Absent a credible military threat, there is no reason to believe that Iran will come clean regarding its nuclear program if Washington surrenders its remaining leverage. Nor is it reasonable to hang one's hat on the belief that Iran will moderate its behavior if both its diplomatic and financial isolation is ended.
Between now and the June 30 deadline, the administration has an opportunity to mitigate the damage by enforcing existing executive orders and creating new ones. Some might argue that such a move would anger the Iranians and complicate the nuclear deal. But such a move is well within the administration's legal authorities
Even in the best case interpretation of the newly disagreed JCPOA, it is very likely that the deal will not meet the objective of preventing Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon -- and that's without picking apart all of the technical details of the parameters contained in the recent, questionable framework.
America's decade-long experience in the post-9/11 Middle East has conditioned the American public, and by extension the American body politic, to embrace hyperbole and sensationalism over fact and nuance. In doing so, decisions are being made which do not reflect reality, and as such not only fail to rectify the situation at hand, but more often than not, exacerbate it. America's experience with Iran stands as a clear case in point, where analysts have failed to accurately depict the true nature of Iran's military capability, among other issues, and policy makers have, as a result, failed to formulate policies which deal with the issues arising from decades of American-Iranian animosity fueled by post-9/11 emotions, which continue to run high to this day. Getting it wrong on Iran has become an American institution, one which may have far-reaching detrimental consequences.