As he prepared to launch his second coup against the constitutional order in Pakistan on November 3rd, 2007, ironically this time against his own Supreme Court and government, General Pervez Musharraf went through his familiar ritual of seeking feedback from others. He gathered a group of 20-25 leading politicians and associates the week before and talked aloud about the possibility of taking some drastic action. Guessing the impending imposition of a state of emergency, one of the least well-kept secrets in Pakistan last month, a number of them advised him against such a measure since it would set back his professed transition to democracy. Musharraf told them that he was ready for the next big move. Citing Napoleon (his current favorite role model) he stated that bold actions are "75 percent planning and 25 percent a leap into the dark."
His leap into the dark in the form of a State of Emergency on November 3, the setting aside of the Supreme Court and the constitution of Pakistan as well as fundamental rights of its citizens, the gagging of broadcast media, and imprisonment of leaders of most moderate parties in the country indeed took the country back to the Stygian gloom of dictatorship. It threatened the very foundation of Pakistan and the "true democracy" that he had promised the country when he took over in 1999 and undermined the growth of private broadcast media that he had helped introduce into Pakistani society. Under these circumstances, the promised elections in January will be flawed and unrepresentative, without the major opposition parties represented or allowed to campaign unhindered; And without the media being allowed to report freely on events around them.
Meanwhile, even as he prepares to shed his army uniform and remove the state of emergency that allowed him to remove the Supreme Court, his own popularity has been sliding. The latest International Republican Institute poll issued on October 12th, before the imposition of the emergency, showed that 73 percent of Pakistanis think the country is headed in the wrong direction, citing economic issues and extremism as major concerns. Some 76 percent of respondents (urban and rural) favored Musharraf's resignation as army chief and his overall approval rating has dropped from 61 percent in September 2006 to only 21 percent a year later, well below both former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, in that order. His approval rating lagged behind both these leaders in every province. Today it may be even worse.
Dangerously, his personal reliance on the coercive power of the Pakistan army and his regime's ill-planned use of the army against militants inside its borders appears to have redounded against that institution. Most Pakistanis and many overseas observers see the army as the key to Pakistan's stability and safety. But, there have been reports of unhappiness among lower ranks and younger officers with the poor showing of the army in the tribal badlands bordering Afghanistan and now in the settled area of Swat, where militants have had the run of the place. Adding to these negatives, the IRI survey noted a sharp drop in the rating of the army from being the most favorably viewed institution in September 2006 at 82 percent to being ranked third, at 70 percent, behind the Media and the Courts in 2007. Continuing popular unrest risks pitting the army against its fellow citizens on the streets of the hinterland.
Today, Pakistanis cannot get any news or commentary from private TV channels. Musharraf and his media managers have been speaking also in recent days about the need to curb the fledgling broadcast media with a government-imposed code of conduct according to "international standards." This is a misguided move and based on a complete misreading of journalistic norms in developed and many other developing nations. It also reflects a military mind set that relies on order and obedience rather than debate and discussion to reach consensus. If anything, freer media in Pakistan will provide a useful counterpoint to highhanded or misguided government or judicial actions. Further, these media can be a strong ally in the growing conflict between the forces of moderation and extremism in Pakistan. They have given no quarter or free passes to any political leader in recent months. For this they deserve honor not blame. If their coverage exposed the weakness in Musharraf's arguments and highlighted the extra-constitutionality of his moves, then the fault is not theirs. Even he admitted to the BBC last week that he had made an illegal move. "Have I done anything constitutionally illegal? Yes, I did it on November 3rd," he said, referring to his imposition of emergency rule. Why then shoot the domestic messengers?
I was a newsman with Pakistan Television, a government-owned network, in Pakistan during the waning days of two earlier military dictators, Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan in 1969 and General Yahya Khan in 1971. They too imposed similar controls on the private, in those days largely print, media, and failed. They too wanted to "save Pakistan" and ended up losing large parts of it. I also recall successfully dissuading my late brother General Asif Nawaz, the army chief in 1991-1993, when he wanted to take into custody a prominent Pakistani journalist friend of mine who had reported in a major news magazine on a leaked document about the misdeeds of intelligence agencies in Karachi. Why blame a journalist for your own agencies' faults? I told him. There are lessons to be learned from those earlier experiences and the history of Pakistan. Leaping into the dark is not one of them.
Shuja Nawaz, a political analyst is the author of Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army, and the wars within (forthcoming) from Oxford University Press. He regularly appears as a commentator on television and radio and at think tanks.