Aristotle Negotiates the Middle East

Can we learn something from Aristotle about Israeli-Palestinian arguments? I don't mean about obvious issues like who violated whose rights some twenty-three centuries after this philosopher died. I mean about who can persuade whom of what. In Aristotle's handbook On Rhetoric, we read this suggestion: a speaker is always more persuasive if taken to be fair-minded by listeners. Consider, then, Israeli responses to the recent Goldstone Report of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The report suggests Israeli war crimes during the Gaza incursion last winter. Many Israelis dismiss this out of hand, and not only because the report fails to take adequate account of attacks from Gaza on Israeli civilians. UN human rights talk has a long history of one-sidedness on "the question of Palestine," and condemnations of Israel have poured out whether Jerusalem's policies are dovish or hawkish, whether its actions can be justified or not. Verbal lynching persuades only those tying knots. Some people point out that Richard Goldstone, the South African judge who headed the investigating commission, is a Jew, but this makes the report less plausible since he appears to be a front-man even if he is honorable. Only a record of fairness towards Israel in UN Human Rights institutions could have made such a critical report persuasive. That record is absent. A similar issue emerges inevitably when groups around the world press universities, film festivals, and unions to boycott everything Israeli, and parade people with Jewish names, not to mention an Israeli or two, as their champions. But here we reach a problem for readers of Aristotle who are interested in the Mideast. If you want to convince listeners, he also suggested, look deeply into the matter you want to address. Then, bring out what seems most persuasive within it. Unfortunately, this hasn't worked so well with Israelis and Palestinians. Each side insists that its own rights are most persuasive. Mutual recognition, on which the Oslo accords rested (and which I supported), hasn't sustained a peace process. There is blame on both sides for Oslo's failure. However, it is now somewhat surreal to intone repeatedly that "we all know what a peaceful solution looks like." You cannot know that in advance of a successful peace process -- otherwise there would be no need for a process. Statehood is obviously in Palestinian interest. It might or might not be in Israeli interest depending on how it arises and what kind of state it is. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists that Israel be recognized as a "Jewish state" by Palestinians. Some Israelis find this a tactical diversion from peace-making, and the Palestinian side largely says no, there will be no such recognition. Yet Palestinians demand recognition of their own right to statehood, and presumably this also means the right of their state to be Arab and Muslim since Palestine is already a member of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. No Palestinian leader suggests that an independent Palestine would withdraw from either. Perhaps it is better to put demands for recognition in the background for a while and focus on practical initiatives. Israel's chief, immediate concern is security. The Goldstone report may minimize this, but Israelis don't. They think of missiles and suicide bombers. They don't forget that Hamas, which runs Gaza, regards the Jewish state as an "entity" to be eliminated, aims to take over the West Bank as the next stage in pursing that goal, and celebrates attacks on civilians -- if they are Israeli -- as "resistance." But Israel is not secured by West Bank settlers, not least when they are nationalist and religious extremists. Israel's army ends up protecting those settlers instead of the Jewish state. And the foremost, immediate concern of most Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, seems to be to stop Israeli settlements there. Palestinians find Netanyahu unconvincing when he promises a moratorium on them or only "natural growth" of existing settlements. After all, Netanyahu's Likud party has long been committed to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Can a practical step be taken that leaves empty rhetoric behind? Here's one. Prime Minister Netanyahu could announce that since security has priority over settlements there will be not just a pause in settlement activities, but a halt with one stipulation: settlements would be linked to aggressive actions against Israel. The formula is simple: No attacks, no settlers. But for every missile, or suicide bombing, there would be x number of settlers admitted to the territories. Washington could endorse this along with the Palestinian Authority. Hamas would have to decide if it wants more Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Hezbollah would have to embrace it in order to prove it is "pro-Palestinian," not just Tehran's tool. The UNHRC could hail it as the embodiment of a median standard, taking a step towards becoming credible in Israeli-Palestinian matters. And if the formula works in a convincing way for a decent period of time, another stage with broader goals could begin.