Egypt is back to square one, with the military grabbing center stage again
through a coup in all but name. This came just two-and-a-half years after
mass protests toppled President Hosni Mubarak in a popular uprising that
rejected a security-dominated autocracy and the military's behind-the-scenes
central role in politics. The military owes its return and the prospect of regaining
ts key role in Egyptian politics to the missteps of ousted President
Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood government -- the very force with
whom it was at odds for the past six decades.
Morsi came to office after more than a year of transitory military rule that the
armed forces bungled with its inept, post-revolt attempts to preserve as much as
possible the old autocratic system and its perks and privileges: control of national
security; an independent relationship with the United States that funds it to the
tune of $1.3 billion a year; rejection of civilian oversight and autonomy for its
commercial empire that accounts for at least ten percent of Egypt's gross national
Legitimacy versus endorsement
History will remember Morsi less as Egypt's first post-revolt, democratically-elected
president than as a failed leader who thwarted the achievements of the
popular uprising's goals and strengthened by default the military's grip on politics,
while presiding over an economy that was already in stark decline following the
revolt that overthrew Mubarak. He also severely tarnished Saudi Arabia and
Qatar's support for Islamists across the Middle East and North Africa, and
demonstrated that the Brotherhood, despite being one of the world's largest
and best organized Islamist movements, has a long way to go before it is
ready for government.
Morsi's failure is much the result of opposition and resistance by key state
institutions -- the military, the security forces, and the judiciary -- to the rise of
the Brotherhood. Morsi's decision to run for office, contrasting starkly with the
Brotherhood's initial reluctance to join the anti-Mubarak uprising, broke its early
promises not to seek a post-revolt majority in parliament or field a candidate for
Morsi's insistence to the bitter end that he was a legitimately-elected leader
reflected the same majoritarian interpretation of democracy displayed by Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his response last month to mass protests.
Both Morsi and Erdogan's failure to adopt inclusive policies alienated a significant
portion of the population. But unlike Erdogan, Morsi failed to realize that he had lost
the second ingredient of legitimacy alongside electoral victory: a recognition by those
that had not voted for him that he was the country's elected leader.
Morsi's political demise has far-reaching consequences for Egypt as well as the Middle
East and North Africa:
• The military will remain a key force free of civilian control and with a significant
political and economic power base even if newly-appointed President Adly
Mansour moves immediately towards free and fair elections. The reinstatement of
Mubarak's attorney general, the rounding up of hundreds of Muslim Bothers in the
wake of the coup, and the prosecutor's investigation of Morsi on charges of
'insulting the presidency' suggest that the military sees its intervention as an
opportunity to shape Egypt in its mold. It raises the question of the role of the
military in future anti-autocratic struggles in the Middle East and North Africa.
• As Egypt ventures into uncharted waters, the military would do well to look
towards Southeast Asia where retired military officers in countries like the
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar successfully managed their
countries' transition to democracy. Those officers understood that their interests
were best protected by getting in front of the cart rather than seeking to salvage
what they could of a failed system that lacked popular support. That is a
recognition that has yet to be accepted by Egypt's armed forces as well as other
• The coup reinforces a widespread sentiment among Islamists that, in the words
of Morsi's national security adviser Essam al-Haddad, "democracy is not for
Muslims." It risks the radicalization of Islamists across the region who may see
the ousting of Morsi as evidence that the Brotherhood's strategy of working within the
system is doomed to failure. There is little short of releasing detained Brothers,
lifting the ban on Islamist media and immediate free and fair elections in which the
Brotherhood will be allowed to compete unhindered that will counter the
Islamists' sense of disenfranchisement.
That sense of disenfranchisement is reinforced by the repression of the Brothers by
Egypt's three previous presidents -- Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Mubarak;
the 1991 abortion of Algerian elections to prevent the victorious Islamists from taking
office, thus sparking a brutal civil war; the soft coup against Turkish Islamist Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan in the late 1990s; and the Western boycott of Gaza
following the electoral triumph of Hamas.
• The intervention of the military strengthens Saudi Arabia in its rivalry with Qatar for
influence in the region. Saudi Arabia, backed by the United Arab Emirates,
cemented its regional predominance by assuring the Egyptian military that it would
step in if the United States cut off its $1.3 billion annual aid to the armed forces
or if Qatar, the Brotherhood's main backer, reduced its $5 billion support to the
government during Morsi's tenure. The intervention was Qatar's second regional
setback as the country seeks to stamp its own influence in the Middle East. Similarly
the supply by Saudi Arabia of non-US surface-to-air missiles to Syrian rebels -
endorsed by the U.S. -- was from the kingdom's perspective designed to strength
the resistance to President Bashar al-Assad as well as to weaken the
Brotherhood's Syrian wing supported by Qatar.
The Egyptian military intervention constitutes a watershed that is fraught with danger and
likely to reverberate throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The absence of a
reformist wing in Arab militaries comparable to those in Southeast Asia will complicate the
region's transition from autocracy to a more open, transparent and accountable polity.
James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University and the co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg and the author of the blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.