Lost in the clamor and commotion of WikiLeaks releasing 251,287 diplomatic cables is the perspective of those who currently or have recently served in government. For four years, I served in the Office of Iranian Affairs at the State Department during the period in which most of the Iran-related cables are from. We worked hard to find constructive solutions toward peace. When President Obama took office in 2009, we launched the most serious attempt since 1979 to begin dialogue with Iran. Clearly, our diplomatic efforts were not perfect, but trying to predict Iranian politics is often a humbling experience. With the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, it would have been more effective if we had done a few things differently. Wikileaks may highlight this, or confirm previously held suspicions. Regardless, it has brought three key issues to the fore:
1. This unprecedented violation will strategically weaken America in ways that are currently impossible to predict. If nothing else, government officials, businessmen, students and others around the world may think twice before confiding in their American counterparts -- if they are still willing talk. And weakening American diplomacy lessens its credibility as an alternative to political, economic and military conflict.
While many view this massive security breach as an exciting and unique glimpse into foreign policy, the bottom line is that it is illegal. And while some may hope that these leaks serve as a catalyst for policy adjustments and greater government transparency, Americans should ask themselves: at what cost? Simply put, U.S. diplomats -- many of whom are my friends and former colleagues -- have been put in harm's way as a result of this illegal act. America has these security and confidentiality rules in place to protect those who serve.
2. It should now be clear that U.S. policy has never been a true engagement policy. By definition, engagement entails a long-term approach that abandons "sticks" and reassures both sides that their respective fears are unfounded. We realized early on that the administration was unlikely to adopt this approach. Instead, we pursued a "carrot and stick" strategy similar to the Bush administration, utilizing positive and negative inducements to convince Iran that changing its behavior would be its most rewarding and least harmful decision. The key difference between the Bush and Obama approach is an effort by the latter to fix tactical mistakes of the former. By disavowing regime change, striking diplomatic quid pro quos with key allies, and dropping preconditions to diplomacy with Iran, Obama changed tactics, but maintained an objective similar to his predecessor -- making Iran yield on the nuclear issue through pressure. By changing tactics, the U.S. managed to build a consensus for international sanctions after talks collapsed in 2009 -- something the Bush administration was unable to achieve.
Moreover, as the leaked cables show, the highest levels of the Obama administration never believed that diplomacy could succeed. While this does not cheapen Obama's Nowruz message and other groundbreaking facets of his initial outreach, it does raise three important questions: How can U.S. policymakers give maximum effort to make diplomacy succeed if they admittedly never believed their efforts could work? Why was Iran expected to accept negotiation terms that relinquished its greatest strategic asset (1200 kg of LEU) without receiving a strategic asset of equal value in return? And what are the chances that Iran will take diplomacy seriously now that it knows the U.S. never really did? The Obama administration presented a solid vision, but never truly pursued it.
3. Paradoxically, WikiLeaks may have caused a "Now What?" moment in U.S.-Iran relations. For America, the strategic ambiguity in its status-quo Iran policy is no longer tenable. Wikileaks has provided Iran with clarity on the U.S. "carrot-stick" strategy. Now, Obama must choose between continuing the existing policy that has been unevenly applied (where are the carrots?), or recalibrating his policy to seriously consider the political, economic, security and nuclear incentives sought by Iran that any diplomatic solution will have to address. This does not imply that concessions must be made to Iran on each of these four fronts. Only robust diplomacy can determine whether it is in America's interest to address Iranian concerns. But if Iran's interests are not addressed in negotiations, diplomacy will be deemed one-sided and fail without being executed in good faith. This increases the likelihood that the aforementioned international coalition will begin to fragment -- and that Iran will likely exploit those fragmentations.
For Iran, WikiLeaks should make it clear -- it has no real friends, in the region or elsewhere. At best, it has leverage that is facilitated by business arrangements. Trust is in short supply. Going forward, this is likely to affect its strategic calculus vis-à-vis the U.S. and its nuclear program. While it is currently unclear whose hand will be strengthened in Tehran by these recent developments, one of two scenarios seems likely. Iran's new-found sense of isolation may exacerbate existing domestic and international pressures to the point where it feels compelled to cut a deal. Indeed, Iranian decision-makers may decide that the WikiLeaks damage suffered by the U.S. and Iran have leveled the playing field, making it easier to reach an agreement without losing face. Conversely, the information gleaned from WikiLeaks could emasculate pragmatic conservatives in Iran, embolden hardliners and their preconceived notions of "foreign plots," and reinforce Iran's "don't trust anyone" mentality that has become increasingly visible in its foreign policy since 2005.
As negotiations in Geneva commence this weekend, it would be wise for both sides to utilize lessons learned -- from the previous round of diplomacy, and from the WikiLeaks debacle -- to maximize the chances for successful diplomacy. Ambassador John Limbert, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran during my time at the State Department, used to (half) joke about doing whatever it took to keep some form of rationality in our Iran policy. If any good is to come out of the inexcusable WikiLeaks security breach, perhaps it will be something as simple as taking Ambassador Limbert's advice to heart.
Reza Marashi is director of research at the National Iranian American Council and a former Iran desk officer at the U.S. State Department.
James Zogby: Israel: Using WikiLeaks to Build a Straw Man
Bill Quigley: Why WikiLeaks Is Good for Democracy
The problem remains to be the Iranian government and their Islamist views. On this side, for the longest time we blamed Bush and hoped for 'CHANGE'. Now what?
"For Iran, WikiLeaks should make it clear -- it has no real friends, in the region or elsewhere. "
no real friends.. in the region and elsewhere..
wow.
that is of course,.. unless you count NEARLY EVERYONE.
when the regional POPULATION has this question put to them, regarding what state most threatens them, threatens their safety;
80% - israel
70% - the united states
10% - iran
so, 'everyone is so very AFRAID of iran'. (BOO!)
unless you count the general population,. most of them.
and beyond that if you lend extraordinary value specifically to the nervous opinions of oligarchies, monarchies, authoritarian leaders, etc
THIS is the lens of 'diplomacy', ladies and gentlemen.
when THIS is the over-arching attitude of the largest, most pervasive diplomatic corp in the world's long history .then..
there is only one question that remains if you are 'only' a member of something so insignificant as 'the general population'.
"will i use my powers of invisibility for good or evil?"
chomsky rightly pointed out that the BIG story, strewn across ALL of these documents. is the unique loathing for democracy exhibited by diplomatic elites.
corporate media will not be telling this story, GO look at the documents..
it is so frustrating what passes for freedom or liberty or principle or dignity among these supposed representatives of their respective populations.
so the document release in not just 'exciting' (giggles and gaffaw!!)
IT IS NECESSARY.
Telhami's "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll" is highly regarded among Arabist scholars and public opinion specialists here who note that its consistency of methodology and questions over an unusually long period of time has given it considerable credibility."
(so.. apparently "Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll" is what it is called,.. and it comprises "4,000 respondents in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates")
"Asked to name two countries that, in their view, posed the "biggest threat" to them, a whopping 95 percent and 88 percent of respondents named Israel and the US, respectively. That compared to 85 percent and 72 percent, respectively, in late 2006."
"By comparison, the sense of threat posed by Iran appears to have diminished over the same period. While 11 percent of Arab respondents named Iran as one of the two greatest threats in late 2006, only seven percent did so in the most recent survey."
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/0805_arab_opinion_poll_telhami.aspx
Based on many polls, and common sense, you are wrong.
But let's assume that you really care for the well-being of Arabs against your big bad Iran wolf of today (who's next, Syria and after that Pakistan, and after that....?), and that you are not playing the ugly tactic of creating antagonsim among Arab and Iranians. If you care so much for the Arabs why don't you stand for and speak out for the rights of the Pales.s. and their right to their own soveriegn homeland? You just want more continuous wa rs of distraction.
Oh, and I'm a fan of Chomsky and critical of Israel (particularly Likud).
Facts are facts, Iran has no real friends among the oligarchies running the Arab states - particularly Bahrain, of course, given its peoples' historical ties to Iran and its state religion. There was actually nothing new about this revelation, except that it makes it a little awkward for the IRI government to cultivate further ties which were themselves hard-gotten during the Khatami admin, which formally dropped exporting the revolution and mended ties. Will Ahmadinejad go straight to the people whom he is more popular with? Perhaps, but this is of interest to me, because that's most clearly not what he did (Assange is part of the Zionist plot, yada yada). He and the current leadership has indeed been put in an awkward diplomatic position - or at least public optics issue (everyone knew they were lying to each other already). I find that angle interesting, not who the Arab street feels more threatened by. That is also common knowledge, but doesn't change the power dynamics. Of course, this likely won't change much, either. In the end, a lot of gossip of little discernible immediate value.
Wrong. Diplomats' *egos* have been put in harm's way, and that's a good thing. Secrecy is to protect actual people's lives, not to cover up negligence.
"The Brookings Institute just a few months ago released extensive polls of what Arabs think about Iran. The results are rather striking. They show the Arab opinion holds that the major threat in the region is Israel- that’s 80%. The second major threat is the United States- that’s 77%. Iran is listed as a threat by 10%.
"With regard to nuclear weapons, rather remarkably, a majority- in fact, 57% – say that the region would have a positive effect in the region if Iran had nuclear weapons. Now, these are not small numbers. 80%, 77%, say the U.S. and Israel are the major threat. 10% say Iran is the major threat. This may not be reported in the newspapers here- it is in England- but it’s certainly familiar to the Israeli and U.S. governments, and to the ambassadors. But there is not a word about it anywhere. What that reveals is the profound hatred for democracy on the part of our political leadership and the Israeli political leadership. These things aren’t even to be mentioned. This seeps its way all through the diplomatic service. The cables to not have any indication of that."
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/11/30/noam_chomsky_wikileaks_cables_reveal_profound
We all know that over time their system is bound to crumble and if the cancer rumours are right it could happen sooner rather than later. Why risk a war when all we need to do is wait.
Worked in Cuba it could work here to.
What was weakened were the lies we've been told over and
over and over and over, which in some peoples minds gives
the appearance of strength.