Can We Negotiate With the Taliban?

Since July, when President Hamid Karzai first made public his desire to "talk to the Taliban" there has been hot debate about whether going to the table with glorified thugs would reap any real benefits, or only major negatives.

The US election helped scare up the idea, through GOP allegations that Obama would meet leaders of so-called rogue states without pre-conditions. The thought seemed so horrifying to so many that few were able to qualify what preconditions should be placed on international diplomacy.

As each day brings bleaker news for Afghanistan - last week's research from the International Council on Security and Development suggesting that the Taliban have a permanent presence in 72% of Afghanistan, for example - the possibility of talking with the Taliban seems to be gaining support as an essential step out of the quagmire.

In September, a leaked memo quoted UK Ambassador Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles - "The current situation is bad. The security situation is getting worse. So is corruption and the Government has lost all trust. Our public statements should not delude us over the fact that the insurrection, while incapable of winning a military victory, nevertheless has the capacity to make life increasingly difficult, including in the capital."

The American strategy "is doomed to fail" the memo quotes Cowper-Coles as saying, (The UK foreign office has questioned whether the memo correctly presents Cowper-Coles views).

Notwithstanding ethnic divisions, the popularity of the Taliban is solidifying across Afghanistan partly due to the increasing lawless, crime and corruption. In rural areas, people sometimes speak nostalgically about the 'good bits' of the Taliban days - safe streets, harsh justice for criminals, law and order. Out of desperation people are looking at them with hope, otherwise they might have none.

The United Nations have cautiously suggested that now is the time for the insurgents to meet with other political parties, foreign agencies and Afghan civil societies to explore a political solution out of the war and the grave possibility of a failed state. Further conflict must be avoided, the UN says, lives may be saved, and civil society and rule of law may be the result of successful discussion.

Who besides the Taliban and the government would be part of the discussions? NATO? The United Nations? Iran, Pakistan? Hillary Clinton? All have an interest diplomatically in peace negotiations being successful, but what are their real agendas? Are the motivations of Pakistan, itself riddled with insurgents, the same as those of NATO? Does Iran care what outcome the UN desires?

And can any of them sit with the Taliban? The new administration is a clean slate to most Americans, but can the US sit at a table with Iran, asking them to call for lessons in compromise from Islamists across the Iranian border?

Stalement may be the only outcome. Samina Ahmed of the International Crisis Group is doubtful about holding any discussions at all.

"The problems begin with identifying those who would be involved in a 'new dialogue process.' Afghan civil society is weak at best, and political parties, which have been completely undermined by lack of domestic and international support, are in no position to lobby or feed constructively into national policy formation," she wrote in the Financial Times on July 24. "But it is wishful thinking to assume that negotiating with insurgents from a position of weakness would stabilize Afghanistan. Obviously, the international community wants to get out of Afghanistan as soon as possible, but this is no way to go about it."

This of course begs the question about whether the insurgents would even be prepared to take part in any discussion, in which - at very best - the outcome for them would be considerable concessions. Compromise is not a word that springs to mind when musing on the more pleasant character traits of the Taliban. Harder still to imagine any decision having traction within a widely scattered Talib membership whose violence and inflexible ideology hides its lack of cohesion and highly factional make up of the widely scattered group. Can anyone - even Mullah Omar - make an agreement and have any hope of it sticking?

The Taliban have in the recent past set out conditions for peace. All foreign forces out and strict Sharia law must be imposed. The modern government of Hamid Karzai could not agree to these conditions, little less anyone from civil society, NATO or the United Nations.

So if these are the Taliban's conditions for peace, will they ever come to talk with their sworn enemies? How can you trade concessions and seek compromises in two such "take it or leave it" conditions?

Can you plan for peace in Afghanistan without including the Taliban?

Comments

[ConnecticutEG]

What is the current and future Taliban agenda? Does anyone know anymore?

Religious control of the Afganistan civilization and the poppy and opium market?

Since the troops were sent to Afganistan, the issues have become amorphous. Today,
the news indicates that 30,000 more US troops will be sent to that country next year. The moderate Karzid questions the usefulness of the troop increase in populated areas. Who can define these issues. Karzid perhaps can develop a citizen's action committee to reach out to the various insurgents which does seems unrealistic given the current state things,

One possible solution given the track of the importance of the opium market is hit-up some new-style drug dealers on American streets. The latest developments in trendsetting heroin manufacture in neighborhoods drug communes which have popped-up in the last few years. Maybe we need some citizen's action committees to reach in and get some insight, No doubt Castro could shed some light on the subject . Cubans have a more recent heroin manufacture market,

Analysis of street drug trends: Econ 600

[research]

You don't know until you try.

[DCNINJA]

I was in Helmand province when the British "tried". For their efforts we saw civilians murdered and British soldiers killed.

You can talk all you want to the Taliban, but it will do no good.

[research]

That's Quitter talk!

Really, No group is monolithic.

Talking to them gives the moderates more power,

I don't know you nor have any reason to believe you were in Helmand.

Why don't you link to some reputable blog concerning you contention on the failure of negotiation.

All the published comment from commanders, indicate negotiation works.

[ArmyCentrist]

I don't mean to sound at all prejudiced, but those tribes have a different set of loyalties to "infidels". Breaking your word to an "American occupier" means nothing to them. Talk all you want, they're a clannish bunch, and don't trust us. And we don't really trust them either. Pakistan is starting to get on my nerves, stop hugging the fence with your inaction!

[S1m0n]

Dude, you're the folks throwing matches in Pakistan's fuel dump. When the US gets bored or tired, you're going to go home, leaving Pakistan to get burned. You did it once already when the Soviets pulled out, and it's certain that you will do so again sooner rather than later.

[goozidi]

Human casualties is the cheapest investment with a big return in a war.
If we can not find a reason to go to war, we create excuses for it.

[MagisterLudi]

WE?
Afghanistan conflict
1." We:" Alliance of Afghan tribes; United States. U.K. Germany, France, Canada, Italy Netherlands, Turkey, Poland, Australia, Spain, Denmark, Romania, Sweden, Bulgaria, Belgium, Norway, Czechs.

2. "They:" T-ali-ban; al-Q-ae-da ;Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin ; Lashkar-e-Toiba; Jaish-e-Moha-mmed; Hizbul Muja-hideen; and foreign Ji-ha-dists from all over the word.

The question is: who are YOU with?

[Bonobo]

We shouldn’t be too focused on the Taliban. They are really more of a symptom than a disease. Afghanistan’s real problems are: Poverty, Pakistan, and Pashtu.

Poverty, because it will destabilize any non-totalitarian government, and Pakistan, both for the safe haven issue and ISI meddling.

The Pashtu problem is more subtle. Southern Afghanistan is dominated by the Pashtu tribes, and were and are the primary source of support for the Taliban. During Taliban rule, they were harsh and discriminatory toward the Northern tribes, and, much like the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, both fear and resent these tribes having power (for good reason, in some cases). Unlike the Sunnis in Iraq, they are about half the population, with even more tribespeople across the border in Pakistan. Like the Kurds, they are a nationality without a nation, and not particularly happy about it. Partition may well be the best ultimate solution, as it should have been in Iraq.

[ErikW65]

Thanks. I agree the solution must be comprehensive, and economically feasible. That is, to address the poverty in Afghanistan because no political solution will work that doesn't.

I think that poppy production must be legalized, taxed, and controlled for use as medicine. And no one ever talks about cannabis in Afghanistan, but we know THAT can grow there as well, so maybe that could be an alternate crop.

[Bonobo]

My only concern with this is that the demand (and price) for opiate medicines is a small fraction of the demand for heroin. Some sort of regulated, legalized heroin trade might work. Europe and Russia would have to buy into this. Cannabis is certainly a good alternative, having several other low-tech uses as well.

[AliMB]

excellent insights, especially regarding the pashtun and pakistan problem... but i disagree with your conclusion that partition may be the best solution. Afghanistan is a multiethnic society, and any partition would prove insatisfactory and complicated. also, in terms of US national interests, a partiition could create a fertile ground for power vaccums. the last thing the US and its Western allies want to leave is a weak provinical (in the case of a partition, national) government suseptable to a power vaccum. Thats the kind of condition that invites organized terror. The partition proposal in iraq was ultimately rejected when floated around between the differing sects and political parties, as well as by our commanders. It was called the Biden plan, though now he rejects the notion that he wanted a full partition, merely greater autonomy for the varying provinces. Again, a partition would be messy and unsastificatory to many entities, and thus may only lead to further civil strife. But these are just my opinions. As you mentioned in an earlier comment, any solution re: afghanistan will be difficult and imperfect.­.. Nice discussion.

[Bonobo]

Thank you. You are correct that the Iraqi arabs (but not the Kurds) ultimately rejected partition due to a strong sense of nationalism. This sense of nationalism seems almost entirely absent in Afghanistan, except, weakly, within the Pashtu tribes. There is now a weak (almost nonexistent) government, and a power vacuum, precisely because we are trying to enforce unity across this north-south divide. If the Pashtu had a country of their own, they would almost certainly establish a strong state, albeit rather weak in the human rights department. Strong states with something to lose can be leaned on. Pakistan, now, is approaching failed statehood, and we might actually want a buffer state between them and Northern Afghanistan.

[S1m0n]

Afganistan has never *had* a strong central government, apart from a breif interregnum under the Mughuls a few centuries back. It has been de facto partitioned for millenia.

Trying to pretend--or force, which amounts to the same thing--that afghanistan is a nation-state in the way that other nations are is both futile and dangerous.

[MagisterLudi]

Sure we can negotiate with Taliban. But the results of such negotiations are DIRECTLY tied to the military facts on the ground. Before sitting down with Taliban we should negotiate with Pakistan first.

[ErikW65]

It is an important question to ask, because it's clear that just doing more of the same in Afghanistan is not going to work.

Suppose the majority of Afghans are sick of Karzai, and want to let the Taliban run the place. They have a general election and the Taliban win. Is it possible to negotiate a treaty with the Taliban, such that if they agree not to cooperate with Al Qaeda, not to allow AQ to set up training camps or other activities meant as part of a plan to launch attacks on the US. That's all we really want from Afgh., is not to be attacked here, right? It would take a lot of tolerance on our part because they're intolerant of other religions, and brutal toward women. But could we trade those off, stomach them, for the benefit of safety here, and getting ourselves out of there?

[rudyinbama]

We negotiated with the Taliban, sent them foreign aid while they stripped women of their rights, and as gratitude, they gave us 9-11.
The return of the Taliban would mean victory for Osama Bin Laden, a one-term presidency for Barack Obama, and Republicans majorities in the House and Senate.

[ThousandDaysRedJasmine]

Unfortunately the word is "NO". We may not, but they consider this a fight to the death, and their sworn commitment is to kill, defeat, subdue the enemy. In whatever way or fashion and with whatever means necessary. From their perspective, negotiations = weakness and a vulnerable point to consider an attack. They will use whatever they gain in "negotiations" to more certainly subdue their enemy. To think otherwise is, again unfortunely, foolish (and deadly). Lock and load.

[Very Berry]

I think this is a very interesting sitaution, well laid out in the article, as I am unsure what my view is on this. War means negoaitating for peace so it seems inevitable but was can deliver and win-win situation for everyone and especially the people of Afghanistan.

[OkieMon]

the more important question is whether we can bribe the taliban?

[RonMar]

Cute word choice - "quagmire.­" If Afghanistan is indeed a quagmire the last time we were in a quagmire was the Southeast Asia War brought to us by JFK and LBJ. And no one in the region attacked us on our home turf.

Before that we had the Korean War under HST, and again we were not attacked on our home turf.

Since then we have had Bosnia and Kosovo under Clinton. We still have troops in Bosnia and Kosovo serving with NATO and none of those countries attacked us on our home turf or a U.S. ally.

So much for the Presidents and political parties that have gotten the U.S. into quagmires, even without an attack on the U.S.

[SoutheastReview]

For just a tad of historical perspective, folks might consider Mary Shelley's "Frankenst­ein." The monster is wont to kill its maker, or vice-versa. Since elements of the U.S. government were instrumental in the creation and subsequent fostering of the Taliban, as a way of playing the 'Great Game' in Central Asia against the Soviets, the issue of 'negotiation' is at best disingenuous, not to mention quite risky.

The only questions of import for U.S. citizens include the following. One: "Will U.S. officials assume some responsibility for the 'terrorists' that they created?" Two: "Will U.S. citizens be willing to insist that their voices, in addition to the perspectives of neo-con, proto-fascist, and other 'practical' stakeholders, be a part of the mix of ideas about how to proceed from here?" Three: "Will U.S. citizens be willing to join with real communities in the affected regions of the world to insist that the process become one of instituting democracy, instead of finding the most opportune path to advance corporate and other imperial interests?"

As is the case with all truly pertinent interrogatories, inquiring minds want to know.

[AliMB]

The US did not create the Taliban; that is a myth. The Taliban began in roughly 1993, long after the US had stopped operations in Afghanistan. The US openly supported the Mujahadeen, which is distinct from the Taliban. Second, currently the Taliban is fighting NATO forces, thus I’m not sure how negotiations are disingenuous. Regarding your questions: US officials would never assume responsibility for terrorists they created (think of the political costs); though I’m not sure which terrorists they helped create. Maybe you can argue for a domino effect i.e. that a certain American policy spawned terrorism, but I think that would be a stretch. Two: I think different voices are part of the mix of ideas on how to precede in Afghanistan. Could you please indicate which voices and policy options you refer to? If you are talking about the ultra-left position (a full withdrawal), I think it has been considered but has no political support. Three: the US does join with real communities in Afghanistan to institute democracy. There are several grassroots and international development projects underway in all parts of the country. Their success has been limited by under-funding and a lack of security; which needs to change. I'm not sure USAID helping to build a water sewage system constitutes imperial interests. If it is important for you, there are plenty of civilian jobs available for work in Afghanistan, not just with government -related organizations but also international NGOs.

[Bonobo]

Many Mujahadeen became Taliban, or allied with them, in possession of resources America gave the to fight the Soviets, and by not stepping into the power vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal, created conditions favorable to the formation of the Taliban. The Bush Administration was sort of attempting to atone for American responsibility for the situation, but messed it up badly with their signature bumbling and corruption. Afghanistan is not a hopeless situation, but neither will it be cheap. And then there's the Pakistan Problem.

[SoutheastReview]

Your assertions miss the mark. The "Economist" noted in Autumn 2001, " [U.S.] policies in Afghanistan ... helped to create both Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that shelters him."

"Afghanistan, the CIA, bin Laden, and the Taliban," by Phil GasperIn, also contributes clarity. "(T)he Taliban... .came from madrassas set up by the Pakistani government­... funded by the U.S., Britain, and the Saudis... . Thousands of young men-refugees ...from the war in Afghanistan-became foot soldiers of this movement."

Pamela Mewes wrote("Rocinante," Santiago, Chile; 10/01--just after the 28th anniversary of the CIA's 9/11/73 mass murder there), "Taliban success ... led American and Pakistani intelligence services..­. to see the Taliban as the force for pacification they (wanted). ...(A)rmed to the teeth with ... modern weapons and ... ample financial support... (they)eventually captur(ed) Kabul", and took over Afghanistan. "World Press Review" reprinted Mewes' work, which noted "that the Taliban, favorites of CIA and Pakistani intelligence ... end(ed) up ... bitter enemies of (ours)."

As to blithe dismissal of my questions, an apt retort is to ask what 'terrorist organizations' the United States has not helped to create. Using 'leftist' labels to reject citizen democracy followed by kowtowing to corporate heavyweights and their governmental proxies at USAID evades what I am asking. The core issue for concerned citizens is to countenance responsibility for changing current political paradigms, unless what we want is a combination of endless war and endless terror.

[DocRichard]

All wars end in talks. At one extreme, the talks are between victors and defeated. At the other extreme, both sides realise that they cannot win. Between these two extremes there is a spectrum, where negotiations take place, and the negotiations will be conditioned by the relative strength of each party.

At the moment the Taleban are in a pretty strong position.

This can position would change if the Taleban were to be cut off from their main source of funding - the opium crop. Someone, preferably the UN, should buy the Afghan opium crop from the farmers and pass it to the WHO, who will turn it into medical morphine and heroin, and channel it securely to medical services in developing countries. There it will be used to relieve the suffering of millions of cancer and AIDS patients, who at present usually die after weeks or months of agony.

The arguments presented by our Governments against this game plan are not convincing.

[SeanOcali]

Why on earth is the a debate over "can we negotiate" with such and such. There should never be a debate about this. Negotiation should always be on the table. What if, for example, we negotiate a deal where we say we're sorry to that Taliban and in exchange they all commit group suicide to become martyrs. Would anyone have a problem with that?

[JimReed]

Our reason for going uninvited into Afganistan was we were going after Bin Laden because the Taliban was too slow in immediately turning him over to us. When we had him pinned down, we paused to get more troops into the region, and directed our army into another richer country. I don't think we can legitimately say now we are downsizing in Iraq, so we are going after Bin Laden again. We can't claim any right to be there, and the Taliban can since it is their country. There is nothing to negotiate. We should leave because we don't belong there, and we can't justify our presence by saying our puppet government there wants us for protection.