Losing Ground: Taliban Cover 97% of Afghanistan: Report

New research indicates that 80% of Afghanistan now has a permanent Taliban presence and that 97% of the country has "substantial Taliban activity."

The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) has followed the movement of the Taliban throughout Afghanistan since 2007, by tracking third party public daily reports of incidents that indicate Taliban presence. Presence is defined by: "(An) average of one (or more) insurgent attacks (lethal and non-lethal) per week."

Even with this new data outlining a 97% presence, ICOS President Ms. Norine McDonald QC told the Huffington Post that she believes that figure is "conservative".

"It's bad numbers and bad news," says MacDonald. "They (the Taliban) have the momentum, their strategies and tactics are working, and ours are not. ... it's not a question of where they are operating, it's more a question of where they are not."

Combined with instability and uncertainty after the August 20 elections, allegations of wide scale electoral fraud and an alarming increase in violence and deaths, the new research further emphasizes the deterioration in Afghanistan.

Historically the north of Afghanistan has enjoyed a relative stability and little insurgent activity. The new ICOS data shows that the northern provinces of Kunduz and Balkh are "heavily affected by Taliban violence" and across the entire north there has been a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks.

MacDonald says that the increasing Taliban presence in the north is alarming and without "simple explanation" although a combination of factors, such as potential access to American supply chains, relatively good roads and a less dynamic NATO presence, could be contributing factors.

When ICOS has released their "presence reports" in the past, they have been dismissed by NATO and international diplomats. However, given the lack of any other published material, ICOS research is the only available indicator for the public to rely on. "There are no official public NATO, UN or Afghan government maps that reflect the situation," says MacDonald. "If they have maps they are not making them public. Nor (are they) refuting our methodology with another one that they suggest is a more credible way of judging the situation."

Top US Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is thought to be lobbying heavily for more combat troops. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, influential Democrat Carl Levin said Thursday he would not support sending more combat troops to Afghanistan unless there were steep improvements in the training and capabilities of Afghanistan's own army and police.

Comments

[S1m0n]

It's time for a new rule: if we have to win hearts and minds to win, that's a country we shouldn't be in at all.

[NCAV2]

It's time for us to face the fact that the Afghan people would rather have the Taliban in power than the foreigners in their country.

[dems08]

The time to get out of the 'war business' and into the 'reconstruction business' in Afghanistan is
NOW!

[S1m0n]

It's not all that much of a question, surely.

Every invasion of Afghanistan ends this way, unless like Alexander and the Moghuls the invaders have had the presence of mind to hurriedly declare victory and keep right on going.

The big question is how the US managed to convince itself that the inevitible WOULDN'T come to pass this time, despite the 2,500 years of history to the contrary. That degree of wishful thinking & willful blindness doesn't come cheap.

~~

Think about it. The Soviets had an army of occupation several times the size of the present NATO forces*, had the short, easy supply lines of a next-door war, were coming to the aid of an existing, functional government, had a great deal of experience in the region and with similar cultures, and a great deal fewer qualms about committing massacres and atrocities.

And they couldn't make it stick, either. That's the kind of precedent that should made the pentagon's planners very, very, nervous.

The US would have been far wiser to follow Rumsfeld's initial strategy fo using the warlords as mercenaries, spanked al Qaeda, and then wrangled a UN-designated peacekeeping mandate for the Pakistani army. And then got the hell out.


*And armed with similar technology.

[evenso]

Al-Qaida attacked us on 9-11 not the Taliban. Could we offer the Taliban a deal, let them rule, but keep Al-Qaida out?

[SNusbaumer]

There are a lot of unanswered questions about this war, such as should we be fighting the Taliban, if so how should we be fighting them, but one thing seems clear: what our military is doing is not working. This means that soon it will be decision time: send more troops or not?

As Obama looks in the mirror, who he sees today is Lyndon Johnson. The outcome does not necessarily have to be the same, with a promising domestic agenda destroyed by a foreign war, although the outcome might be the same.

Decision time is quickly approaching.