Washington, D.C. -- Last week in Washington's venerable Willard Hotel, Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana and former Governor Hailey Barbour of Mississippi drew comparisons between their states and the Republic of Azerbaijan. They were part of a buoyant celebration of Azerbaijan's 20-year relationship with the United States. Their sentiments, and those many of the guests, were focused largely on Azerbaijan's status as a critical mid-sized energy power connected to world markets, and increasingly to Europe, through important pipeline systems. Indeed, energy is the principal reason most governments and corporations pay attention to Azerbaijan.
Energy wealth in today's world is enough to generate interest almost everywhere. Indeed, without energy the small Caucasian state of Azerbaijan would likely have been an afterthought in the post-Soviet space: deep in the shadows of the Christian civilizations of Georgia with its compelling cultural attachments to Europe, and Armenia with its engaged and potent political diaspora on both sides of the Atlantic.
But Azerbaijan is much more than an energy hub. It is precisely at the hinge of powerful cultural forces where old empires overlap and modern states compete -- and it has energy. Azerbaijan is the sum of three elemental tendencies that accentuate the pivotal nature of its geographic position: culturally infused with Iranian culture, ethnically and linguistically Turkic, and historically part of the Russian, then Soviet empires. Eurasia's future is likely to play out in and around Azerbaijan for reasons that are independent of the Caspian's energy wealth but are amplified by it. Put differently, Azerbaijan's importance to the West goes well beyond oil and gas.
From the vantage point of Baku, its strategic universe is increasingly complex and worrisome, if not threatening. To the north, Russia is a lethal cocktail of dysfunctional politics, official corruption, economic torpor, regional fissures and ethnic shifts -- all within the cone of a demographic death spiral and powered by resentment at having lost an empire and its corollary, unrequited imperial ambition. Russia has never forsaken its appetite for its former Caucasian possessions. Its wars in the North Caucasus, its attack on Georgia in 2008, and its efforts to impede a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh as a way to increase its own presence and influence in the region and block Azerbaijan's access to Turkey illuminate Russia's strategic design. For Russia, the key to this region is Azerbaijan.
To the south, Iran is on the cusp of conflict. Azerbaijan shares a 700-kilometer border with Iran, and up to 25 percent of Iran's population, according to some estimates, are Azeris. Iran's mullahs of Azeri descent have made Baku a special target, as they are mostly Shiite Muslims, and Iranian authorities have never made a secret of their disdain for Azerbaijan's independence. Their strategies will resonate in Azerbaijan to the extent that the smaller northern state fails to anchor its citizens in a more potent set of values and lives by them. A destabilized Iran, whether from internal revolution or attack from outside, will pose a special range of challenges for Azerbaijan. It is implausible to imagine that Azerbaijan can be isolated from the resulting turmoil, and therefore it is in the West's interest to assist Azerbaijan in advancing inoculations of strong civil society antibodies. Yet there is every reason to believe that a stable Azerbaijan linked politically, economically and militarily to the West can serve as a model for post-conflict Iran, as well as a conduit for the West's values and ideas.
Turkey represents a counterforce to Iran, an important influence impeding Azerbaijan from sliding into Iran's orbit. Its links to Azerbaijan have grown steadily, based on common ethnic and linguistic foundations, and there are growing economic, social, educational, political and military ties. Major energy pipelines connect the two. Former Turkish Prime Minister Ebulfez Elcibey may have struck close to the mark when he inaugurated the concept of Azerbaijan and Turkey as "one nation with two states." Turkey's support for Azerbaijan against Armenian claims on Nagorno-Karabagh has been constant. Yet the Arab Spring, and particularly turmoil in Syria, have exposed institutional weaknesses in Turkish foreign policy that could eventually affect a range of Turkish interests, including Azerbaijan. And Europe, reluctant to give Turkey traction toward full membership, will miss a singular derivative opportunity to pull Azerbaijan into its embrace.
Azerbaijan faces difficult challenges in governance, civil society and democratic development which must be addressed if it is to maintain its delicate balancing act amid these powerful interests and states. But it also boasts important strengths and instincts. A strong sense of national identity, as well as its historic tradition of Islamic modernism, has been a barrier to the inevitable inflow of radical Islamist ideas, though this is a constant worry. It actively seeks Europe and strong relations with the United States, despite the often distracted attention of both. (Washington currently has no ambassador in Baku.) Azerbaijan's young professionals can be found in most Western and Asian capitals and universities today, and its cadre of professional diplomats, prepared increasingly by the globally-linked Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, are notable.
But these strengths and Azerbaijan's growing sense of self-confidence should not detract from the larger sobering picture. Azerbaijan's neighborhood grows increasingly dangerous and unstable, while many of the most potent political, economic and cultural dynamics intersect the small Caucasian country. It is hard to imagine where modest investments from the West that reaffirm Azerbaijan's inclination and predispositions might pay a larger dividend, nor where failure to do so could have more extended consequences. It's about a lot more than energy.
Joshua W. Walker is a Transatlantic Fellow and S. Enders Wimbush is the Senior Director for Foreign Policy and Civil Society at the German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Washington, DC.
Co-authored with S. Enders Wimbush
This piece was originally posted on the GMF Wider Europe series.
Follow Joshua W. Walker on Twitter: www.twitter.com/drjwalk
I assume that the Azeris don't understand the term "Don't sh*t where you Eat"
The authorities there fabricate evidence against and jail opposition figures, youtube users, and critical journalists.
Does it bother the author at all that Azerbaijan is infamous for its human rights records, corruption, nepotism, and patronage?
In Azerbaijan there is insignificant pro-western support amongst Azerbaijanis, and mainly Islamic opposition, does not that mean that Azerbaijan is a spring away from becoming the west’s and Israel’s worse enemies, exactly like Iran? How long can the Aliev regime survive? Refresh my memory, was not Iran under the shah a darling of the west. Look at it now; this is what happens when the west supports a dictator against his people. This should serve as a model to Americans and Israelis when thinking of propping up a dictator.
Two pillars of intellectual integrity.
And while on the subject, what makes you think so highly of Persia? Yes, you are ok, but you are not great. Or is it because you are ancient enough to have been around when Greece was great and you fought a war of "equals" with them ... 5000 years ago?! Never mind that they crushed you spectacularly! Anything more recent you are proud of? As far as the rest of the World is concerned, Iran is one of the most backward countries around. Wake up and smell the roses ... or the Israeli bombs.
http://www.rferl.org/video/16136.html
I doubt many Azeris share your view on Iran. Besides if it weren't for Iran in 1993/4, Azerbaijan Republic would have collapsed. There is considerable support for Iran in Azerbaijan, particularly with regards to freeing themselves from the tyranny that is running that country. The only reason some people in Azeri republic, such as yourself, feel so strongly against Iran is because they feel Iran loves Armenia more than them, that's about the sum of all your frustration, isn't it?
As for Azb collapsing in 1993/94, without Iran, are you serious? What evidence do you have for that? Clearly, you have no genuine understanding of the region and its history. So don’t pretend that you do, because to the people who do know the region, your comments remind them of a guy running around butt-naked without realizing it. Now, it is a public fact that Iran supported and continues to support Armenians. With its border with Turkey closed, and no direct access to Russia, Armenia gets most of its energy from Iran, without which it, and not Azerbaijan, would collapse.
Azaris are not ethnically Turk, they are ethnically Persian, but they are speaking Turkish. The word Azarbayejan is a Persian word, that means "Gaurdians of Fire". Azarbayejan was called "Aran" before the Tsarist Russia separated it from Persia, in a devastating war.
The republic of Azarbayejan is not ethnically or geographically or culturally independent from Iran.
Neither its oil reservers are totally isolated and separated from the Oil reserves of the rest of the Caspian sea, to which Iran has an inalienable right, and Azarbayejan is extracting them, without a mutually acceptable framework with the country with which it shares the oil reserves.
This article is another attempt to further isolate Iran and deprive it from its naturally dominant position.
The day is not far when the Iranian nation will rise up and overthrow the illegitimate and illegal rulers,
of Tehran, and when it happens, Iran will assume its natural position in the Central Asia and the Near East. Iranians will not forget who was their friends in the times of hardship and who tried to further kick them when they were down. The times of weakness will pass. History will judge.