Redefining Success in Iraq

Progressives have for years now offered recommendations for how Iraq could have been better handled at every turn; much of the advice was on-target and could have helped avert the current crisis.
This post was published on the now-closed HuffPost Contributor platform. Contributors control their own work and posted freely to our site. If you need to flag this entry as abusive, send us an email.

While the crux of Bush's argument for increasing US troops in Iraq is utterly unconvincing, he's made at least one point that is valid: those who oppose his plan ought to offer something in its stead. As he put it: "To oppose everything while proposing nothing is irresponsible."

Progressives have for years now offered recommendations for how Iraq could have been better handled at every turn; much of the advice was on-target and could have helped avert the current crisis. But voters are concerned with what their leaders are prepared to do in the here and now to address policy problems, not what they woulda, shoulda, coulda done in the past.

Counter-proposals need to go beyond simply rejecting an escalation in the number of US troops in Iraq. If we're convinced that 17,000 extra troops won't be enough to calm Baghdad, it goes without saying that sustaining current troop levels and strategies is a recipe for continued disaster.

But before alternatives can be proffered, we need first to understand what we're trying to achieve at this late date: with even Bush having finally stopped speaking of "victory" what does success - or even avoidance of total failure - entail? Putting aside why we entered Iraq and what we might have achieved there, what goals are still realistic and worth striving for now. I offer a few for your consideration:

- Preventing Iraq from becoming an unfettered breeding ground for al Qaeda and like groups (to his credit, Bush did propose allocating a portion of the increased troops he's proposing toward this end in Anbar province)

- Preventing Iraq from becoming an enemy of the US - Given the state of our relations with Iraq and Syria, we can ill-afford an out-and-out hostile regime and population in Iraq. This has implications for how we conceive an exit, and how we interpret our moral obligations to the Iraqi people.

- Minimizing American and Iraqi loss of life - Having the political staying power to work toward any other goals in the region will depend on mitigating the ongoing loss of life that has turned the US public so sour on the war. Rising Iraqi casualties are also likely to impede other policy objectives, such as retaining amicable relations with Iraq and fending off al Qaeda.

- Containing the geographic radius of the conflict - Though you'd never know it from the headlines, most of Iraq remains peaceful. Keeping it that way, and confining the conflict to Baghdad, should make it easier to reach a military and political resolution.

- Salvaging American credibility in the region - This is a tough one. While the Administration maintains that any US pullback will spell victory for al Qaeda and its kin, having the US bogged down with heavy troop commitments and scant signs of progress plays right into the hands of Iran. For others to realize that we're prepared to dig in to the point of self-destruction in Iraq may come off not as determination, but rather foolhardiness. As I've said before, by remaining in Iraq (and still more so by escalating) we run the risk that when we do depart, our exit is hastened by events outside our control, such as a Beirut style barracks bombing and mass US casualties. While the Administration argues that any leave-taking will only embolden the US's enemies, the problem will be far worse if we face a tail-between-our-legs, Saigon embassy rooftop style evacuation. Facing up to a tough situation, articulating a redefined notion of success, and then pursuing it doggedly may be our best bet to restore damaged US bona fides in the Mideast.

- Preventing hostile regimes from using the Iraq conflict to their advantage - While everyone agrees on this, there are fundamental rifts about how to do it: Bush is using a tough line, others like Flynt Leverett believe a much more conciliatory approach toward Tehran would do the trick and even enlist the Iranians in helping us in Iraq. My own view is that these are unpredictable regimes, and that an opening for talks with neither preconditions nor high expectations probably makes the most sense.

Popular in the Community

Close

What's Hot