In recent months some of the more controversial and troubling aspects of American drone warfare in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have emerged. Especially disturbing have been credible reports that significant numbers of noncombatants have been killed in American drone strikes, including those targeted in areas previously attacked or at funerals for those killed in the initial bombing.
Recently, drone warfare has received significant media attention, substantially due to a nearly 6,000-word front-page story that appeared two weeks ago in The New York Times. That article detailed several key features of the drone program that had not been widely reported. For example, the president's intelligence team has prepared for him a "kill list," people deemed to be lethal enemies of the United States. President Obama, according to the Times, has arrogated to himself final and sole authority to determine who on that list will die. The Times notes that in at least one case, the president authorized a kill order even when he knew that the intended target was surrounded by family members or other noncombatants, resulting in the deaths of women and children along with the intended target.
Despite the Times' painstaking efforts to portray the care with which such decisions are made, the process is fraught with uncertainty. This fact was underscored by Newsweek magazine's Daniel Klaidman, who has reported that one of Obama's key lawyers, Harold Koh, has at times been given only half an hour to review the legality of a kill authorized by the president.
Among the more sensational facts to emerge from the Times piece is the White House's method for counting civilian casualties. As I noted previously, the president's team claims that civilian casualties from the drone program have been vanishingly small, vindicating their claims about the precision of drone warfare. According to the Times, however, the White House "in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent." This is quite an extraordinary guilt-by-association logic that if men of combat age are near a strike, they "must be up to no good."
While the administration insists that this new weapon of choice is targeted, precise, and proportionate, some officials say that our drone strikes, especially those that kill noncombatants, are creating future American enemies faster than they are eliminating current ones. Robert Grenier, who helmed the CIA's counterterrorism center from 2004 to 2006 and was CIA station chief in Pakistan at the time of the 9/11 attacks, recently said the drone program is too broad. He cautioned that "[w]e have been seduced by [drones]" and further warned that "[w]e have gone a long way down the road of creating a situation where we are creating more enemies than we are removing from the battlefield. We are already there with regards to Pakistan and Afghanistan."
"Seduced" is a good word for the new warfare. Drones are cheap. They've been effective at knocking off Al-Qaeda operatives. They involve no loss of life among American service personnel; they appear to enjoy broad popular support in the U.S.
So what's the big deal? A friend of mine -- a highly intelligent, liberal-minded guy -- told me recently that he supports drone warfare. Why? Because, he argued, the U.S. will continue to maintain a global military presence whether we like it or not. Given this reality, the question becomes how can we do so in the most efficient and, not incidentally, least murderous way. If our choice is massive deployments of force -- as was the case in Iraq, and still in Afghanistan -- or drone warfare, then it's really no choice at all. Not only are we sparing ourselves large numbers of American casualties, but we are sparing target countries large numbers of casualties, as well.
Yes, he grants, drones are imperfect. They kill some people they shouldn't. But compared to the inevitable direct and collateral damage of an invading army, drone warfare is obviously preferable.
I have thought about this argument before. And it troubles me, deeply. It assumes that we are traveling an arc of warfare in which we retire, for all time, the clumsy 20th-century warfare of tanks, boots on the ground, indiscriminate bombing, and mass death. But our recent withdrawal from Iraq and plan to do the same in Afghanistan doesn't ensure that we've put that particular tool of war away forever.
Another mass casualty attack on American soil or other unforeseen circumstances might yet prompt a new mass mobilization. There's no guarantee that drones are a replacement for industrial-scale warfare. They might just be an addition to the toolbox of death. Meanwhile, we've endorsed a new expansion of presidential power, green-lighting unilateral and unaccountable authority over who should live and who should die, including in places in which we have not formally declared war, in circumstances in which we often don't know whom we're killing.
Many liberals have accepted this reality and Obama's role in it because they trust the man. His apparent judiciousness, legendary even-temperedness, and background as a constitutional lawyer are all said to endow him with unique restraint in exercising such awesome power. But whether you believe that Obama is wise enough to keep us safe at an acceptable moral price is not really germane to the larger issue raised by drone warfare. These powers don't expire when Obama leaves office.
There is also a matter of principle. American leaders have long insisted that we serve as an example to the rest of the world for living according to the rule of law. On this account, the U.S. embodies a set of constitutional principles that restrict the arbitrary power of government and enlarge justice and freedom. This freedom is why, we were repeatedly told, "they hate us," and why our principles are worth fighting for. Marginal statistical increases in our security do not, on this account, justify abrogating fundamental principles.
America has a long history of dealing death and destruction to near and distant lands, including by overthrow of popular and representative regimes and support for murderous dictatorships that suited our interests. This history, some argue, puts the lie to any pretense that we embody noble ideals of democracy and justice worth emulating. Despite that history, I have little doubt most Americans still believe the American idea is an important one. Though national security and protection of the "homeland" have been paramount priorities since 9/11, most Americans believe that even when we fight to defend ourselves, we fight the good fight and represent values that distinguish us from our fanatical and immoral enemies.
Drones may be expedient. They may result in fewer deaths than other forms of combat. But how we continue to exercise our unrivaled military power is raising disturbing questions about what principles we'll avow the next time American citizens are attacked because they were considered legitimate targets of a foreign force convinced that we are a lethal threat to its security and well-being.
A version of this article originally appeared in the Independent Weekly of North Carolina.
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If you think that a 20-lb missile is indiscriminate, you should see the crater from a 2000-lb bomb.
If you decide to have a war in the early 21st century, there's no point turning up with a lance and a horse. It might be better not to have a war, but sometimes it's unavoidable, and destroying individual 20-square-meter areas seems to beat destroying villages and towns.
Vote 3rd Party!
Obama has joined the ranks of Bush and Cheyney who are not safe from arrest in any foreign country. Sadly more than 60% of Americans support drone killings of innocents- shame on you.
It takes as little as 30 minutes to decide if it is legal to kill someone. But require "explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent" to move them out of the category of combatant to civilian. And this justification is purely and simply for domestic US consumption, as is the garbage about US ideals and leadership of the free world.
I have slowly been moved into the camp which sees little difference between what the terrorists do and what sections of the US administration and military do. I simply read the stories and redact any reference to nationality or group. If is callous, it is callous. If it is horriffic it is horriffic. And it makes no difference who does it, or who claims to have god on their side. The US and terrorists are as guilty as each other.
The next major attack on US soil I will look at with indifference, both sides are killing civilians. What is the difference? Everyone is a target now.
The issue I have is the ridiculous notion that people under time pressure simply making an assumption you are labelled as guilty, and worthy of being killed. Any sort of KPI could be declared fabulous by simply assuming that any bad result is actually a good result, unless you explicitly prove otherwise, after the event.
At it's heart what is the US trying to achieve by this policy?
Kill people they think deserve it - OK as long as you accept the other side's version of who they think are combatants.
Set up conditions to make it hard for the "enemy" to operate by winning hearts and minds? I cannot think of a better way of pissing people off than by killing innocent civillians, then claiming unless you provide explicit proof they are innocent, they are guilty. If you run the risk of being killed anyway and labelled a terrorist, then you might as well actually be one!
Every president has had the power to issue military orders that could result in people getting killed. What has changed is the precision with which it can be done. Instead of having little more than a yes/no choice about implicitly ordering the deaths of tens of thousands of anonymous Filipino presumed-insurgents as in 1900, with no way of knowing much of anything about the facts on the ground, it's now possible to have round-the-clock surveillance of specific individuals beamed at the speed of light to decision-makers on the other side of the world.
We are targeting individuals who are accused of "being enemies of the United States". There is no reasonable standard of what they need to have done to be targeted. They don't even need to have proof that they have harmed anyone.
There is no court that has convicted these people. There is no trial. We just execute them without a trial. We are responsible for summary executions of people.
The same kind of people who made the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction are informing the president of the intelligence on these people. And their unreliable information is the sole basis for the president's decision. There is no oversight of the decisions.
And, many other people are being killed at the same time.
And, there is no evidence that these strikes are effective. In fact, the NY Times just published an op-ed where the Yemeni columnist states that the drone attacks are a recruiting tool for Al-Queada. For every person killed, particularly innocent women and children, there are many relatives who are ripe targets for Al-Queada recruiting efforts, because they want to get revenge on the people who killed their relatives (the U.S.). We are creating more enemies than we are getting rid of.
I'm sure I'm over thinking this but the Roman Colosseum comes to mind.
But nothing. If we posses a more discriminating weapon we are obligated by the Law of War to use in favor of a weapon system which produces more collateral damage to protected persons and places.
This is not debatable; it is not something upon which reasonable persons could disagree.
But we don't. It's not just a choice of which weapon system to use. It's also a choice of whether to take military action at all in response to a particular threat. The greater the apparent certainty and control, the greater the temptation to take action in marginal cases.