No-one outside of Iran, and few inside Iran, can state with certainty what the long-term intentions are of the Iranian leadership are with respect to the development of nuclear weapons. The question is inherently speculative, and it's no accident that those who seek confrontation want to centralize attention on an allegation that can't be proved or disproved. Anyone in the United States who claims they know with certainty what the long-term intentions of the Iranian leadership are with respect to the development of nuclear weapons is simply not telling the truth.
What seems clear is the following. The Iranian leadership, supported by a strong majority of Iranian public opinion, has no intention of being bullied by the Bush Administration into abandoning the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil. This, they have said repeatedly, is a "red line."
What also seems clear is that for the Bush Administration, Iranian enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil is also a "red line." The Bush Administration's conception of "diplomacy" with Iran on the nuclear file is: how can we compel the Iranian leadership to abandon the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil?
And for reform of U.S. policy, this is the unacknowledged fundamental issue: under what circumstances, if any, is the United States prepared to countenance the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil?
All of the jabber about meeting with Iranian leaders is at best a very imperfect proxy for this fundamental question, at worst a sideshow, as Senator Obama knows. The reason that Bush Administration officials refuse to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear file "without pre-conditions" is not because they're afraid of getting cooties from the Iranian officials. The reason is that the key pre-condition that the Bush Administration has set is that Iran cease enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil. And the view of Bush Administration officials is that, having set this pre-condition, if you negotiate with Iranian officials on the nuclear file without this pre-condition having been met, you're sending a signal that you might be willing to move your red line. And it's a tenet of dogma in the Bush Administration that this red line cannot be moved; in fact, the notion that under some circumstances, it might be moved, cannot even be discussed.
And, the reason, from the Bush Administration's point of view, that this question cannot be discussed is that, for both the Bush Administration and the Iranian leadership, the question of the enrichment of uranium on Iranian soil is a proxy for the question of how much influence Iran has in the region. For the Bush Administration, the amount of influence that Iran now has is intolerable. Of course, for the Iranian leadership -- as for just about every other actor in the world -- the notion that they have too much influence is quite unacceptable.
The position of the Iranian leadership is: why should we consider moving our red line, if the U.S. is not willing to consider moving its red line? To which the Bush Administration fundamentally has no answer but: we have more power than you. But when the Iranian leadership looks around their neighborhood today, and then looks at the United States, they do not see a country in a position to give them orders.
There are too few political actors in Washington today who are willing to publicly state the obvious: that we should accept the fact that Iran has more power and influence in the Middle East than it had in the past and that it will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, and that therefore we should seek to integrate Iran into a framework of regional peace and security on the basis of its present power and influence, just as the Nixon Administration, in its diplomacy with China, accepted that China was a regional power that the U.S. could not simply push around.
Instead, there is a broad consensus that the choices for the U.S. are diplomacy or war. But as long as "diplomacy" is defined as the Bush Administration defines it -- how we can compel the Iranian leadership to say "Uncle" -- it is nearly certain that "diplomacy" will fail. And therefore, a logical corollary of the present consensus is that unless U.S. policy changes, war is inevitable.
This is the background for the demand that the United States negotiate with Iran without pre-conditions. Negotiating without pre-conditions does not commit you to any result. It does, however, suggest that you are willing to move from your present position. It's certainly true that there is no point in negotiating with someone if you have no intention of changing your position one iota. Negotiation implies willingness to compromise.
It is urgent that these questions be dragged into the light of public debate. How many American lives are we willing to sacrifice for the demand that there be no uranium enrichment on Iranian soil?
Because of this urgency, Just Foreign Policy is sending Stephen Kinzer back to Washington.
Kinzer, you will recall, is the author of the book All the Shah's Men, about the U.S.-organized coup that overthrew the democratic government in Iran in 1953, and the aftermath of those events. Kinzer has argued to U.S. officials that the example of 1953 indicates that even if the use of military force or external efforts at regime change should appear successful in the short-run -- a highly dubious prospect in any event -- they are almost certain to backfire in the long run, creating a government in Iran that will make today's government seem like a day at the beach. Since the policies of military threat and regime change do not gain the U.S. anything, and in fact make real diplomacy more difficult, these policies should be abandoned. Instead, the United States should pursue direct and comprehensive diplomacy with Iran, without pre-conditions on either side.
Kinzer will be taking letters from Americans across the United States, urging real diplomacy between the United States and Iran. You can sign such a letter here.