As part of its War on Terror the George W. Bush administration offered a new American strategy for the Middle East. Instead of being an honest broker between Arabs and Israelis, a position that to varying degrees all US administrations have tried to occupy since 1948, the Bush administration intended to reshape the region, to topple regimes, to promote democracy and to establish a Pax of sorts.
Having noted that the traditional US policy of seeking regional stability had led to alliances with unpopular Arab regimes, this administration promised to support ideas, concepts and local democrats whatever disorder they might bring. Realists and pragmatists viewed this approach as dangerous, ahistorical and arrogant but the administration seemed sincere. Since the undemocratic regimes in the region are all Arab, the implication of the policy was that the US was going to become an Arab powerbroker. Instead of flying at 35,000 feet and shaping international structures or sending vague messages supported by flexed muscles, we would be on the ground, occupying territory and choosing Shia, Sunni and Kurdish leaders. For a nation whose students, in general, have a hard time learning French let alone Arabic or Farsi and whose knowledge of history is at best Wikipedia, this was a tall order but let that be for the moment. Our president, on our behalf, took on this huge responsibility ostensibly to give young Muslims an alternative to violence, a worthwhile goal to be sure.
Two weeks into Israel's campaign against Hezbollah, the Bush administration appears to be using diplomacy to gain international support for an Israeli occupation of a strip of Southern Lebanon. Perhaps an international force will be created quickly and peace can be made along the border because of an Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah restraint; but it is also possible that the effect of US diplomacy will be to legitimize the re-establishment of an Israeli security zone in Lebanon. In the Cold War, where the main adversary was the Soviet Union, US support for an Israeli border zone could have been done at little cost to US global interests. But now that one of the overarching goals of US policy is the political transformation of the Middle East, it is unclear how supporting the Israeli occupation of additional Arab territory serves our greater objectives in the struggle against Islamic extremism. In fact, it doesn't. Our strategy appears to be incoherent.
Israel's right to self-defense is unquestionable and that country's desire to destroy Hezbollah's missile capability completely understandable. Missiles bought in Iran and lobbed by Hezbollah extremists are terrorizing Haifa. But what the two-week campaign has shown is that Israeli bombs and border attacks are not stopping these Iranian-made rockets or even the shorter range Katyushas. The Israelis are already occupying a strip of Lebanon. How could continuing that occupation make Israel more secure, especially when the danger is from rockets that are fired from further inside Lebanon? The problem is that the Lebanese government is not in control of its own territory and needs international assistance to contain and weaken Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. Expanding Israeli control a few miles into Lebanon will arguably only weaken the hand of the Lebanese government in that greater struggle. What is beyond a doubt, however, is the negative effect that this outcome would have on our longterm interests. If the US is seen to be supporting an Israeli occupation of even one inch of Lebanon, our ability to effect change in the region will sink even lower than it is now, the recruitment of new terrorists will be made even easier and our troops will be in even greater jeopardy in Iraq.