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Scott Atran

Scott Atran

Posted: August 8, 2009 03:24 PM

The (Im)moral Logic of the Show Trial

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Last week, leading reformists in Iran appeared in Tehran's Revolutionary Court sporting gray pyjamas and plastic slippers. They were unshaven, had clearly lost weight, and seemed dazed. According to Human Rights Watch, many if not all of the defendants were subject to harsh and violent interrogation techniques. Of course, the regime denies that "torture" was involved; and if you bought the Bush administration's take on what isn't torture, then the Islamic Republic's version comes for free.

Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a cleric and vice president to former President Mohammad Khatami, went on the stand. Denied his robe and turban but gripping a piece of paper that served only as a stage prop, he swore profusely to plotting for years with fellow defendants and foreign powers to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Abtahi's daughter said that a few days before, in one of the only visits she got with her father, he told her he was being forced in to take pills that made him dizzy and lose concentration. A gaunt Maziar Bahari, veteran Newsweek reporter and celebrated documentary filmmaker, confessed that in some of his articles he unwittingly aided the alleged conspiracy, made all the more pernicious because of its call for peaceful protest. Bahari's wife, who fears her husband may be kept for a long time, doesn't want to think about the baby she carries.

Khatami and unsuccessful presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi courageously denounced the "show trials" and "torture" in their country, a specter from Stalin's purges so hauntingly described in Arthur Koestler's classic, Darkness at Noon. But their calls for reform, like Gorbachev's attempt to reform the Soviet system, can probably only be achieved by the regime's collapse, which is what the trials are designed to forestall.

In Koestler's true-to-life novel, the state interrogator explains to the old Bolshevik why he is being tortured into publicly confessing that he plotted to bring down the regime at the behest of foreign powers. It's that the masses are much easier to mobilize against foreign plots than home-grown dissent. "Truth is what is useful for humanity, falsehood is what is harmful," explains the interrogator, where "truth" is defined by the Revolution as incarnated in the opinion of its Supreme Leader, No.1.

In this revolutionary logic, anything that runs counter to the wishes of the Supreme Leader, no matter how sincere or honest or supportive of other aspects of the revolution, are "objective crimes" against a regime whose first duty is to survive, no matter the cost in human lives or suffering, in order to ultimately save "humanity." Likewise, the coerced confessions of Bahari and others are, in the logic of the revolution, objectively "true," however far from their actual actions and motives. The irony is that Bahari's well-meaning attempts to explain Iranian nuclear ambitions and other confrontational policies from the regime's standpoint, like Khatami's and Moussavi's attempts to "save the Revolution," are (correctly) taken by the Supreme Leader and his devotees to be even greater signs of counter-revolutionary perfidy than outright hostility.

A lesson here is that our own cultural conception of political morality, which is centered on liberty and justice for the individual and the belief that ends do not justify means, is not universal; but it may not even be as common as we think in our society or as uncommon in others we don't like. Another lesson is that basic notions of what is moral or immoral do not neatly separate along the secular-religious divide.

Scott Atran is a research scientist at France's National Center for Scientific Research, The University of Michigan, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City

 
 
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09:58 AM on 08/11/2009
As long as ISLAMIC REGIME is in place , it all go's down to SUPREME LEAEDER WILL [HIS]
AUTHORITY ! SHARIATI - dreamed of an Islam without clerics . KASRVI criticized the clergy creating what he called a false ISLAM . WITHOUT CHECKS &BALANCES ! PEOPLE' VOICE'S ARE SILONCED
without speech ! GANJI, WE ended up with tyrnny & fascism. IN TIME IRAN will need to have
SEPARATION OF MOSQUE &STATE / WITHIN IN . IF THEY CHOOSE SO ??
06:37 PM on 08/10/2009
One problem is the insistence of some systems, and the Iranian Islamic regime is one example, which insist that democracy need not be the same everywhere. That may be true, but essential features must be present in any system to qualify as a variant of democracy. If transparency, dissent and rule of law could be picked up as the three principles, for example, we would not have the spectacle currently on in Iran. By supporting the principles on which the Islamic regime is founded ( the supreme leader, the council of guardians/experts et al) in its formative years, the current reformists have overlooked this fact and are victims of their own limited vision and flawed principles. By refusing to accept fundamental principles in the first iinstance, they find themselves trapped and helpless in the monster that their own creation has become. Yet one more example of a revolution devouring its own children.
07:58 PM on 08/10/2009
You make some very good points. I'd just add that IRI started to jail and execute left political prisoners from day 1 of the 'islamic' republic.
10:34 AM on 08/10/2009
Great article. I'd say both secular and religious societies are at high risk for political injustice whenever powerful groups are grappling for control.
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Khirad
11:15 AM on 08/09/2009
Your whole article nailed the situation quite succinctly. It also posed the question I have been mulling over, myself. Is a certain Glasnost, as Khatami and the reformists advocate, even possible under the current system of velayat-e-faqih? Without a restructuring of the checks and balances set up by the Revolutionary government, and a stripping of powers from the Supreme Leader, as Mossadegh forced from the Shah, it is impossible for the current régime to transition finally into a post-revolutionary phase. Of course, is this transition even possible in the first place under this very same structure -- built and bulwarked in the past decade further by archconservatives - to prevent that very eventuality?