Why Obama Must Follow Drucker's (Not McChrystal's) Advice

David Sirota has written a great essay called "Who are "the deciders"?"

In it, he lays out both the basic Republican "Obama had better do what General McChrystal tells him to do" mantra and the basic How the Government Actually Works rules of the Constitution.

Personally, I side with the Constitution, which says the president is Commander in Chief (civilian control over the military having been one of the Founding Fathers' great ideas). I harbor no Seven Days in May type fantasies in which the military "resolves the Obama problem" by staging a coup.

Thank you Newsmax magazine for, I hope, spiking sales of the DVD of this classic 1964 film, directed by John Frankenheimer from a screenplay by Rod Serling. Perhaps if more Americans were familiar with the civics lessons of this 45-year-old masterpiece, we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Alright. So, I don't want President Obama to follow General McChrystal's advice. Listen to him, sure. But treat his advice as if it's the most relevant advice available? No!

That's what I don't want President Obama to do. And now, here's what I do want President Obama to do.

I want him to follow Peter Drucker's advice, not General McChrystal's.

(Peter Drucker? Who's Peter Drucker?)

If you don't know who Peter Drucker is, allow me to explain.

First, he's dead. Died in 2005. Was 96 years old at the time.

(WTF? You want President Obama to take the advice of a dead man? How's he supposed to do that?)

Yes, I do. And here's how and why.

Peter Drucker basically invented the science of modern management theory. And both his personal work and that theory have survived his death.

("Modern management theory"? What's that? And why does it matter?)

Well, basic management theory is the organized study of how human beings accomplish what they say they want to accomplish. And modern management theory is the latest and best result of that research.

In a matter of speaking, human beings have been using various types of management theory since the cave man days. Back then, some cave man figured out that using a club was better than using his fists to defend his watering hole from another group of cave men. (Thank you, Stanley Kubrick, for that imagery.) This was an early form of management theory, because at its core was innovation, planning, and adopting new habits. But it was largely the activity of one person, which was then shared with others.

Modern management theory is something Peter Drucker and his fellow researchers began to formulate in the years after WWII (when there was a lot of interest in studying how humans organized themselves most effectively, since we had just fought the biggest "who's going to control the watering hole" event in history). Drucker's book, The Practice of Management (1954) is credited with launching the formal profession of management as it's known today.

Here's the bottom line of why I'm bringing all this up:

We have a huge problem here in America. A great many of us think that you make something happen by... just making it happen. Literally by force of will (or, for some, prayer). Because we don't know any better, this leads to a situation in which our society -- especially the civic side -- uses the only model of organized effort we've ever experienced: the Autocracy that exists in most families.

We are raised under Father (or Mother) knows best circumstances. And if we serve in the military, that experience of "top down leadership" dynamic is reinforced... big time! And relying on this form of thinking, this form of planning, in which we "do as we're told," is sending our nation perilously close to going off a cliff (economically, environmentally, and sociologically).

But modern management theory is different. Unlike top down management, it creates an environment that fosters innovative thinking. An environment in which asking questions is actually encouraged, as well as its sister behavior: challenging conventional thinking!

This modern management-type process is what we need to make sure we do the right thing in Afghanistan.

"We, the people" and our elected representatives must support President Obama in making a decision that's wise, not fast. One that's based on asking questions -- lots of them -- not just listening to General McChrystal. General McChrystal's perspective is -- by the nature of his job -- limited and less comprehensive than that of the civilian leadership in the Obama administration.

Just to be clear, I am not saying that General McChrystal shouldn't be saying he needs more troops now.

What I am saying -- from the perspective of modern management theory -- is that General McChrystal's request is akin to the request coming from the head of the production department of a large company, a company that is functioning in an environment that is changing in ways that go beyond how the market for the product that McChrystal's department produces is changing.

And what President Obama is doing -- as the CEO of the overall business -- is taking the request from his head of production and factoring that into the wider perspective that comes from he and his other advisors seeing that the customers for the product McChrystal produces are actually changing themselves and, perhaps, need a different product now than the one McChrystal currently produces!

It is from this larger -- and, yes, ultimately wiser -- perspective that President Obama will make his decision.

My intuition tells me that President Obama knows more about the big picture thinking side of modern management theory than General McChrystal knows. (Were General McChrystal to be a student of modern management theory, he might actually be able to see beyond the needs of the "department" he runs.) For this reason, I trust Barack Obama to be the Commander in Chief. And I do not harbor any "military resolving the Obama problem" fantasies like the people at Newsmax do.

If we, as a nation, take a step back and see what's going on from a planning perspective -- from a "thinking" perspective -- this could be a huge, teachable moment for "we, the people."

We could finally learn, as a nation, that there is a science to developing truly effective plans for doing what we say we want to do. There's much more to making something happen than just "trying hard" or "praying hard."

We could learn that there's a very effective alternative to thinking the only choice is to use the lessons we learned from growing up in autocratic family environments.

That other choice is to study the work of Peter Drucker, W. Edwards Deming, Russell Ackoff, and Peter Senge, to read books like Idealized Design and Blue Ocean Strategy, out of the recognition that their methods have been responsible for most of the positive innovative developments in our society.

Were a significant portion of America to discover this side of the "how we organize and plan what to do" world, a second American quality revolution might be launched, one that would go far beyond the one we had in the 1980's (see "If Japan Can Why Can't We?" and the Baldrige National Quality Program at NIST.gov started by President Reagan)

I'll leave you with a brief quote from Peter Drucker:

"The righter we do the wrong thing, the wronger we become."

And one additional place where you can go to learn more about all this: The journal Systems Research and Behavioral Science.

And, finally, a 30 minute keynote about all this given by Dr. Russell Ackoff in 2004. Believe me, if you will take the time to watch this keynote, it may change your life.

 

 

Follow Steven G. Brant on Twitter: www.twitter.com/SteveBrant

Comments

[IaHawkeye]

This all sounds so, hmmm, academic. Similar to the strategy Mr Obama apparently is inclined to employ in the business of government with his use of "czars" most of whom seem to be long on ivory tower credentials but short on dirtying the hands on the ground level experience. Maybe you'd like to comment on the inefficiencies associated with decision-making by committee and the inverse relationship between efficiency and the size of a committee. You can substitute bureacracy in there at any time. I've always viewed "top-down" management as inherently dismissive of the "bottom-up" perspective of the rank and file. I also believe that the bigger government becomes, the farther it is from real wordly experience and essentially develops into a "top down" approach. In any event, I would hardly disagree with the intent of our founding fathers in the constitutional construct of our chain of command (but they might not have foreseen the size and inefficiency of our current government). McChrystal may have a constitutionally determined subservient role, but that does not mean that he should not be entitled to a strong opinion, nor that his opinion should not be considered with extra measure. He is after all, the one with the most authoritative perspective on the ground and probably has the best ability to assess what will work in accomplishing the goals set by government. It's kind of ironic that Lincoln had to push his generals into decisive action - it's the other way around now.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

"This all sounds so, hmmm, academic."

Am I supposed to take this as meaning you don't like what comes from the academic world? Just curious. Because I often wonder how those who don't like the academic world stand living in a modern society. I mean, so much of what we have today is the result of research begun by people trained at academic institutions; and a lot of research itself is done there too.

"Similar to the strategy Mr Obama apparently is inclined to employ in the business of government with his use of "czars" most of whom seem to be long on ivory tower credentials but short on dirtying the hands on the ground level experience."

Sorry, but I'm not here to debate how the administration conducts its hiring processes. If you have an anti-intellectual bias and think things are best learned "on the ground", I will remind you that what you get "on the ground" is raw data. It's only by understanding what you're looking at that you can then turn that "raw data" into "information"... and then, if you've studied the right subjects, turn that "information" into "knowledge"... and then, if you've got specific relevant experience and foresight, turn that "knowledge" into "wisdom".

"Maybe you'd like to comment on the inefficiencies associated with decision-making by committee and the inverse relationship between efficiency and the size of a committee. You can substitute bureacracy in there at any time."

I see you believe larger groups are automatically less efficient than smaller groups. That's autocratic thinking. The truth is that it's the intellectual and emotional quality of the people - and the process they use - that counts... not how many people are involved.

"I've always viewed "top-down" management as inherently dismissive of the "bottom-up" perspective of the rank and file."

You should study the works of Drucker, Deming, Ackoff, and Senge. You'll find out this does not have to be the case. Properly organized and trained, people at all levels of an organization can understand the big picture of what's going on and how their work relates to that larger whole. This, however, is NOT how General McChrystal is trained to think.

"I also believe that the bigger government becomes, the farther it is from real wordly experience and essentially develops into a "top down" approach."

You are entitled to your beliefs, but I highly recommend you check out the government agencies that practice Quality Management. (see http://www.quality.nist.gov and http://www.asq.org )

"In any event, I would hardly disagree with the intent of our founding fathers in the constitutional construct of our chain of command (but they might not have foreseen the size and inefficiency of our current government)."

So, you think the American government has gotten too big for the Constitution? What do you propose we do?

"McChrystal may have a constitutionally determined subservient role, but that does not mean that he should not be entitled to a strong opinion, nor that his opinion should not be considered with extra measure. He is after all, the one with the most authoritative perspective on the ground and probably has the best ability to assess what will work in accomplishing the goals set by government."

This "extra measure" stuff. You are one of several people who have failed to grasp my point about McChrystal being a specialist... and that the solution to the Afghan "mess" can only be developed by people who see all the dimensions of the situation. It's the difference between being treated by a family doctor (a GP) and a specialist in one part of the body alone.

"It's kind of ironic that Lincoln had to push his generals into decisive action - it's the other way around now."

(a) Lincoln was fighting a very different kind of war. And (b) as long as we live in a democracy, no general is going to get away with pushing any president around.

[TRYKER]

The Afghans are fighting to get the invaders to leave their land, but we call them "insurgents" as though they were some illegal fighters on some other army.
How can we stay there and add more military...or even fly drones over their land operated by some man on a screen in Florida? Talk about a mess!
To McChrystal, its all war all the time, that is why he has a job, that is how they get those precious medals on their chests. Whoopeee! Medals...
Without war they don't get to advance in the military, what a sure-fire rule to be sure American's are footing war bills decade after decade...and why there is no money left for social programs at home. They have plenty for the "troops" "over there", but when they come home, ooops, we can't fund the VA.
Diplomacy should be our focus as a country, the State Dept. should be engaged...not planes bombing civilian wedding parties...ooops, always by accident.
No wonder they kill US troops, we'd do the very same thing if we had "occupiers" on American soil ferchissakes. More troops will only make them more angry, McChrystal has to know that, so he is setting up our military men for more deaths...and more than likely blow-back for President Obama.
The hammer needs a new grip.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Yes, this is why General McChrystal has a job. And no one likes to see the department they run get downsized or otherwise reduced in importance in the pecking order of the larger organization to which it belongs.
I will not go so far as to say that McChrystal is advocating this strategy just to "get medals on his chest", but I just don't believe he can think outside his own specialized area of expertise: war fighting in Afghanistan. He can't see the other options that could contribute, ultimately, to the creation of a strategy that supports all of America's needs and interests in the region (and world-at-large).

[thewho77]

After 8 years in Afghanistan General McChrystal says that we are close to failure if we don't sent many more troops, maybe 50 percent more troops. The generals have failed already!

Let's leave a small observatory force with some predator drones in Afghanistan and just wait and see what happens. If the Taliban gets too strong we can just use the Hellfire Missiles on the Predator Drones to attack them.

[iridium53]

Drucker was a great man.

He wrote:

What made them all effective is that they followed the same eight practices:

• They asked, “What needs to be done?”

• They asked, “What is right for the enterprise?”

• They developed action plans.

• They took responsibility for decisions.

• They took responsibility for communicating.

• They were focused on opportunities rather than problems.

• They ran productive meetings.

• They thought and said “we” rather than “I…”

We’ve just reviewed eight practices of effective executives. I’m going to throw in one final, bonus practice. This one’s so important that I’ll elevate it to the level of a rule: Listen first, speak last..

You can decide how Obama rates in these areas.

Or, as Crucker wrote, "No decision has been made unless carrying it out in specific steps has become someone’s work assignment and responsibility."

Speeches are nice entertainment. Decisions, as Drucker defined them, are better.

[Javaline]

After reading this article I am struck by how little military thinking seems to have progressed over the centuries. Personally, I'd like to see all military go the way of the dodo, but as they are still some sort of necessary evil why aren't the top dogs reading their history? Over the years reading about the various invasions of Afghanistan by different nations I am struck by the similarity to the scenario of the British fighting the Native Americans in the early colonial days. They insisted on using their brilliant military strategy of large contingents of brightly dressed targets marching in unison against guerilla fighters - those who could slip in and out of the shadows, knew the lay of the land, and had the support of the native population.

It's painfully obvious to me, a non-military layperson, that if America wants to make any progress in Afghanistan then we should start by building their country back up into a livable condition and help them feed and educate their people. Then we can take all the money we save and do the same for our own country.

[Fez]

When are Americans ever going to learn about tribal cultures? We learned nothing from the Native American tribal cultures and have abused, misunderstood, and finally ignored our own tribal people in the US (I have lived and worked on Indian reservations for 10 years+). Unless the US is willing (it isn't) and able (definitely not) to subdue every single tribe in Afghanistan, we should leave immediately. All these people know is warfare and... guess what?... they are much better warriors than the US or any NATO troops. They are born to fight and don't particularly care what the cause is. Their values are much different from ours and they are ruthless and effective in achieving their goals. Right now their goal is to remove the occupying American forces from their blighted land. And our goal is.... ????... crickets. Oh yeah, our goal is to protect the thieves on Wall Street so they can continue their pillage.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Thank you for addressing the cultural / sociological aspect of the Afghanistan situation. We are not there to "take over" the country. This is not like when we "took over" North America from the Native Americans.

[ramper]

The General's perspective is "limited?" The guy who is actually on the scene and has seen first hand what it takes to solve the problem and is telling it straight is only "limited" by the 'suits' with clipboards who move from office to office in the White House. Don't tell me those minions know more about what is needed or have a clue how to evaluate intelligently the military situation on the ground. Those minions tell the President what he wants to hear. McChrystal is giving the facts.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Yes, the General's perspective most certainly *is* limited... BECAUSE he is a General!
Just as a specialist running one part of an organization only knows his or her specialty, General McChrystal only knows the "battlefield side" of the Afghanistan situation.
I repeat a point I made in reply to another comment: This is NOT a straight "let's invade a country and knock off all the bad people who run it" war. As much as some might wish for the "good old days" of WWII, Afghanistan today is not like Nazi Germany.
The solution to this sort of non-tradition warfare mess will not come from the mind of a General.
If you have so little faith in the "suits" in The White House, I suggest you reflect on your use of the words "military situation on the ground". We are NOT dealing with a purely "military situation". For one, we now have a government that was not legitimately elected.
I also suggest you read Frank Rich's column from Sept 26th on the parallels between this situation and Vietnam of 1961...
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27rich.html

[ramper]

You are underestimating him. He is well versed on the history of the country and the feelings of tribal leaders and the populace. He is with them each day. He is far more than a General who only knows the battlefield. He is also a military man that knows wars are won beyond the battlefield.

[David Campbell]

Commander In Chief has given us a great deal of trouble from President Polk. on to our time. We have a long list of President's wars, undeclared but carried on by one man:
North Korea
Yugoslavia
Haiti
Panama
Philippines
North Vietnam
Cambodia
Laos
Dominican Republic
Somalia
Guatemala
Grenada
Afghanistan
Iraq
Mexico
Sudan
Libya
Cuba
(From - The Best To The Worst-p.91) I think we've had enough of Commander-In-Chief wars.
(Obviously, I am a fan& impersonator of Charles Darwin)

[TN60]

Ir has always been a General's narrow scope of their job to want more "fodder" ( fodder being the military troops) for their wars. That is what they are trained for, waging wars and chess playing to win. That's how they get all those stars on their chests

The theory I would like to advance, is the theory of bringing our tired troops home and letting military families rebuild there lives. I am tired of Bush's wars. I am tired of the looting of the Treasury and off budget costs that lie. I'm tired of Republicans trying to stick a monkey wrench into health reform by saying it costs too much, while cheerleading for more troops and more war spending, be damned the costs.

This is just the theory of one American, and as such, I have a right to be heard and a right to advance my theory. My theory is that Joe Biden is right.

[Arun Ranga Swamy]

The strange thing about this piece is that it shows no sign of having even the most rudimentary understanding of what McChrystal is arguing. According to this piece, which focuses exclusively on McChrystal's request for troops, all McChrystal is doing is expressing standard military tunnel vision. But McChrystal's analysis of Afghanistan and the strategy he recommends are a radical departure from conventional military thinking in the United States, very much aimed at responding to the changing environment the country is facing. He says that the US has alienated the Afghan population by focusing more on killing Taliban and protecting themselves than on the safety of the Afghan civilians. McChrystal says American soldiers should not treat their own lives as more valuable than those of the Afghans and should take greater risks in order to save Afghan lives. He wants to use more troops in order to live closer to the population and protect them from the Taliban. You might disagree with the strategy. The American people might not support a strategy that risks American lives MORE. The military, which is used to arguing for overwhelming force to kill the enemy is deeply divided over the request precisely because they don't like the strategy and it departs from their normal way of operating. I don't Drucker would say about any of this but I do suspect that he would think the author should first acquaint himself with the issue before writing about it.

[wildedge]

I've heard this argument from a friend of mine, but remain unconvinced; McChrystal's shift in emphasis is not strategic, but tactical; and the presumed strategy grounding it remains nation-building - stabilize the civilian social structure (at least in the urban areas) and a nation can at last be properly established. That's just a bad strategy.The original goal in Afghanistan - and the way the war was sold to us - was to be rid of Al Queda in Afghanistan; we should have left as soon as that was achieved. However, of course, Cheney was always lying to us, it plan was regime change all along; but that's easy to accomplish, nation-building is not. In fact nation-building is an old colonialist strategy for an exit out of a former colony, but it presumes a condition of relative stability and peace. The reason is clear, the need to leave behind at least the illusion of amity between former colonials and the native population. McChrystal's report shows that this has at last sunk in at the Pentagon (it would never occur to Cheney); unfortunately, it may be a matter of too little too late - if you accidently killed a farmer's son in a fire-fight and showed no remorse for it ("collateral damage happens, not our fault"), it's probably not effective to then offer to protect his daughter the next day.

[wildedge]

Although Iraq is now largely pacified, the jury is sill out as to whether we've built a nation there or simply prepared the civilians for a long bloody civil war. But although McChrystal writes as though the jury's still out on Afghanistan, it isn't - the Karzai government is a failure, the base economy in the north is the opium trade, the Taliban retains a strong presence in the South and has strengthened its ties to various Pakastani rebel groups. meaning it remains well-supplied, has personnel reserves to draw on, and has a ready escape route. If nation-building was our real purpose there, the war is lost.
Finally, I should point out that McChrystal's tactical shift would take at least a year to implement, probably two or three, and remains a gamble.
We need an exit strategy. We need to identify a withdrawal that leaves us ready access into the area, not to preserve Karzai or prevent a civil war, but simply to keep Al Queda out. That can be planned and accomplished within two years; and it was the original mission that the American people agreed to.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Thank you for pointing out the keeping Al Queda out of Afghanistan was our original reason for going there...and for the other points you make. Yours is the kind of multi-dimensional reasoning I'm saying President Obama needs to use.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Thanks for going into more detail about McChrystal's proposal. Do you know the expression "When you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail"? That's what we're dealing with here. McChrystal's "hammer" is his troops. And now he wants to use them "differently"... to "focus on the safety of the Afghan civilians"... and "not treat their own lives as more valuable than those of the Afghans". This is a "Hammer" being used to.... I'm not sure how to characterize it... but certainly not for what it's designed to be used to do. And the proof is in your own statement: that the military is "deeply divided over the request... because... it departs from their normal way of operating."
Drucker, Deming, Ackoff, et al believe in combining talent pools... that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts... NOT that existing talent should be told to do things it's not trained to do.
The Afghanistan mess (and "mess" is a technical term from Systems Thinking) is as much developmental and sociological in nature as it is military. For this reason, following the advice of an expert in using "hammers" when he says "Use my hammers differently than they are designed to be used. Trust me. It will work." is to deny that the tools other than "hammers" are available. They are. But General McChrystal does not have authority over tool in the other "departments" of the "organization" known as the United States of America. For that reason, I am not surprised he does not recommend using them. He sees this war as "his responsibility". President Obama does have the authority to use a great many tools... and he (I believe/hope) knows the Afghan mess requires using them.

[wildedge]

You know, the great generals of WWII saw their primary responsibilities as 1) winning battles while 2) keeping American losses to a minimum. Policy was decided in Washington and determined strategies in the theater of war. First in Korea and then in VietNam, this noble sense of duty got misplaced. I by no means believe McChrystal is a tool of the 'military-­industrial complex' the way some generals were in VietNam, but I do think his adoption of the war as his responsibility is misplaced. One of your central points throughout, that because generals ought to have a narrow focus in their own planning and therefore they are not well-equipped to see the whole picture, is right on the money. The war in Afghanistan is as much about Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and for that matter Russia and China, as it is about Pakistan itself. We desperately need global political vision in developing a strategy there, and generals are not equipped for that.

[researcher]

our current pattern of thought

capitalism

where is it taking us

bankruptcy and wars for profits.

then a society of haves and have nots

most being have nots

most of have nots thinking they well be a have

so goes america

capitalism and patroitism tied together

with communism man exploits man with capitalism it is the other way around

few americans understand those words. very few.

glad you mentioned deming, few in america understood what deming taught.

deming predicted the future of america, ie third world.

[jeff.mowatt]

Steve, I believe your intuition is right. Consider the illustration of the social investment fund network and agency for social enterprise for example, "paid for by ending the war in Iraq and eliminating corporate tax loopholes" according to the Skoll Foundation.

This as a concept for development will be found as a recommendation in a strategy paper which reached the Senate 3 years ago. It was based on a model of social purpose business in which Drucker was one of the major influences. It can be read in the Summary and Conclusions section.

http://en.for-ua.com/analytics/2007/08/09/110003.html

In the founding paper for the model on which this is based, you will find a reference to Post-Capitalist Society, by Peter Drucker. This is the paper which seeded the concept of business with a primary social objective:

http://www.p-ced.com/about/history/

Jeff

[Neopolitan]

A comparison of troops in combat to the production department of a large company is specious reasoning. If you are going to use this ridiculous model, imagine all the machines in the production department exploding or people being wounded by flying debris from "production". Do you think maybe the upper management would come down quickly from the executive offices and take a look at what is happening to the guts of their company? It puts the decision process on fast forward. Winter is coming to Afghanistan and there is no sense of mission urgency in addressing a strategy that the General needs to protect his men. You can't do it from Copenhagen. It has to be done in Washington with all the participants.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Interesting point. A production department which is "exploding" with "people being wounded" is an emergency. Are you saying we are in danger of our Afghan war mission "exploding"?
A contemporary of Drucker's - W. Edwards Deming - once said "If a fire is burning you must, of course, put out the fire." He went on to say that what you re-build after the fire is out must be a *better design* that will not burst into flames again.
I don't think you want Afghanistan to "explode" again after the current "emergency" (as you see it) ends. As Drucker says, "The better we are at doing the wrong thing, the wronger we get."
I believe Obama will "do the right thing", after thinking through this situation **systemically** (not mechanically). "More troops" is a mechanistic, specialized solution that does not consider the other, non-military factors determining Afghanistan's future.

[sherbug]

Why won't you allow the President to make an informed decision? What is it about war that makes certain parts of the male body stand up.

Why are we always fighting somebody who has never done anything to us? The Taliban have not harmed America in anyway. The Iraqis had not harmed us. Yet we invade their countries and destroy it with our bombs and then get all upset because Americans get killed. And you say the remedy to that is to send more Americans to be killed.

There are already 200,000 troops in Afghanistan including the NATO troops. That would seem to be enough troops. If the General needs to protect his men, then he needs to do his job and protect them with a different strategy. Throwing more bodies onto the fire is stupid, stupid and more stupid.

[S1m0n]

Malcolm Gladwell's book Blink has an entire chapter about the failure of Modern Management Theory on the battlefield. Specifically, he discusses the half-billion dollar wargame run by the Pentagon to simulate the invasion of Iraq. In it, retired marine General Paul Van Riper, a firm sceptic of Drucker-style decision-making, repeatedly pwned the Pentagon's planners, causing the simulation to be restarted over and over with Van Riper's actions undone.

At one point he'd 'sunk' 2/3 of the Blue (US) ships in the Persian Gulf within hours of the start of the exercise, a result that would have meant the loss of 20,000 men had it actually occurred.

Luckily for the US, Saddam Hussein didn't have, or didn't trust, any generals as talented as Van Riper, but this exercise does demonstrate the pitfalls of Drucker-style decision-making in war.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

Thanks for the reference to Gladwell's book.
But I want to make sure you understand I'm NOT talking about using modern management theory in planning the execution of the straight-forward invasion of another country (which - as you say - is what the Iraq War was).
I am talking about modern management theory's application to the evaluation of war options when (a) there is no "invasion option" available. (What? Are we going to "take over" Afghanistan?) and (b) when the options we need to consider require more than the application of "force" (which *is* the case in Afghanistan).

[S1m0n]

Fair enough; point taken.

[RobtBrock]

McCrystal will not be making decisions.

[Steven G. Brant - Huffpost Blogger]

I agree, but I'm curious to know why you think so.