After Senator Obama suggested that he would engage in dialogue with Syria should he become president, his political opponents -- both Democrat and Republican -- commenced to howl in protest.
Their reaction is premature, as Obama went into little detail about what he meant by 'engaging' Syria diplomatically. His detractors read into his comment as they pleased while concocting political attacks against him. Some suggested his words implied that he wishes to capitulate to Syria's regional demands in a flailing attempt to reach some measure of peace in the Middle East. Others proclaimed him politically naïve, stating that this perceived strategy of engaging our enemies was indicative of his lack of experience. At this stage it seems silly to read too much into Obama's potential Syria strategy, as other then the word 'engagement', we have little idea what his intentions are. However, Obama's words do warrant discussion on what engaging Syria would mean. Is it a tactic that will serve American interests?
Any discussion of diplomatic engagement with Syria first begins with an analysis of what the United States could hope to gain from such an endeavor. Then we should determine what Syria's interests and motivations are. Finally, we need to ascertain whether engagement with Syria is a viable path for realizing our regional interests without causing unacceptable collateral damage to our allies, particularly those in Lebanon who currently find themselves in a frequently violent struggle with Syria and its proxies.
As our interests in Syria go, they seem to prominently include improving the security of the Syrian-Iraqi border, working towards a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, taming Syria's hand in Lebanon so as to move forward in solving the Lebanese political stalemate, halting Syria's support of groups we deem to be counterproductive in the region, isolating Iran, and helping to ease the Iraqi refugee crises.
Determining Syria's interests is slightly more complex. On the face it seems Syria's primary interests are re-gaining the Golan, installing a pro-Syrian government in Lebanon, slowing down the Hariri tribunal process, and improving the Syrian economy. However, in the event the U.S. decides to engage Syria, it is vital that we understand the root of Syria's motivations. At the end of the day, the link between all of Syria's interests is very simple: regime survival. All of their regional interests are simply means to an end, that end being retaining the status quo, enabling the continuation of Asad Baathist rule. Practically, what this means is that what the U.S. can reasonably hope to discuss fruitfully with Syria becomes limited.
The Syrians seem to view a continued presence in Lebanon, as well as derailing the tribunal to some degree as essential to the well being of the regime. Our objectives in Lebanon are virtually diametrically opposed to Syria's. They want their allies and proxies to achieve a maximal degree of power. Their allies and proxies are the enemies of our allies.
The unfortunate truth is that to a large degree it's a zero sum game between our allies and Syria's allies in Lebanon. Syria will be unwilling to budge on any of our requests vis a vis Lebanon as they will view them as the antithesis of their Lebanon agenda. As such, we have nothing to talk about with Syria regarding Lebanon, because quite simply they won't make concessions on Lebanon, and any concessions we make to Syria on Lebanon will be directly hurting our interests as well as selling out our Lebanese allies. Many western diplomats have tried to negotiate with Syria on the behalf of Lebanon, and all have come away with nothing to show for it. There is no reason we should expect to succeed where others have failed, particularly as our position is more diametrically opposed to Syria's then that of most of the would be gap bridgers.
Another potential point of discussion between the U.S. and Syria is Syria's regaining of the Golan Heights and peace between Syria and Israel. At this point in time it is unclear that the Syrian regime genuinely want the Golan back, or wants peace with Israel. The regime frequently cites the transcendent threat they face from Israel as a justification for the lack of any tangible domestic political liberalization.
The regime's most powerful claim to legitimacy is the ongoing state of emergency, which has been in effect since 1963. Laws resulting from the state of emergency continue to be used by the Syrian government as justification for jailing individuals critical of the regime. Should Syria regain the Golan the regime would certainly enjoy a burst of domestic political capitol, but it would be relatively short lived. Assuming the return of the Golan included normalization of the Israeli-Syrian relations there would be no excuse for retaining the state of emergency. The regimes rasion d'etre would disappear overnight. As such we have to be skeptical that Syria's claims that they want the Golan back are genuine.
At the very least, should Syria be willing to engage in negotiations for the Golan, we can be sure that they would demand massive concessions on the Lebanese front at the expense of our Lebanese allies. As such, negotiating with Syria on this front is folly because it will invariably lead nowhere.
Currently, the preceding items seem to be the most prominent of the issues that would presumably be up for discussion between the U.S. and Syria. The reality is that on the aforementioned fronts, there's simply nothing to talk about. This leaves us with the leftovers. Here we may find some mutual interests that can be worked with.
Syria has been a conduit of foreign fighters to Iraq. To some degree the 2008 U.S. presidential election will be a referendum on the Iraq war. Should Obama win, a large part of his support will be derived from his desire to extract us from Iraq. With the U.S. on the withdrawal the Syrian regime will have far less motivation to destabilize Iraq. That said, there would still be plenty of foreign fighters itching to get into Iraq to kill remaining American forces. We can reasonably expect Syria to play ball on this issue at this stage, not because of an altruistic desire to help us, but simply because they no longer have as large a stake in funneling foreign fighters into Iraq.
The whole 'remove Arab despot by American force and institute democracy' plan didn't work so well. The Syrians don't need to farther destabilize things at this stage. A large part of their motivation for destabilizing Iraq was to prove that the aforementioned model of regime change was misguided. Touché, Syria. In exchange for tangible border stabilization, we can help Syria manage the massive Iraqi refugee population within Syrian borders. This help can come primarily in the form of monetary aid for refugee education and health care as well as financial incentives for third party countries to facilitate permanent refugee resettlement. As evidenced by the ever-evolving Syrian laws to limit Iraqi refugees in Syria, the Syrians are running out of resources to deal with the million plus Iraqis estimated to be in Syria.
The key to any near-future diplomacy with Syria is to make sure that we clearly define both their and our interests so that we can anticipate which regional concerns warrant discussion. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the Syrian regime, what we can hope to achieve through diplomatic engagement is very limited. However, that doesn't mean that there aren't some issues that may still be on the table. The U.S. must learn from Syria's recent behavior to ensure that we don't engage them on issues we can't realistically hope to gain ground on. Should we attempt to engage them at this stage on issues such as Lebanon and the Golan we will be doing so at the expense of our allies, particularly those in Lebanon who now more than ever need our support.