After the infamous Rolling Stone article that led to General Stanley McChrystal's resignation was published two weeks ago, there has been a considerable amount of debate concerning the current rules of engagement (ROE) that govern how and when military force is used in Afghanistan. In the article a squad of disenfranchised soldiers interrogates the ousted general about the restrictive ROE that he instituted when he took command. The article shows an uncharacteristically bumbling McChrystal unable to provide satisfying answers.
General Patraeus has now agreed to review the ROE, but the unfortunate reality is that they should remain unchanged. Counterinsurgency environments are rife with conflict and contradictions, and the ROE are no exception. The same ROE that our troops see as prohibiting them from neutralizing the enemy are actually in place to protect our troops from the enemy - even if that is not immediately evident to the those fighting on the ground.
It has become a trite counterinsurgency adage at this point, but we know that often for every insurgent killed, we create several more. With Afghanistan's tribal culture, familial ties are incredibly strong and Afghans can often feel compelled to avenge the death of one of their own. The quick lesson here is that insurgencies are best defeated not by actually killing insurgents, but rather by marginalizing the insurgents' message.
But the real threat of relaxing the ROE is that we will return to a time of increased civilian casualties. Civilian casualties are an incendiary issue like few others in Afghanistan, and engaging in the reckless practices that result in civilian casualties is perhaps the most destructive thing the U.S. can do. After the Afghanistan Rights Monitor report on civilian deaths released on Monday showed that U.S. and NATO forces civilian deaths have "reduced considerably" in the last year, we simply cannot afford to return to less stringent ROE.
Despite the reality and rationale that support the current ROE, they still frustrate our incredibly brave and determined troops on the ground. Enemy fighters routinely exploit our ROE for battlefield advantage. For example, when I was in southern Afghanistan's volatile Helmand Province last year, insurgents would fire at us and then drop their weapons, knowing that we could not return fire if we could not positively identify the fighter with a weapon in his hands.
The ROE put commanders in a difficult leadership position and it is difficult to watch Marines and soldiers get hurt because of a cunning enemy. But competent commanders should have the strategic foresight to understand why the ROE are in place and effectively communicate those reasons to the troops they are charged to lead.
With all the advantages that a native insurgency enjoys, it is particularly important that our uniformed troops exercise physical restraint while capitalizing on the value of our ideals. The onus falls on us to convince a weary population that our motives and ends are genuine, and rarely is military force the best way to achieve that.
ROE, like any other aspect of military strategy, warrants regular reassessment. But despite the frustrations our ROE engender, there are few strategic arguments that support a blanket relaxation given the current circumstances. Participation in the all-volunteer force today requires self-sacrifice like few other periods in history. Our servicemen and women should take unrepentant pride in the hardship they endure and, though it is little consolation when you are in the midst of violent conflict, it is what distinguishes them from civilians and lesser militaries. We will be successful because of, not in spite of, the empathy and compassion that we show for the millions of Afghans who just happen to be victims of circumstance.