Egyptians have traditionally called their country "Om El Donya" or "Mother of the World." But in recent years, Egyptians seemed less confident that they could credibly describe their country as such. Then, for 18 days, Egypt was again the epicenter of the world. Suddenly, events in a country that was considered important but with diminishing influence regionally and internationally were having repercussions throughout the Arab Middle East andwere being closely followed all the way to China.
I happen to live about one hundred yards from Tahrir Square, so I had the privilege of seeing the stream of events. The evidence of public control of the agenda came early in a response from a group of young demonstrators that my son brought up to our apartment as the first curfew was announced. When I suggested that the group sleep over since the curfew had come into effect, the response was "Who decides that there is a curfew? It is our country and we shall demonstrate until we are heard." Soon they were out again on the street.
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One of the ironies of Egypt's political life was that Mubarak's rule was actually more liberal than Sadat's or Nasser's, particularly with respect to freedom of expression in the media. Mubarak's first fifteen years helped Egypt regain its footing and rebuild the foundations of its economy. However, it is during the second fifteen years that the problems surpassed the achievements, as the regime turned to "ruling" rather than "governing".
It is important to note that 56% of Egypt's population was below the age of 25. Thus the "youth centric" population was anxious, energetic, self confident and well connected. At the other extreme was the ruling sector throughout Egypt, which tended to be in the 60-80 year bracket, with the possible exception of the business sector. This dichotomy led to a wide crevasse of misunderstanding between the governed and those governing.
The impressive economic growth during the last years did not end the dissatisfaction among those left out, which was increasingly fuelled by the disparity between rich and poor as well as unemployment. Additionally, the expanding political party system in Egypt did not lead to a consultative process or rotation of power beyond the majority party, which blatantly grabbed 97% of the seats in the November 2010 parliamentary elections, leaving almost all opposition groups outside parliament. This coalescing of the opposition would haunt the regime in late January as the youth movements took sole target at the majority party and its surrogates.
The inability of the regime to comprehend what was really happening during the demonstrations led it to misread the magnitude of the discontent and the determination of the youth leaders. As a result, the regime's responses throughout the 18 days were always late, piecemeal and in poor form, ultimately fueling increased demands from the demonstrators as well as support from the Egyptian society.
Early in the revolution, a small group of independent public figures - myself included - informally tried to develop some practical solutions that would respond to the aspirations of the demonstrators while convincing the government to respond progressively to this new reality. After initially rejecting the idea, President Mubarak ultimately accepted a proposal to hand over power to his Vice President and remain a titular President. However, by then, the youth in Tahrir Square were ruling Egypt and the President's offer was too little too late.
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I cannot imagine that Egypt will go back to where it was politically before January 25th. There has been a political awakening that is startling, led by its youth and supported by its society. Much remains to be done and we may stumble on the way. Changing the culture of governance will take time and determination. Limited changes to the constitution are being developed to enable free and fair elections. This will be an interim step until we revisit the constitution as a whole and have a public debate about numerous issues, including whether we want a presidential or parliamentary system. My expectations are that this will exceed the initial six- month period suggested by the Military Council which is now governing Egypt. There is an inherent contradiction between wanting more time and wanting to move to civilian rule, but this is the kind of issue Egypt has to deal with.
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I can imagine the conflicting trends and interests that sway the thinking of international policy makers, and I do not doubt that democratization in the Arab world is supported as a matter of principle by democratic countries throughout the world. Nevertheless, even democratic countries waiver when standing on principle may appear - at least in the short term - to be costly politically, in terms of security, and/or economically. I have followed numerous debates amongst Americans, Europeans, and Israelis. All of these are understandably anxious, both those concerned with bilateral relations and those focused on ensuring a sustained flow of reasonably priced oil.
My response to all of them is that Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners are as human as you: no more, no less. They will strive domestically, regionally and internationally to achieve their rights and be treated equally. As democratic processes gain traction in the Middle East, the people in the region will not become more Arab or change strategic policy rapidly. However, they will likely become less tolerant toward double standards, inequity, and usurpation of their rights and freedoms. They will also become more tactical and short-term in their demands in order to respond to domestic constituencies.
Hopefully, the Arab world will become more engaged internationally and less dependent on foreign powers. And hopefully, non-Arab Middle Eastern states will engage seriously in efforts to resolve regional problems on the basis of equal rights and responsibilities. As international players promote democracy and equality, not only in the domestic affairs of states but amongst nation states themselves, I see no reason for serious concern: quite the contrary.
Nabil Fahmy is Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo and Former Ambassador of Egypt to the United States of America and Japan.