted for Protesting; U.S. Silent
Jamal Dajani: Direct Talks: Five Myths
After such lachrymose comments and excuses, his last paragraph is kind of optimistic, but it also revels the Palestinians real hope from the negotiations: that someone else will do the job. They are unwilling co compromise. Unwilling to recognize Israel for what it is. Lacking the integrity to tell their people that they will have to give up some of their demands to gain others (that is what negotiations means) - they want an external solution, that someone else will make the hard decisions for them, and that they will be able to continue and feel victimized--and hold to their claim until the end of time--instead of taking responsibility and mature. This is how Palestinian leadership always was since the beginning of the conflict a century ago.
3. Security guarantees - Despite common accusations on "land grab," the main reason for the 1967 occupation was security, and despite the fact that more issues, complicated issues, happened since then (the settlements), this is still the most urgent concern. A temporary, transitional arrangement was part of previous plans as well, such as the Geneva Accords (which the author says he supports...). This is something Israel wants to negotiate.
4. Terminology: The author is welcomed to suggest a neutral language, but he fails do do so. He also fails to see that for many Israelis (I am not included) calling these places "settlements" is choosing a narrative that undermines their legitimacy (in Hebrew it makes more sense than in English). That Gush Etzion, for example, was a Jewish owned land that was conquered--and its inhabitants massacred by the Jordanians--in 1948, and those who live there now cannot see why they shouldn't continue and do so and compensate the Palestinians in another land. If someone stole this land, it was not Israel, but the Palestinians. Also, the "right of return" is a Palestinian term, claiming a "right." used this way, without qualifications, adopts the Palestinian narrative. So the terminology argument works for both sides as well.
[to be continued]
1. The "Israeli pre-conditions" argument: Well, saying what you want to achieve in the negotiations, and even presenting it as something you are not willing to compromise on, is not a "pre-condition" for starting to negotiate. This is simple English, not politics.
2. The "Jewish State" argument: recognizing Israel the way it defines itself, a Jewish state, indeed means the rejection of the return of the refugees. The same way the insistence on the return of the refugees means the rejection of Israel as a Jewish state and even more, transforming it into a Palestinian state, or to a sort of a non democratic regime. It is the "two states for one nation" solution. The Palestinians want to achieve one, the Israelis want to achieve the other, and this is what negotiations are for. In addition, recognizing Israel as a "Jewish state" does not mean it "disenfranchises the 20% of Israel's population." It simply mean they will be ab national/ethnic/religious minority, like there are minorities in most states in the world.
[to be continued]
Calling negotiations goals a "precondition" is not very convincing either.
What guarantee does Israel have that even if they make peace, that tomorrow another 20 new extremist factions wont be created that will continue to terrorize Israel, that will ignore the cease fire, that will use terrorist tactics to "express" themselves.
Very complicated situation.
It remains amazing that the "newspaper of record" can deign to publish such absurdities as this:
The United States insists that Hamas meet strict preconditions before it can take part in negotiations: recognize Israel, renounce violence and abide by agreements previously signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, of which Hamas is not a member. These demands are unworkable. Why should Hamas or any Palestinian accept Israel’s political demands, like recognition, when Israel refuses to recognize basic Palestinian demands like the right of return for refugees?
So according to Abunimah, for Israel to ask its negotiating partners to not demand its violent destruction is "unworkable"?
Abinimeh also tries to make a tortured analogy with Northern Ireland, as if the Irish ever demanded that Great Britain be utterly destroyed as part of their negotiating position.
Apparently, Abunimah thinks that Israel should be thrilled if Hamas is willing to negotiate the terms of Israel's destruction. Maybe they'll even be willing to wait a decade or two! Isn't that moderate?
I do not know if he means an ethnic cleansing or not (it is not nonsense at all, as the modern history of Jewry in Arab countries--and such one state will be an Arab country--clearly demonstrates), but it is definitely the denial of the Jewish people's right for their own state. Since this right is given to every other national group, it singles out the Jews as not worthy for self determination, and thus, antisemitic. .
Settler leader speaks of holding Netanyahu to his word on construction
Naftali Bennett, Netanyahu's former chief of staff and the recently named director-general of the settler advocacy group the Yesha Council, spoke to the Los Angeles Times about what he thinks his old boss will do and the challenges facing the settler movement.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-israel-settlement-qa-20100829,0,1354446.story
A poisoned process holds little hope
08.25.2010 | Financial Times
By David Gardner
Full text: http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/the-truth-behind-the-peace-process/
EXCERPTS: "...the heart of the question remains the continuing Israeli occupation. It is essential to remember that the biggest single increase of Jewish settlers on Arab land – a 50 per cent rise – took place in 1992-96 under the governments of peace-makers Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres at the high-water mark of the Oslo peace accords."
"A decade on, the Israeli settlement enterprise has turned the occupied West Bank into a discontiguous scattering of cantons, walled in by a security barrier built on yet more annexed Arab land and criss-crossed by segregated Israeli roads linking the settlements. Last month, B’Tselem, the Israeli human rights group, published a study showing Israel has now taken 42 per cent of the West Bank, with 300,000 settlers there and another 200,000 in East Jerusalem. The siege of Gaza has turned that sliver of land into a vast, open-air prison."
"The outlines of a deal are clear, in the (Bill) Clinton parameters of 2000 and Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, endorsed by 22 Arab and 57 Muslim countries (as well as Hamas, as part of the 2007 Mecca accord). There has to be an end to the occupation, and the US and Quartet cannot just allude to this; they must demand it."
As Benny Morris nicely concluded his latest book on the 1948 war, the Palestinians suffered the most from the war, but that does not mean they were not the aggressors, and they had worst intentions towards the Jews, only they failed to fulfill them.
The Palestinians are no "rightful owners" of any land, they never held it as a collective. They are rightful owners as individuals of private land, and when they will have their state, as they should, they will have a Palestinian land as well.
The massive terror attack was not genocidal in my opinion, but it was vicious, barbaric and repulsing. Shame that some find it suitable to defend.
President Mahmoud Abbas does not represent the people of Gaza and certainly has some legitimacy issues with the people he claims to represent.
Everyone knows this, yet it appears that Abbas alone has been "selected" by the U.S. et al to represent all Palestinians.
Should he ultimately sign an agreement, who would enforce it in Gaza ?
Setting all the Israeli pre-conditions etc. aside, I simply do not see how any legitimate agreement can be reached.
an example is the myth of past peace talks.... would anyone accpet terms of aparthied in the guise of statehood? What country would have accepted no water rights, piseces of statehood not continously connected and no right of return? whose whole existence was in the hands of another country...even oneo fthe Israeli peacemakers said they wouldnt have accpeted the deal offered Arafat it would have been suicide...lets get real here.
a poster mocks the author stating that it is clearly about what Israel should give up..do you think they are not in control...to the victer went the spoils and responsibility.
"no right of return" - this demand is not for a country to accept, it is the demand that another country needs to accept. It is the demand to destroy Israel as a Jewish state. It is the demand to create two states for one people. It will never happen.
"no water rights" - BS, this is part of the agreement in all its versions.
I'm sure you would have no problem with giving up your home because someone wanted your house and based their claim on the fact that their ancestor pi$$ed there 2000 years ago, right?
I'm not optimistic. I think the plan of the Israeli right is to hold out for as long as possible, so that by the time they have no choice but to loosen their grip on Palestinians, their "liebensraum" - irony intended - will be as complete as they could ever have expected it to be.
Completely agree with you. Israel must be strong and maintain superiority of arms. This is the only potent guaranty of peace in the region
Everything here is about what Israel should or should not do and how the United States better have some good trick up their sleeve.
Why is there nothing here about what Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority need to do for the possibility of a real breakthrough?