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Rob Richie

Rob Richie

Posted: December 8, 2010 03:00 PM

I wrote the following with Chris Marchsteiner, who worked with FairVote as an intern this fall

No elected office in the world matters more than the presidency of the United States. Given that reality, it's remarkable that our method of electing it can have such flaws. Take the nomination system.

An upcoming FairVote research report on plurality voting systems will review the history and effects of "first-past-the-post" voting rules in the last decade of elections in the United States. Of particular importance are insights into the Republican Party's nomination rules. With the mid-term elections done, the nation's political pundits are naturally turning to who Republicans will nominate in 2012 to face off against the Democratic nominee, almost certainly to be incumbent President Barack Obama.

What seems clear is: first, the race seems to be wide open, with any number of candidates having a chance to win; second, Republican nomination rules poorly accommodate a divided field, and may easily result in a highly unrepresentative nominee.

Consider the 2008 Republican nomination contest. John McCain secured an essentially insurmountable lead on February 5, Super Tuesday. Sen. McCain had become the frontrunner heading into Super Tuesday by winning three key primaries: South Carolina, Florida and New Hampshire. His average percentage share in those contests was just 34.5%, and he never even broke the 40% threshold. Even on February 5, he won only three states with a majority of the vote.

Although McCain did not capture a majority of the popular vote on Super Tuesday (and did not, in fact, ever reach a majority of 50% of votes cast in primaries), McCain's disproportionately large delegate count forced his leading opponents to drop out of the race. Former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney only trailed McCain by 842,355 votes in the popular vote after Super Tuesday; however, he trailed him by 683 delegates. Winner-take-all states played a major role in this disparity. Unlike the Democratic Party, the GOP contests often assign all the delegates in a state to the plurality winner.

Such a disparity is the result of the GOP's undemocratic voting rules -- rules that produce such unrepresentative results that Republicans reformed them after the 2008 primary. Those rules can be defined in two ways: "winner-take-all" allocation rules in most contests that give frontrunners a highly disproportionate share of delegates, contrasting with Democrats' requirement of proportional allocation; and plurality voting rules, that allow candidates to build momentum by "winning" states with relatively low pluralities -- even if they would have lost in a one-on-one race against their top opponent with those same voters.

Going into 2012, one of the Republicans' key changes was to have winner-take-all elections take place in April. Proportional contests would be allowed to take place in March. Republicans do not appear to want a repeat of 2008. Despite these changes, however, there has been speculation that winner-take-all states, regardless of when they take place, could help a divisive nominee achieve the Republican nomination -- one popular with a relatively narrow base of the party, but not a strong general election candidate. Some might argue former Alaska governor Sarah Palin would fit that description, although others would argue her star power may be just what Republicans need.

Palin currently leads in the Republican field: a Public Policy Polling survey shows the national numbers currently as: Sarah Palin 21%, Newt Gingrich 19% and Mitt Romney 18% -- with others like Tim Pawlenty and Mike Pence hoping to break through with good results early.

So Palin's lead, though insignificant at this point, could end up being magnified similarly to John McCain's lead in the early 2008 primaries.

The contest that may be most revealing on the "momentum" of early wins is the 2004 Democratic nomination contest. Going into the Iowa caucuses, Sen. John Kerry had slumped from early front-runner status. But he surged in the final two weeks before the caucuses, and ended up winning 38% of caucus delegates, just ahead of surging candidate, John Edwards who secured 32%. But although Kerry's delegate count was only slightly ahead of Edwards, he was the one who secured magazine covers and momentum. His win with 38% in New Hampshire, where he had a "home field" advantage, further cemented his momentum.

Looking to 2012, then, we may well see a candidate emerge with early wins in fractured fields in states like Iowa and New Hampshire, gain momentum and keep that frontrunner status long enough to keep winning plurality victories when the GOP turns to winner-take-all contests. The ultimate winner may well be a strong nominee, but the rules do not guarantee it.

In 2010, FairVote provided testimony to the Republican Party about recommendations for improving its nomination process. Two specific proposals were: (1) proportional allocation of delegates; (2) instant runoff voting (IRV) in as many contests as possible, giving that state's IRV winner a delegate bonus and more deserved bragging rights as that state's winner. Although pleased that Republicans have made improvements like delaying contests and requiring proportional allocation in early contests, we suspect they may end up regretting not adopting more substantial reforms.

At the very least, they're rolling the dice. And when it comes to the world's most important elected office, it seems like we can do better than that.

 

Follow Rob Richie on Twitter: www.twitter.com/FairVote

I wrote the following with Chris Marchsteiner, who worked with FairVote as an intern this fall No elected office in the world matters more than the presidency of the United States. Given that reality...
I wrote the following with Chris Marchsteiner, who worked with FairVote as an intern this fall No elected office in the world matters more than the presidency of the United States. Given that reality...
 
 
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04:19 PM on 12/08/2010
IRV is highly susceptible to strategic voting. Something like approval voting is going to work far better for fields with lots of candidates and voters who have complex rankings. Plurality voting does a terrible job of representing voter intent but does a very good job of forcing coalitions. Strongly rewarding candidates and parties with a willingness to form coalitions is one of the reasons the American democratic system works as well as it does.
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Rob Richie
06:28 AM on 12/09/2010
Thanks for commenting ,but note that approval voting is much more prone to strategic voting. That's due to the fact that to have a chance to help any candidate other than your first choice, you have to cast an equally weighted for that candidate. If you think your first choice might win, that's tricky because that indication of support for that second candidate could defeat your first choice.

It's commonly accepted that in IRV, well-informed voters cast ballots that are going to reflect how they would have voted if less-informed about IRV -- e.g, do what the instructions suggest. That's not true of approval voting,.
04:14 PM on 12/09/2010
Hi Rob thank you for the good response. And I disagree with you that well-informed voters do what less informed voters do. First off on approval you aren't using strategic voting correctly. Lets assume there are 4 candidates A,B,C,D with A & B being my first and 2nd choices respectively. Neither (A) nor (A,B) are strategic votes the both accurately reflect my preference. In this case the choice between (A) and (A,B) is reflecting how much I prefer A to B which is exactly what approval voting should do. That's working as intended. If I vote (A,B) I'm saying the important thing is A or B wins while if I vote for (A) I'm indicating that in reality I vastly prefer A to B,C or D.

Now contrast that with IRV. Assume that again A > B > C > D is my preference. But I know that many of B's voters actually prefer C. And additionally many C voters prefer A to B. Then I might want to vote C > A > B and not A > B > C to best achieve my preferences. That's strategic voting where I have to vote in a way totally unlike my preferences to advance my goals. IRV works really well in allowing people to protest vote without having to fight against the "lesser of evils" but once you actually have real elections that are multi party it falters.
11:50 PM on 12/09/2010
Rob Richie has it backwards on Approval Voting and IRV.

Say you prefer X over Y over Z, and Y and Z are the clear frontrunners. Your obvious strategic best move is to maximally support Y and minimally support Z. With Approval Voting that means "vote for Y but not Z". With IRV that means "rank Y first and Z last".

NOW you can decide what to do about X, your sincere favorite. With Approval Voting, you might as well go ahead and vote for X, since that cannot possibly hurt you, and may even help lead to an upset by X.

But with IRV, you DO NOT want to put X in first place, since X would be more likely to be a spoiler for Y than to defeat Y *AND* Z. This causes IRV to degenerate roughly into ordinary Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post).
See www.electology.org/irv-plurality

Moreover, IRV voters have in practice "bullet voted" (ranked only one candidate) MORE OFTEN than in Approval Voting exit poll experiments!
www.electology.org/bullet-voting

Australia has used IRV in its House since 1918, and in conversations with AU third party members, they expressed their belief that most voters use the exaggeration strategy I mentioned above, ranking the preferred major party candidate in first place to be safe.

Evidence:
ScoreVoting.net/AusAboveTheLine07.html

As for Approval voters who might "bullet vote" if their favorite candidate is strong, so what? That's not the problem.
08:56 AM on 12/15/2010
The problem with IRV is that it too is also a plurality victory system. It hides this by knocking choices off the end, but pluralities still win as well as the pay off in second guessing the other voters (tactical voting). Merely ranking your choices does not show the contrast of preference, which is more important. IRV, like the original plurality voting, takes the blessing of numerous good choices and turns it into a curse. The extra choices still split the votes and allow false results of extremist victories. This does not happen when the actual preference contrast is indicated as in range voting or approval voting.

Its much more important that we express our preference then merely rank the choices. And that is why both forms of plurality voting fail, orignal and IRV.
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Rob Richie
03:31 PM on 12/15/2010
What you should be arguing isn't winner-take-all systems, but forms of proportional representation. I support form of proportional voting for legislative elections where it can be won. But for one-winner races, I disagree with you -- and challenge you, like others, to make your case for range and approval against the status quo and see how you do.