I am not anything close to an expert on Iran, but like anyone else with an interest in how to rehabilitate US foreign policy, I've been reading and thinking more about this rising Persian power in recent months. Its pretty obvious that a resolution that reintegrates Iran into the international system and normalizes relations with the US, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will have to be at the very least sidelined. This is so whether such a rapprochement were to occur prior to the realization of Iran's nuclear ambitions, or afterward as part of an effort to get Iran to behave responsibly as a nuclear power bound by traditional rules of deterrence.
This and many other pieces explain why Ahmadinejad won't be part of the solution. He is a regional power-monger whose appeal is predicated on rejecting any concession to the West. While experts seem to agree that among the most important offerings the US could make in the context of a diplomatic resolution to the Iran standoff is a blanket security guarantee, Ahmadinejad's fiery personae could never abide the idea of Iranian security being beholden to a pledge from Washington. Ahmadinejad's hold on power rests in his revolutionary populism and his fearless willingness to stand up to the US and the world. The minute a diplomatic compromise is reached, his raison d'etre as a leader is destroyed. On the other side, the fear Ahmadinejad has sown in Israel and the West means that even if he were to transform himself in a moderate direction, the rest of the world would never trust it.
While Flynt Leverett and others have made a compelling case that the best resolution to the Iran standoff is a grand diplomatic bargain, Ahmadinejad will need to be jettisoned before such a breakthrough is possible. This doesn't mean that without Ahmadinejad a deal is guaranteed or even likely. Far from it. Anti-Americanism, Islamic radicalism and nuclear aspirations do not stop with Ahmadinejad. But there are longstanding signs that other leaders in Tehran leaven these beliefs with more pragmatic calculations of the country's political and economic interest.
In Iran's convoluted power structure, Ahmadinejad's status as President means less than it would in a Western democracy. Just how much sway and staying power he has are matters of debate. His obsession with bucking international pressure to stem Iran's nuclear program has come at the expense of delivering on promised economic reforms. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini has the power to oust Ahmadinejad, and there are rumors that relations between the two are increasingly strained. Student protesters have decried Ahmadinejad's denunciation of the Holocaust, arguing that it is discrediting Iran. Its hard to know how much to make of these potentially promising signs, but given the alternative of a potential armed conflict, it sure seems worth trying to build on them.
All this speaks to the difference between rogue leaders and rogue states, a distinction that strikes me as warranting more attention and analysis than we've given it.
Make rhetorical distinctions between Ahmadinejad and Iran - As the White House heats up the rhetoric on Iran's role in fomenting violence in Iraq, little effort is made to differentiate between the present regime and the country as a whole, including its population. If our goal is to pry Ahmadinejad away from his support base, that distinction should be drawn (as was done with the Taliban vis-a-vis the people of Afghanistan and for Saddam in relation to Iraq).
Avoiding shoring up Ahmadinejad - We need to avoid steps that buttress Ahmadinejad's hold on power. There's more to it than this, but given the US's unpopularity in the region, its a good bet that the more this looks like a direct standoff between Tehran and Washington, the more that serves Ahmadinejad. Thus the importance of maintaining a measured stance and a united front with Europe and others.
Expand measures that weaken Ahmadinejad - Signs suggest that even the weak sanctions now in place have pinched the Iraqi people and hurt Ahmadinejad's popularity. Thus the impetus to go further. If its true that many Iranians worry that the President's outspoken Holocaust denial is damaging his country's credibility, this can also be played up through more aggressive international repudiation of this discredited stance. But open efforts to discredit Ahmadinejad or pressure Iranians to turn away from him could yield the opposite result.
Work back channels to other leaders - I don't know to what degree back channels with other Iranian leaders like relatively pragmatic Iranian National Security Adviser and nukes chief Ali Larjani are open and active. It was thought for a time that James Baker's meetings in Iran as part of his work on the Iraq Study Group were the beginnings of a second diplomatic track, but the reception afforded Baker's proposals makes that seem unlikely. The Administration's blunt rejection of the proposal to engage Iran to discuss the deteriorating situation in Iraq suggests that such contacts, if happening at all, are deeply buried.
Making clear that the door remains open if Iran is ready to alter course - In the fall the Administration sent several signals - its agreement to lift sanctions to allow for the repair of Iranian civilian aircraft and its decision to leave the package of incentives offered to deter Iran's nuclear program on the table even after Tehran refused it - that showed open-mindedness and a willingness to embrace an Iranian change of heart should one manifest. Of late, the rhetoric has stiffened and no longer seems to speak to those seeking to wring change from within. If more moderate Iranians become convinced Washington is bent on war come what may, they may see little incentive to back more moderate leadership.