Iran, Protest, and Intelligence: Why Strategic Reports Often Get it Wrong

A major shortcoming of private security firms and official intelligence agencies is that they frequently lack on-the-ground, in-country, sources and do not fully utilize experts who travel to and study the country. Human intelligence is woefully lacking, so too much reliance is placed on signals intelligence. Those organizations under-exploit the open source information that is readily available to them. Such reports usually are concisely written and closely argued--not long-winded like academic analyses. They are exactly what decision-makers like to read. The Strategic Forecasting, Inc., or STRATFOR geopolitical report "The Iranian Election and the Revolution Test," issued on June 22, is one example, recently, on Iran. That report is a current example of how and why such documents are off-target, and so it can serve as a foil for investigating assessments of issues in the forefront of the Iranian political crisis.

Four major issues warrant focus: (1) The Iranian government's ability to gather, transport, and count a representative sample of the 40-plus million hand-written ballots within a few hours in a country approximately one-fifth the size of the United States of America and nearly seven times the size of the United Kingdom; (2) Whether the protests really have spread beyond universities and major cities; (3) The role of technology in spread and suppression of dissent; and (4) What motivates the protestors and major political players in Iran.

The issue of ballots cast and votes tabulated, during Iran's tenth presidential election on June 12, has been much vexed. The STRATFOR Report dismissed most of the allegations of fraud. One insightful resource available to guide discussions is the careful analysis of voting patterns at chathamhouse.org. Statistical evidence of election fraud has been laid out at the Washington Post as well. Those precise investigations suggest ballot fraud did occur on a national scale and that the scheme was centrally coordinated.

Likewise, the spread of election-related protests has been debated. A fuller understanding of this specific issue warrants examination of the data gathered at irantracker.org. Public protest has been reported not only in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, but at Tabriz in the northwest, Rasht along the Caspian Sea, the holy city of Mashhad in the northeast, Kerman in the southeast, and even at the largely ethnically-Arab city of Ahvaz in the southwest. Anti-government demonstrations have occurred at Cham, Taft, and Bam among other towns and villages. The anti-government protestors are not drawn from any single social, ethnic, religious, or other type of demographic sector. The political unrest seems to have begun among and spread between a variety of public settings, not just university students and westernized elites. Again, valuable data can be found at irantracker, which should be consulted. Conclusions, such as those in the STRATFOR Report for instance, that protest is limited to universities, the "twittering classes," and other elites are based on an incomplete evaluation of available evidence.

Cell phone penetration and internet access in Iran exceeds land-line capacity and cuts across urban, rural rich, and poor divides. It is a basic means of communication not restricted to any particular socioeconomic segment of the population. Details can be gleaned from menafn.com, genderit.org, internetworldstats.com, and NedaNet. Electronic communication has become the predominant means of assembling opposition to the Iranian regime and communicating crackdowns by that regime. The Iranian government has its own reasons for not shutting-off all electronic communications. The regime in Tehran is utilizing covert technologies to locate cell phone and internet users who are protesting the theocracy and transmitting data to one another and to the outside world. On this matter, it is useful to consult WSJ.com with a response at nokiasiemensnetworks.com. The Janus-face of modern technology in tussles between citizens against the state is vividly illustrated by recent events in Iran.

It is important to bear in mind that Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami, and even the usually conservative Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani are the symbolic standard-bearers of change. The election results were the spark, not the fuel for the protests. Thirty years of public outrage has built up slowly but steadily against repression great and small throughout the entire population of Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad speaks only for the hard-line clerics rather than against them as, for example the STRATFOR Report among others has suggested. It is particularly telling of the mood in Iran that even the usually conservative madrassa students at Qum, Mashhad, and Isfahan are not supporting the regime through public demonstrations. Precisely because the hard-line mullahs are no longer representative of many Iranians is why Ahmadinejad's claims to victory have been widely rejected.

The current Iranian president's political mentors include Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati who is the chairman of the Council of Guardians of the Constitution that ratified the election results. So while reshuffling among the ruling classes may occur, the degree of change depends on whether fundamentalists like Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his cohorts such as Jannati and Ahmadinejad prevail or whether pragmatists like Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri emerge much stronger from the clerics' internal struggles. Coalitions of pragmatic politicians, public intellectuals, moderate mullahs, economically-strained entrepreneurs, democratic-minded men and women, and activist students played pivotal roles during Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and Islamic Revolution of 1979. The past indicates that, if not now then in the near future, those groups are very likely to succeed again.

Revolutions are accurately designated as such only after the fact, not when protests begin. The protests in Iran are not yet and may never become a revolution. History suggests such developments are comparatively rare as the status quo often endures. Yet, Iran experienced two revolutions during the last century--so the latest protests could very well be sowing the seeds of change again. The role of continued public protests by citizens--especially if the civic outcry remains sustained, grows again in frequency and number of participants, and continues to invigorate a wide range of Iran's socioeconomic classes--will determine if the people eventually prevail again. The variegated ways in which citizens are using technology, passive resistance, and infrastructural attacks on the regime suggests that the uprising is steadily gaining momentum on various fronts. Even then, change in Iran may not take the form of a revolution. It may produce a return to the more traditional form of Iranian statecraft where political leaders, religious clergy, government bureaucrats, and citizens are the equally important and comparably relevant pillars of a stable, outward looking nation. Intelligence estimates and conclusions need to comprehend the broader contexts of large-scale events and local incidents then analyze those within the frameworks of history, religion, sociopolitics, and culture to accurately present and predict events in Iran.

 

 

Comments

[S1m0n]

Counting millions of votes within hours of the close of polls requires a little bit of planning, but it's far from impossible, even when its done with no form of technology more advanced than a telephone.

In Canadian elections, this is exactly what happens. All ballots are counted by hand in the presence of witnesses, and almost always within an hour of the close of polls. The only reason for suspense is the staggered close of polling stations made necessary by Canada's five times zones.

It's not even that difficult. I've been a part of this machine, and a two or three hour advance training session was all it took to teach me what it was I had to do to play my role successfully. The structures of Iranian government and society are entirely capable of organising a similar operation.

[wereeverywhere]

As bad as the fraud is, your lines are a valuable perspective:
"The election results were the spark, not the fuel for the protests. Thirty years of public outrage has built up slowly but steadily against repression great and small throughout the entire population of Iran."

The eighty percent plus turnout was all that was needed for the Iranian people to smell a rat. Of course it didn't help as Noam Chomsky says:

"And then right away immediately after the election the Interior Ministry sealed the ballot boxes and took them to wherever, to their own headquarters, where they then came out with a figure that doesn't look like a very credible figure and the method of reaching it is in violation of their own laws and procedures and of course undermine whatever credibility they might have." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sk04v2yq4PQ

The strategic reports that got it wrong don't have the insight of enduring an undemocratic process and everyday repression that is IRI and discounted the Iranian people's perspective.

[Hass]

Sorry but just because Stratfor's report does not meet your agenda, doesn't mean that Stratfor is wrong. The claims and counter-claims of fraud have been taken apart in detail at IranAffairs.com

You have failed to explain how Stratfor is wrong in showing that the ballots could indeed have been counted in a matter of hours (there were 48000 counting stations at work, requiring them to only count an average of 800 ballots per station, which can quite easily be done in a short time contrary the claims repeatedly asserted by you.)

As for the statistical studies supposedly proving fraud: the Catham House study is shown to be faulty by Flynt Leverett in Politico. http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00EB1A844-18FE-70B2-A863CA2A46BF24AA) The University of Michigan study is faulty because it relies on Benford's Law, which has been proven by the Carter Center not to be applicable to electoral results (See http://tiny.cc/IMAPq for details. )

You have further failed to explain a very simple question: Considering that Mousavi is a hardline regime insider who had promised to return the revolution to "true Khomeinism", and that he was specifically vetted and cleared to run for offce, then why would his alleged election victory pose such a big threat to the regime that they would collectively conspire to commit massive election fraud and keep him out of office?

[Squaker]

"The Iranian government's ability to gather, transport, and count 40-plus million hand-written ballots within a few hours in a country approximately one-fifth the size of the United States of America and nearly seven times the size of the United Kingdom"

This is a very easy to way to tell if the analyst is intellectually honest
Because of course the votes weren't counted "within a few hours" they were counted in a few days
The author must have been thinking about when Iran has counted 10 million votes and projected Ammedinijad the winner. Something that was widely criticized here yet happens in every single american election I have taken part in.

[altohone]

A kinder gentler debunking.­.. or spin on a report that contradicts the current sales job?

Whose agenda motivates more?


I'd be curious if those eager for revolution think the revolters goals coincide with the goals of those seeking war?

[wereeverywhere]

As someone in solidarity with the protesters, who hopefully can topple IRI, one of the last things I want is US or its proxies intervening or bombing in Iran.