President Barack Obama's Afghanistan strategy has received lukewarm reception in Pakistan. This is bad news given that he has acknowledged that the fate of the troop surge depends on support from across the Durand Line.
The President was in a tough spot in terms of delineating the endgame. While at home, an open-ended commitment was sure to backfire politically, a time-bound approach was certain to be just as catastrophic for our military campaign in Afghanistan. He seems to have underestimated the danger associated with the latter.
Even before the speech, I knew what was coming. Yet, I was hoping against hope that a timeline was not fixed.
Obama has misread the sentiment among those operating against US forces in Afghanistan. My recent conversations with relevant people in Pakistan reveal consensus on the view that the Taliban will be galvanized if they are convinced that American resolve is weakening. The Taliban's entire strategy since its 2004 resurgence has aimed at making life miserable for American troops in their strongholds, hoping that this would force an early American retreat. An official confirmation by the US President that the end is near is precisely what the Taliban wanted. It will now reinvigorate its energies to undermine what it perceives to be America's last push.
Consider the repercussions of the Taliban's interpretation of a time commitment from Obama in the broadest terms.
The Taliban will count down patiently to next summer. It has planned a two-pronged approach: while resisting in its strongholds when it can, its fighters will melt away in the Pakistani border areas and wait for the US commitment to be exhausted. If it remains largely unharmed, the President's goal to negotiate with it from a position of strength will be unfulfilled.
Here is where we need Pakistan to step up to the plate. But they won't do that, in all likelihood. Pakistani officials in Islamabad are livid about the strategy surrounding the troop surge. They are already bracing for a backlash; this is certain to hurt us in more ways than one.
A negative spillover into Pakistan risks undermining the consensus the Pakistani polity has managed to forge against militancy within its borders. Not only will this play into the hands of the Pakistani Taliban, it will also lower America's stock further as the public draws a direct correlation between the surge and added violence in their country. Of course, the militant enclave will deliberately step up its attacks within Pakistan precisely to ensure such a reversal in sentiment.
Next, since a successful US surge will in no time push a greater number of Taliban over the border, such a development is unwelcome from Pakistan's perspective. They therefore have an incentive not to allow a truly successful surge. The obvious way to achieve this is to avoid beefing up Pakistani borders to confront the infiltrating militants.
Corollary: the Taliban will get the very breathing space it needs to wait it out.
Better yet, there are those in Pakistan advocating subtle support to the Taliban. The idea is to increase America's misery to the point that political pressure at home forces Obama to order an 'on-time' pull out without many preconditions.
Obama has managed a catch-22.
His desire that the surge cause internal ruptures and weakening within militant ranks cannot be fulfilled without Pakistan's full commitment. But why should Pakistan be interested, given that the prospects of victory for their former clients in Afghanistan are brighter than ever? Indeed, the Pakistanis would much rather wait it out too.
Officials in Islamabad told me that they have long agreed on the importance of eliminating Al Qaeda. They are willing to work for that goal as long as a distinction is made between the Taliban and Al Qaeda. They want us to go after the latter and talk to the former. This is indeed a bitter pill to swallow. But the alternative is an embarrassing pull-out that leaves both the Taliban and Al Qaeda intact. A failure of the troop surge under the present circumstances risks precisely this outcome.
The author is a Fellow at the Pardee Center Boston University and a Research Fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has worked on Pakistani foreign policy for the past five years.