Below is an excellent piece from fellow Iraq War veteran and IAVA member, Ray Kimball. The national conversation about what to do next in Iraq is finally starting to bloom. However, as new ideas are presented daily, Ray urges us all to look deeper:
The current fight is simply too important to let your own biases towards one media outlet or another get in the way of reading the good ideas that are out there. So, all you dittoheads and Kossacks out there, hold your nose if you must, but dive in and see what the pros have to say.
I don't often post ideas for changes in strategy, operations and tactics in Iraq, mainly because most of the people floating these ideas have little idea what they're talking about. A classic example is the recent NPR interview with the head of the Iraq Foundation, who called for greater troop strength in Iraq; when pressed, she admitted she had no idea how many more troops would even be needed, or even what additional roles they needed to play! For too many of these people, soldiers are just nameless numbers who perform distant dirty jobs; in the words of our former SECDEF, "people are fungible." Even most of the military pundits have little to no experience in actual insurgency and counter-insurgency; they are, in Dave Grossman's memorable phrase, "virgins writing about sex." (And before I get the outraged comments citing your favorite civilian commentator, let me make it clear that I'm not talking about grand strategy).
So it's a great day when I get to post not one, but two great perspectives on necessary changes in our methods in and preparing for Iraq and Afghanistan. First up is the venerable T.X. Hammes. If you've spent any time studiyng insurgency and counter-insurgency, you know his name (and you've got to love anyone who includes this line in his official bio: "He never served in the Pentagon, Headquarters Marine Corps or a Joint Staff.") Hammes gives a very thoughtful interview with NPR where he discusses the need to greatly expand both the advisor base and the material support for ongoing operations. Perhaps his most attention-grabbing statement: the US should plan for the insurgency to last for at least the next ten years.
On the other end, you've got a relative newcomer, Eric Egland. Eric's credentials include service in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with counter-terror experience. His recommendation, as published in the Weekly Standard, is exactly what you'd expect from an officer schooled in the current operating environment:
The plans for victory so far have fallen short. They have come, top-down, from the Pentagon or the palaces-turned-coalition headquarters in Baghdad. Now, American leaders, especially the nominee for secretary of defense, should consider a bottom-up plan to win that taps the collective grass-roots wisdom of successful battlefield innovators.
The careful observer will notice the significantly different political orientations of the sources of these two pieces; that's deliberate.