President Bush called yesterday's Palestinian election results a "wake up call" for senior Palestinian leadership. Only they didn't know they were sleeping on the ledge of a 10-story building, nor that the morning alarm would come in the form of a swift shove. No one has had the time to fully digest the results, but here are a couple of observations in relation to US policy:
1. Bush's neglect is Hamas' gain - As progressives, we've long criticized Bush for failing to fully engage in the Israel-Palestinian peace process. Team Bush's involvement in pressing peace has been intermittent at best: at first Bush seemed reluctant to wade in where Clinton had tried and failed; later in the Administration Bush was too distracted, mainly by Iraq.
Hamas' victory grows out of this neglect: at the simplest level, if it had reached a settlement with Israel, Fatah would still be in power. More broadly, the US's failure to engage bred a sense of stagnation that fueled popular frustrations with the party. Time passed, and the momentum built up at various points (for example, right after initial combat operations ended in Iraq, and right after the Gaza pullout) repeatedly disintegrated into hopelessness. This is an example of the unwillingness to take more risk has wrought a worse outcome probably worse than a policy tried and failed.
2. US Aid to the PA - The US funnels hundreds of millions a year to the Palestinian Authority. If Hamas takes over key ministries and other functions, this money will go to the hands of a terrorist organization, something Congress has already resolved not to allow. Yet a substantial cut-off in US aid could quickly doom the already precarious PA down.
While we can wait until a new Palestinian government is formed, thereafter we should provide the PA with a list of clear demands - agreed with the Europeans and other major aid donors - that must be met for the monies to continue to flow. These prerequisites would have to include revision of the Hamas charter provision calling for Israel's destruction, a platform the group's leadership has vowed to maintain.
Here Bush can and should call Hamas' bluff: they've run on a platform of delivering social services and basic needs to the population, and making good will require funds. Yet a frightening scenario could involve Hamas responding to a US aid shut off by turning to Iran, Syria or others for support. By turning its back entirely on Hamas, we may risk driving a pragmatic group toward its own worst extremes.
The key to avoiding this worst-case scenario may be getting moderate Arab countries - Jordan and Egypt in particular - to help convince the Hamas-led government that by isolating itself and aligning with Islamists and terrorists they will quickly lose their following among the mostly secular Palestinian population and/or see the Palestinian territories devolve into a failed state. The last thing the Arab countries want is a Palestinian basket case of a partly-born nation on their doorsteps. Jordan and Egypt each have their own domestic Islamist concerns which will complicate any mediating efforts. But still, a unified front consisting of the US, Europe, Russia, and Palestinian neighbors is probably our best bet.