Afghanistan Reconciliation Reboot

For some yet unknown reason the mainstream press would have you believe Afghan peace czar Burhanuddin Rabbani's assassination has doomed the reconciliation process and any chances for peace in Afghanistan -- which is an absurdity given the fact such a process never truly existed anyway.

From the New York Times to TIME magazine, one can't turnaround without reading about Rabbani the peacemaker whose untimely demise has now guaranteed war without end in Afghanistan. The former theology professor's media makeover has been quite impressive considering during his reign as president from 1992 to 1996, according to Human Rights Watch, Rabbani's regime committed a slew of heinous war crimes including the murder, rape and torture of thousands of Afghan civilians. In fact, it was Rabbani's sadistic and corrupt rule that helped facilitate the Taliban's ascendance.

President Karzai turned the reconciliation process into an exercise in futility by selecting Rabbani to head the Afghan High Peace Council in the first place, because by doing so he commissioned a Tajik warlord with a significant amount of Pashtun blood on his hands to seek out and negotiate a settlement with members of a Pashtun-dominated insurgency.

The reconciliation initiative has defects that run deeper than Rabbani's revisionist history, because the very principles upon which the entire process rests must be uprooted. At the heart of the dilemma has been the U.S.-led coalition's efforts to force install a Western-style uber-centralized government in Kabul that is anathema to centuries-old Afghan institutions and value systems. The foreign-designed Afghan constitution has allowed for a gross consolidation of power and wealth that has directly fostered a culture of impunity, enabling characters like Rabbani to be recycled into leadership positions ad infinitum.

Hence, any arrangement between powerbrokers who derive their authority from brute force will allow this pattern to continue. Peace without justice has proven to be a losing recipe and a "grand peace deal" will not erase social iniquities from three decades of war and will not deliver the much-needed national catharsis and psychological recovery the Afghan people deserve.

In addition, Karzai himself is perceived as an illegitimate modern-day Shah Shuja who has retained power via fraudulent elections. And the U.S. has exacerbated the situation by favoring strongman-rule in a short-sighted effort to defeat the Taliban militarily. Meanwhile, the international community has excluded traditional leaders with historical legitimacy from the political process while it has failed to provide space for the development of civil society and adequate governing institutions. According to the International Crisis Group's Candace Rondeaux:

Though a sustainable political settlement will without doubt entail prolonged engagement with a broad range of Afghans -- from civil society activists, to political party leaders, women and youth groups, religious and legal scholars as well as members of the armed opposition -- neither Washington nor Kabul has indicated any genuine interest in expanding the national dialogue on reconciliation...

The notion that cutting a deal with the Pakistani-supported Taliban will achieve any semblance of stability is a dangerous and delusional one. Such a deal, by the way, will allow Pakistan to realize its vision of installing an Islamic hardline regime in Kabul that would be hostile towards India.

Besides, failing to find any contacts within the Taliban movement empowered to speak on behalf of the insurgency, Western officials readily admit the process hasn't amounted to anything beyond "talks about talks." It's now clear the Karzai regime had been duped into believing the Taliban were interested in talks -- a ruse exposed when a suicide bomber killed Rabbani in his home on Tuesday.

A broad-based political settlement is in order involving representatives from all segments of Afghan society. What is not needed, according to Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institution, is the equivalent of a "secretly negotiated Kissinger-like armistice between President Karzai and Mullah Omar."

Afghans desperately want to start from a clean slate but would be well-served to look to their past for clues on how to start anew. When the country did enjoy any semblance of stability the writ of the central government was limited while dynastic loyalty cemented Afghanistan's mosaic of ethnicities, tribes and religious sects together, producing an informal Afghan-style democracy that was much more effective than what is nominally in place today. Authority was devolved, equitably distributed at the local level and decisions were arrived at via consensus-building -- which stands in sharp contrast to the amalgamation and abuse of power evident today.

In order to restore this type of society the current reconciliation program must be abandoned in favor of a far more inclusive process of self-determination, thereby avoiding problems that invariably arise when the job of peacemaking is left in the hands of a select few.

 

Follow Michael Hughes on Twitter: www.twitter.com/mhughes3500

Comments

[ewldest]

09:03 PM on 09/25/2011

"Pakistan('s) vision of installing an Islamic hardline regime in Kabul that would be hostile towards India."
Actually Pakistan - itself a near-failed state - has no such vision. What the Pakistanis want is exactly what exists - confusion, chaos, enemies to play against each other, and foreign (US) money pouring in. We are contributing to the instability in the region - and Pakistan wants it that way.
WE ARE PLAYING THEIR GAME. WE ARE LOSING

[Paul Stacey]

05:15 PM on 09/25/2011

In relatively recent history, there has only been one successful foreign military adventure in Afghanistan - the 3rd Afghan war in 1919, when the Brits marched in with the new technology from WW1, beat the living cr*p out of Kabul, and got out FAST. It was enough to achieve their objective (reducing Russian influence), and the Brit warlords of the time saw no need to try to mess with the tribal systems of government. By the 1960s, Afghanistan had become one of the nicest places in the world to visit, despite occasional tribal flare-ups (which were mostly a bunch of sabre-rattling). All that ended when the States started sponsoring the Mujahedeen insurgency against the communist (but democratically elected) government of the time who were trying to do things like educate girls and separate church from state, and the Soviets invaded in response. We know the rest. It is way past time now to get out and let the locals sort it out. As to Pakistan gaining too much influence in the area by their sponsorship of the Afghan Taliban, well, if the Taleb achieve any kind of security in Afghanistan, it won't be long before they're supporting their brothers in the NWFP........

[Andrew Joseph Mumford]

07:27 PM on 09/24/2011

The titular character, Homer Atkins, said to develop Vietnam, "I told them the first step was to start things that the Vietnamese can do themselves. Then they can go on to the big things as they pick up skills." The French used that contractors cared more about concessions than developing the country. The US government uses contractors that care more about making as big a profit they can than developing Afghanistan, the economic development plans pay scant attention to the major sector of the Afghan economy, agriculture. They need to re-plant their orchards and refrigeration facilities to store their fruits to prevent from spoiling, otherwise Pakistani wholesalers buy their fruit quickly from them before the fruits spoil and sell it back to the Afghan people at three times the cost.

[Andrew Joseph Mumford]

07:27 PM on 09/24/2011

The Afghan War has shown we have unlearned the lessons of The Ugly American. In the chapter on the French war in Vietnam, Americans who became acquainted with the Vietnamese people, found that the local people saw it as a war between the French and Communists, and both Communists and non-Communists hated the French. The Afghan people see this war as a war between warlords and the Taliban, both Taliban and non-Taliban hate the warlords.
It was endless defeat for the French in Vietnam because they refused to adopt the guerrilla tactics of their foes, the French general saying "If you are suggesting, Ambassador MacWhite, that the nation which produced Napoleon now has to go to a primitive Chinese for military instruction, I can tell you that not only are you making a mistake, you're being insulting." The US still has adapted its tactics and refuses to adopt some of the Taliban's tactics, leaving them on the losing end. The book emphasized focusing on the little things, like improvement of seeds and livestock breeding for the farming majority, as well as canning plants to provide cans to store their produce prevent spoiling.

[Countess]

02:41 PM on 09/24/2011

I think we have allowed Karzai to steal enough money to secure his future and we have giveen the corrupt contractors enough money to secure theirs so perhaps it is time to give up the ridiculous notion of changing Afghanistan and come on home. I know that Obama and the entire pro-war foreign policy establishment want us to stay there at least until 2014 but enough is enough.

[Khalil Nouri]

10:27 PM on 09/22/2011

Very well said Mike,
In the context of who should lead the peace process, that by itself, is a twisted word, because there is no one can or could have. Peace in Afghanistan can only come when Afghans collectively-- from all tribes and ethnicities-- come together under one God, one flag and one thought to resolve their issues as they have done so for centuries. To do this, it requires a monumental effort by an independent Afghan group that is comprised of savvy, reformists, honest, and credible Afghans who can put forth a series of Loya Jirgah(s) convened only for this purpose to bring Afghans together for face to talk. The result will be an Afghan solution which is the only solution for the current Afghan dilemma.
The so called Karza-Taliban reconciliation is a futile effort where it resolves the issue between Mr. Karzai –who is not backed by the majority—and the Taliban. Overall the ill though process would keep the silent majority at bay. Therefore, it was a waste of time from the very outset.