There were some interesting reactions to my post yesterday on proposals for the "soft partition" of Iraq. Many people think that "soft partition" is an interesting idea, as I did originally. Some thought I was being particularly unfair to Sen. Joe Biden, who was cited as the intellectual inspiration for the plan.
Let me be clear: I respect Sen. Biden in many ways, and the idea may very well be a good one -- but only if the Iraqis choose it for themselves. But today it's only an abstract notion being pushed by Washington politicians and think-tank types. The Iraqi government rejects it and polls show a lack of Iraqi enthusiasm for it. Some regional experts are convinced it will fail, that Iran and Syria will benefit, and that it will lead to even more bloodshed. Still, soft-partition advocates seem attached to their idea.
Ideas like that led us into war. Let's not let another one keep us there.
Ideas by themselves are neutral, morally and practically, but context is everything. Ideas and proposals have been used lately to manipulate public opinion -- or to keep us in the war a little longer while leaders try to come up with the next idea. They can also tell us a great deal about the mindset of their proponents.
Michael O'Hanlon, the war advocate who is now misleadingly labels himself a reformed war "critic," recently co-authored an "academic" paper that promotes the "soft partition" idea without clearly defining it. How does "soft partition" differ from Federalism, already permissible under the Iraqi constitution? If it's not different, why aren't the authors calling it Federalism?
Sen.Biden also uses the fuzzy language of 'soft partition.' Again, the idea - as an idea, absent its political context -- may very well have its merits. But here are the problems with "soft partition" in real life:
It would be imposed on the Iraqis, without considering their preferences as an independent nation: If the Iraqis want something called "soft partition," then I would agree with Sen. Biden that we have a moral obligation to assist them. The most important point, however, is this: Unless any decision about the country's future is made democratically by Iraqis, we have no right to impose it by force.
It provides a rationale for the continued occupation of Iraq: As long as we convince ourselves we have a better idea about Iraq's future than the Iraqis do, we have a good reason for continuing to occupy their country against their will. This idea is not a good enough reason to keep on killing and dying on foreign soil, unless and until a) they adopt it themselves, and b) they ask us to help them implement it.
As proposed, there's not enough of a role for the international community: Any solution to the Iraq crisis must include the international and regional communities in the planning stages, and not be presented as yet another unilateral U.S. decision. That's important for both moral and practical reasons. First, partition won't be accepted by the Iraqi public if it's imposed by the U.S. Secondly, we will want international help if we get involved in a task as monumental and risky as relocating civilians.
We need to involve regional experts, in a way we failed to do in planning for this war: What do legitimate scholars -- not policy mouthpieces looking for a State Department appointment - say about the viability of the plan? Proposal advocates don't draw enough on region exterts.
We need to view ivory-tower 'think tank' exercises with more skepticism: Washington is filled with theoreticians who have sketched out grand designs in white papers - designs that crumbled to dust when faced with real-world exigencies. Every such idea should be vigorously debated, prodded, and analyzed by cold-hearted skeptics. The days of greeting each new proposal as a 'liberator' should be over forever inside the beltway.
Buzzwords Obscure, Not Instruct: Why wasn't the "surge" called a "temporary increase in troop levels"? To sell it to the public. Why is this plan called "soft partition," instead of either "partition" or "Federalism"? I don't know. But we must demand that terms and ideas be clearly defined and described. Don't sell us, tell us. (And yes, I've read the proposals. I find them vague -- especially on the definition of terms, and on explaining how the Iraqis will embrace the concept.)
If Sen. Biden and his think tank associates think they have a workable plan for Iraq, they need to propose it ... first, to the Iraqis, and then to the international community and the American people. But in the end, it is the people of Iraq who must decide the fate of their nation.
Dear God, haven't we learned that simple lesson yet?
Sen. Biden failed to make a decision in the real-world context before when he voted for the Iraq war resolution. He has excused himself since then, saying he didn't know how badly the Administration would mismanage both the diplomacy and the war. That means he didn't understand the greater context -- ongoing inspections on the ground, widely reported stories that the decision to attack had already been made, who would lead the effort - when he cast his vote.
As for O'Hanlon's forecasting abilities, here's a 2003 sample:
The U.S.-led mission in Iraq is still quite likely to succeed over a time period of roughly three to five years. The lack of any unifying ideology for the resistance there makes it unlikely we will face a snowballing mass insurgency.
Mr. O'Hanlon thought the invasion of Iraq was a good idea. Sen. Biden thought that giving the President some vaguely defined "authority" -- one that just happened to allow him to start a war, too -- was a good idea. But, as the nation learned to its great sorrow, context is everything.
It's time American leaders learned a simple lesson: In the wrong context, ideas can kill.