Economic sanctions are coward's war. They do not work but are a way inwhich rich elites feel they are "committed" to some distant struggle". As aform of aggression they enjoy lasting appeal to politicians because theycost them nothing and are rhetorically macho. They embody the spirit of"something must be done," the last refuge of stupidity in foreign policy.
The African Commonwealth and international communities havebolstered, flattered and cosseted Robert Mugabe's one-party state inZimbabwe for a quarter of a century -- including an early slaughter of theNdebele far worse than anything perpetrated last month. Only now that thedictatorship has become blatant does this cosseting look tasteless.
Champions of economic sanctions can find hardly a shred of evidencein their favour, as indicated in the celebrated 1999 congressional evidenceof Richard Haass of Brookings. He was reduced to admitting that they were a"blunt instrument that often produces unintentional and undesirableconsequences."
Their first use in modern times, against Italy over Abyssinia in 1935,crashed the lira but did not free the Abyssinians. America's most ferocioussanctions drove Cuba into the arms of Russia and came near to precipitatinga nuclear exchange. They cemented Castro in power to this day.
The same uselessness was seen in action against Russia, Poland,Rhodesia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Iraq and Iran. Subjecting a politicaleconomy to external siege leads to consequences. It enforces a commandeconomy, in which the rulers keep what they want for themselves, skimmingevery deal and corrupting every transaction. It made Saddam Hussein thesixth richest man in the world, as it enriched the Taliban warlords, theBurmese generals and Robert Mugabe.
Sanctions over time destroy the mercantile, managerial andprofessional class, the rootstock of opposition to totalitarian government.They push power into the hands of brute force. The withdrawal of tradecloses factories, farms and mines and can only debilitate the politicaleffectiveness of those dependent on them. More people must rely on statehandouts, that is on the regime.
Disinvestment transfers local assets to the ruler's cronies andprevents foreign traders from ameliorating the condition of the people. InSouth Africa, sanctions tore up the international code of practice enjoinedon foreign firms. The recent evolution of "smart sanctions", supposedlyaimed at the rich, indicates the absurdity of "dumb" ones.
Rhodesian sanctions created a command economy that supported thewhite regime for a decade. This was after Wilson, the British primeminister, predicted the rebel downfall in "weeks not months". Suchfoolishness still rules in London.
Enthusiasts regularly cite South Africa, for the simple reason thatit was sanctioned and its government eventually fell, as if the one led tothe other. I reported this process for a decade in the 1980s and found thevarious embargos counter-productive. I was guided by such anti-apartheidactivists as Desmond Tutu and Helen Suzman, who dismissed sanctions as aliberal feel-good gesture that would merely putting miners and farm-workersout of jobs. (Tutu later changed his mind under pressure from Americansanctions lobbyists.)
South African sanctions, starting with that most fatuous ofgestures, a sports boycott, led to a burst of white entrepreneurship andimport substitution. The arms manufacturer, Armscor, has to direct itsinvestment to counter-insurgency and fast became a world leader in the(illegal) export of field weapons. Indeed the best thing to be said forsanctions was that they postponed majority rule while a new generation ofblacks were educated and advanced, as firms realised apartheid was comingto an end.
Those churchmen who regularly cry for this form of economicaggression, cannot be aware of the implications. They seem to regard it asclean and anti-capitalist, a phantom revolution, a pacifist path topolitical change.
In almost every case sanctions make the evil richer and moresecure, and the poor poorer. What have they done for the Burmese or theCubans? It was war that brought change, albeit chaos, to Iraq andAfghanistan after sanctions had failed. It was war that upheaved Nicaragua,Rhodesia and Serbia. South Africa was transformed not by sanctions but bythe collapse of the moral coherence of Afrikanerdom, leading to an orderlytransfer of power. It is arrogant for outsiders to claim any part in thatremarkable process.
The only clear-cut case of a sanction working was America'ssabotage of sterling during the 1956 Suez crisis. It was instantlyeffective, because Britain was a democracy whose government knew it couldnot stay in office with a collapsing currency. This is the true sanctionsparadox: to be susceptible to such pressure a state must have a responsivegovernment, but then such a government should not need sanctioning.
The dictionary definition of the word is "a specific penaltyenacted in order to enforce obedience to the law." It is fine for MallochBrown to sit in a London television studio and talk the pseudo-enforcementtalk of "the game is changing" and "upping the repertoire of sanctions".This will not enforce obedience to any law.
Only invasion would do that but invasion, in this post-Iraq age, isrightly considered a step too far. So instead we pretend. We toss gesturesthat will not bring about Mugabe's downfall, only make the poor less ableto resist his thugs. And all so we can feel better for a day.